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History of Formation of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
18300406 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
14 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by D. Gulyev, director of the Institute of Party History under the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, a branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee; doctor of historical sciences: "From the Positions of Internationalism; On the History of Formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in the Azerbaijan SSR"]

[Text] Perestroyka has enlivened an increased public interest in the problems of history of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, since the experience of history serves as an effective factor in the struggle for implementing the strategic course of our party. Getting to know the past with all its dialectical contradictions allows us to better delve into the essence of the complex phenomenon of current social reality and to find the optimal means of solving the immediate problems which have arisen at the current breakthrough period in the country's development, problems which have found their specific expression in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

One of the problems whose current nature is illuminated by the events which are occurring today is the question of the conditions, reasons, and history of creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in the Azerbaijan SSR. The article which is submitted for the reader's attention was prepared on the basis of an in-depth study and a thorough analysis of the historical sources, party and government documents. Its goal is to provide answers to the questions posed by the general public of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the other fraternal republics comprising the Soviet multi-national state.

The formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR was done in the course of the realization of CPSU Leninist national policy and in accordance with the Leninist principles of national-state formation of the USSR. In resolving this question, the party proceeded from the program requirement of oblast autonomy which was developed and deeply substantiated by V. I. Lenin.

The works of V. I. Lenin and the party resolutions stressed the need for broad oblast autonomy and totally democratic local self-government. They also formulated the basic principles for defining the boundaries of autonomous self-governing territories:

- a) the democratic resolution of the question from below, by means of expressing the will of the local population itself;
- b) the consideration of economic and domestic conditions, national make-up of the population, etc.

Thus, the Bolsheviks did not put the national make-up of the population in first place. This factor had to be considered along with more important factors—economic, social and others taken together in dialectic unity.

In resolving the question regarding the formation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its place in the developing structure of the Soviet multi-national state, the following indisputable fact was taken into consideration. The Karabakh on the whole, including its upper and lower parts, had long been formed into a single region with inviolable economic, social, and administrative-political ties and with common historical fates, living conditions and cultural development.

Being an age-old Azerbaijan land, Nagorno Karabakh was organically tied in an economic sense with the rest of Azerbaijan and acted as a component part of the capitalistic system of economic management which had developed in Azerbaijan. The destruction of these ties would have created serious hardships in the matter of restoring the national economy and laying the foundation of a socialist economy.

The working peasantry, who comprised the main mass of the oblast's population, had a vital interest in the retention of Nagorno Karabakh within the make-up of Soviet Azerbaijan. They received favorable possibilities for resolving the land question, since Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, had significant, partially open, land areas. Moreover, conditions were created for absorbing the excess labor resources thanks to the presence of the major industrial center of Baku, whose oil-fields and construction employed many workers who had come from Nagorno Karabakh. Baku and the other cities of Azerbaijan were also the place where the oblast's peasants came in the seasonal lay-off period. Armenia at that time could not have provided all this, since it had not yet attained serious industrial development and had been bankrupted during the years of the infamous Dashnak rule.

The ties with the proletarian Baku and the influence of the steadfast detachment of Lenin's party—the Baku Bolshevik Organization—had an important significance for the socio-political fate of Nagorno Karabakh, for the formation and development of the liberation and revolutionary movement there, and for the growth of class and political self consciousness and organization of the workers.

The friendship and unity of the multi-national population of Karabakh, the Azerbaijanis from the lowlands and the Armenians from the highlands portion of the region, became ever more strongly tempered in the fire of the struggle against the servile minions of world imperialism, who had managed to seize power in the Transcaucasus in spite of the will of the peoples living here. Despite the efforts by the Musavati rulers and

Dashnak adventurists to sow international dissension, the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians gave each other comprehensive mutual aid and defense.

All this led to the fact that at the referendum held in 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh peasantry unanimously voted in favor of leaving the oblast as part of Azerbaijan.

Even in the period of the ignominious rule of the mercenary hirelings of world imperialism in the Transcaucasus, despite the efforts of the Musavatists and the Dashnaks to alienate the Azerbaijani and the Armenian workers and to use the "Karabakh question" as a means of inciting an international conflict, the population of Nagorny Karabakh spoke out decisively in favor of leaving the kray within the boundaries of Azerbaijan. This was reported by A. I. Mikoyan on 22 May 1919 in his speech to the RCP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee and to V. I. Lenin: "The Dashnaks, agents of the Armenian government, are striving to achieve annexation of the Karabakh to Armenia. However, for the population of Karabakh this would mean losing the source of their life, Baku, and tying themselves with Yerevan, with which they never had any ties. At the 5th Congress, the Armenian peasantry also decided to recognize and join Soviet Azerbaijan." S. M. Kirov reported on A. I. Mikoyan's speech to V. I. Lenin in a telegram sent 3 June 1919 (S. M. Kirov. Articles, Speeches, Documents, Vol I, 1936, p 143-145).

The question of the fate of Nagorny Karabakh and its Armenian population and of the position of the kray under conditions of the Soviet order, required optimal resolution together with the birth of the Azerbaijan SSR and later the other Soviet socialist republics in the Transcaucasus. Already soon after the victory of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, in June of 1920, when counterrevolutionary, anti-popular, pro-imperialist governments of the Dashnaks and Mensheviks remained in power in Armenia and Georgia, the following telegram bearing the signature of G. K. Ordzhonikidze was sent to RSFSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin: "Soviet rule has been proclaimed in Karabakh and Zangezura, and the above-mentioned territories consider themselves to be a part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, f. 85, op. 13, sec. 32, p. 3).

The speech on the state of affairs in Karabakh was presented at a meeting of the ACP(b) [Azerbaijan Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee Buro on 10 July 1920. The speech directly stated the opinion of the Karabakh communists regarding the need for annexing Karabakh to Azerbaijan "due to the economic conditions closely tying Karabakh with Azerbaijan." This point of view, as recorded in the meeting protocol, reflected the sentiments of the peasant masses.

On 29 November 1920, Soviet rule was victorious in Armenia. This event was a turning point in the historical fates of the Armenian people, an outstanding landmark in the mutual relations of the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, and an affirmation of their unity and friendship. V. I. Lenin fervently greeted the victory of Soviet rule in Armenia, and stated in a telegram addressed to Chairman of the Armenian Revolutionary Military Committee S. I. Kasyan: "I bring greetings to you as the representative of labor Soviet Armenia, which has been liberated from the oppression of imperialism. I have no doubt that you will make every effort to establish fraternal solidarity between the workers of Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 42, p 54).

The victory of the workers of Armenia, who became the masters of their land, evoked great joy and jubilation among the fraternal Azerbaijani people. The very next day—on 30 November—there was a joint meeting of the ACP(b) Central Committee Politburo and Orgburo. Some of the participants of this meeting were M. D. Guseynov, V. G. Yegorov, G. N. Kaminskiy, A. G. Karayev, M. B. Kasumov, N. N. Narimanov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Sarkis (S. A. Ter-Danielyan), Ye. D. Stasova, and A. P. Serebrovskiy. The resolution charged N. N. Narimanov with compiling and publicizing the Declaration of the Soviet Government of Azerbaijan. The basic positions of this political act were also formulated here: "Point out that there are no boundaries existing between Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia... The Nagorny portion of Karabakh is given the right of self-determination. Soviet Azerbaijan concludes an inviolable military and economic union with Soviet Armenia (specify oil)".

The Declaration of the Azrevkom [Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee], which was proclaimed by N. N. Narimanov on 1 December 1920 at the ceremonial meeting of the Baku Soviet dedicated to the victory of Soviet rule in Armenia, had principle significance for bringing the workers of Azerbaijan and Armenia together on a common platform of the affirmed Soviet rule, as well as for the fate of Nagorny Karabakh. Permeated with the spirit of proletarian internationalism, the Declaration triumphantly stated: "Soviet Azerbaijan, coming to the aid of the fraternal Armenian working people in their struggle against the rule of the Dashnaks, who have and are continuing to spill the innocent blood of our closest comrades—the communists within the confines of Armenia and Zangezur, proclaims that henceforth no territorial questions can become the cause for mutual bloodshed of the two peoples who have been neighbors for centuries—the Armenians and the Muslims."

"Moreover," the Declaration further stated, "Soviet Azerbaijan opens wide the gates to its inexhaustible riches to Soviet Armenia: oil, kerosene and other products which Soviet Azerbaijan possesses."

"These riches, which were extracted by the plunderers of world imperialism, for whose sake bloody orgies were held on the territory of the Transcaucasus, henceforth become the property of the workers of Russia, Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia who, joining together in close ranks, will pursue the final defeat of the yoke of world capitalism.

"Long live the fraternal union of the workers of Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan!"

In accordance with the Leninist principles of Communist Party national policy, the Declaration stated that "the working peasantry of Nagorny Karabakh is given the full right of self-determination."

A. Bekzadyan greeted the ceremonious meeting in the name of the Revkom [Revolutionary Committee] of Soviet Armenia. Also speaking at the meeting were G. K. Ordzhonikidze, first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, G. N. Kaminskiy, and Mikhaylov from the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Red Army.

In his speech, G. K. Ordzhonikidze said: "Soviet Azerbaijan as represented by Comrade Narimanov has proven to the entire world, and primarily to the workers and peasants of Armenia, that only Soviet rule is capable of resolving all the accused questions associated with international hatred which existed here and is widespread throughout the world... Muslims and Armenians—henceforth these workers are becoming brothers under the Red Banner of Soviet rule. This statute, read here, is a statute of utmost importance. It is a historic statute which is unprecedented in the history of mankind."

The resolution unanimously adopted by the meeting stated: "The ceremonious meeting of the Baku Soviet and the Azrevkom, along with all the workers' and Red Army organizations, notes the fact of victory of the Soviet revolution in Armenia with a sense of genuine proletarian joy, greets and wholeheartedly approves the historic Declaration proclaimed by Comrade Narimanov. This Declaration, which puts aside once and for all the age-old international strife and bloody wars between Armenia and the Muslim world, opens up a new page of happy life in the history of the peoples of the Transcaucasus and the entire East." (The Declaration was published in the newspapers KOMMUNIST, 2 December 1920; BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 3 December 1920, and others.)

The RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo [Caucasus Buro], subsequently the party Zakkaykrom [Transcaucasus kray committee], and the Azerbaijan CP(b) Central Committee thoroughly studied the question of the status of Nagorny Karabakh within the make-up of the Azerbaijan SSR, giving consideration to the opinion of the local population.

Thus, on 27 June 1921, the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the ACP(b) Central Committee discussed the question "On the boundaries of Azerbaijan with Armenia." The resolution pointed out that the resolution of this question must consider "the unconditional economic gravitation of Nagorny Karabakh toward Azerbaijan." In connection with this, "from the standpoint of administrative and economic expediency," it is impossible to separate the areas from each other according to the national indicator (Party Archives, Azerbaijan Branch, Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, f. 1, op. 74, sec. 123, p. 64).

The principle resolution of the question occurred on 4 and 5 July 1921 at the meetings of the RCP(b) Central Committee Caucasus Buro Plenum, in which the following Kavburo members participated: S. M. Kirov, F. I. Makharadze, A. F. Myasnikov, A. I. Nazaretyan, N. N. Narimanov, M. D. Orakhelashvili, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Yu. P. Figatner, as well as RCP(b) Central Committee member I. V. Stalin, Azerbaijan SSR People's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs M. D. Guseynov, Kavburo Komsomol Secretary Breytman, and Georgian CP Central Committee members Tsintsadze, Mdivani and Svanidze.

The question of the territorial affiliation of Nagorny Karabakh evoked serious disagreement at the meeting of the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo Plenum held on 4 July 1921. Because of this, the Kavburo decided to leave the final resolution of this question to the RCP(b) Central Committee.

The next day, 5 July 1921, the Central Committee Kavburo Plenum, taking into consideration the opinion of the RCP(b) Central Committee, adopted the following resolution: "Based on the need for national peace between the Muslims and the Armenians, the economic ties between upper and lower Karabakh, and its permanent ties with Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh will remain within the confines of the Azerbaijan SSR, having broad oblast autonomy with its administrative center in the city of Shusha, which is part of the autonomous oblast."

In accordance with this, the ACP(b) Central Committee was ordered to define the boundaries and the scope of autonomy of Nagorny Karabakh and to present its recommendations for ratification by the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo (Party Archives, Azerbaijan Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 64, op. 2, sec. 1, pp 118, 121-122).

The opinion of the masses on this question was studied again and again. Thus, on 1 August 1921 in the settlement of Kendkhurt, an extraordinary congress of the Councils of Shyshinskiy District 2nd sector was held. Levon Isayevich Mirzoyan participated in this congress. The meeting protocol stated: "The Congress is taking up the discussion of the Karabakh question. Comrade L. Mirzoyan is the speaker. The comrade announces that

the question is not being presented for discussion officially, but merely for the purpose of becoming acquainted with the opinion of the peasantry. Comrade Mirzoyan maintains that from an economic, spiritual, political and national standpoint, Karabakh is closely tied with the center of Azerbaijan (Baku). These factors already predetermine the question of the political formation to which we must relate Karabakh... The comrade considers quite correct and expedient the resolution of the Transcaucasus Committee on making the Nagorny section into a specific administrative unit, which would be directly subordinate to the Center (Baku). Comrade Mirzoyan considers this measure to be fully sufficient to eliminate any possibility of national oppression and to create conditions of cultural development of the Nagorny section's population."

For the practical work on implementing the autonomy of Nagorny Karabakh, by resolution of the ACP(b) Central Committee, a Central Commission on the Affairs of Nagorni Karabakh was created, comprised of S. M. Kirov, T. K. Mirzabekyan, A. M. Karakozova, as well as a Committee on the Affairs of Nagorni Karabakh under the chairmanship of A. M. Karakozov.

The legislative ratification of the status of Nagorny Karabakh as an autonomous oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR was implemented on 7 July 1923 by the decree of the AzTSIK [Azerbaijan SSR Central Executive Committee] entitled "On the formation of the autonomous oblast of Nagorni Karabakh."

The AzTSIK resolved: "To form from the Armenian part of Nagorni Karabakh an autonomous oblast as a component part of the Azerbaijan SSR, with its center in the settlement of Khandendy." Soon after that (in September of 1923), by resolution of the Karabakh party obkom, Khandendy was renamed Stepanakert in perpetuation of the memory of S. G. Shaumyan and other Baku commissars.

In August of 1923 a referendum was held in Nagorni Karabakh. Reporting on its results, Karabakh Party Obkom Secretary Sero Manutsyan announced to the ACP(b) Central Committee on 12 October 1923: "The act of autonomy has been greeted by the peasants with total unanimity... The peasants in their mass resolutions greeted autonomy and Soviet rule" (Party Archives, Azerbaijan Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 1, op. 125, sec. 327, p 24).

The measures implemented by the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the republic's government made it possible to create in November 1923 the first (constituent) Congress of the Soviets of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The TSIK [Central Executive Committee] of the autonomous oblast was elected at this congress.

Already the first steps in the implementation of soviet national-state construction, whose important landmarks were the creation of autonomous Nagorni Karabakh and

Nakhichevani, bore their fruit and opened even broader perspectives for their progressive development. This fact was noted in the speech presented by the chairman of the oblast TSIK, A. M. Karakozov, at the 3rd Congress of Azerbaijan SSR Soviets (November 1923). Greeting the Congress in the name of the First Constituent Congress of Soviets of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, he said: "In the summer of this year, the Azerbaijan Central Executive Committee decreed the autonomy of Nagorni Karabakh. The Azerbaijani working masses have realized the great principles of the October Revolution, the great principles of self-determination of peoples, and have proclaimed their autonomy. They, comrades, approached the resolution of this question very skillfully. We have resolved one of the most urgent subjects of Azerbaijan reality without any bloodshed at all."

In its reporting speech presented to the Central Committee by S. M. Kirov, the 6th Azerbaijan CP Congress (May 1924) gave a high evaluation to the resolution of the Karabakh problem. Kirov stated: "We have finally resolved this question once and for all, and undoubtedly have done the right thing. There can be no doubt that in general we will not have to re-solve this question. The entire matter will consist of filling the very juridical form of autonomy with as much vital, real content as possible. This will lead only to the situation whereby we will obtain new moments, which will serve as the basis for the ultimate and real fraternal coexistence of the peoples inhabiting Azerbaijan."

This, in short, is the true basis of the history of formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR based on strict documental evidence. However, unfortunately articles have appeared in the press written by authors who are insufficiently competent in the question or even those who knowingly distort the historical facts and falsely depict the course of events. They make direct attempts to revise and cast doubt upon the resolution of the most authoritative organ of our party, the RCP(b) Central Committee Caucasus Buro. This shows a disrespect for the memory of the outstanding leaders of the Leninist Bolshevik guard. Thus, on 15 June 1988, the newspaper KOMMUNIST (Yerevan) published an article by Professor Kh. Barsegyan under the alluring, promising title with a claim to "academism": "Studying History, Internationalism and Armenian Soviet Historiography". The article was published in the column "Looking Forward to the 19th All-Union Party Conference," which required from the author, first of all, that each fact and each judgment be well thought-out and substantiated, and secondly—that the article work toward perestroika, one of whose priority tasks is to strengthen the internationalist principles in the life of society and the friendship and unity of the peoples of the Soviet state, including the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples.

However, it follows from the content of this publication that it meets neither the first nor the second requirement.

Promising, as the article's subtitle states, to examine the problem of illuminating internationalism in Armenian Soviet historiography, the author gives primary attention to the question of a component part of Soviet Azerbaijan, an important link in the national-state formulation of the republic—to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

The author quite justifiably—and in this we fully agree with him—calls for a truthful illumination of our country's history. He speaks of the high degree of responsibility which historians have before the people, and of the need for new methodological approaches to the analysis of the historical past and present. However, Kh. Barsegyan himself does not heed this call. He allows arbitrary distortions in the illumination of history. The evident doubtfulness of his "conclusions" and "generalizations" stem from this fact.

The professor has perceived the concept of revolutionary perestroika [reorganization] developed by the party in a rather unique manner. Avoiding the primary essence of the problem, he states that "...the question of territorial appurtenance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is among those **first priority!** (boldface ours—D.G.) questions in the sphere of international relations which must be resolved in the spirit of revolutionary perestroika and democratization in accordance with the basic principles of CPSU national policy." However, in spite of Kh. Barsegyan's affirmation, we must draw an entirely different conclusion from the effort which he has made at "analyzing the events which took place in Nagorno Karabakh and around it."

In speaking of the events which took place in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] in February of this year, Kh. Barsegyan maintains that, supposedly, "the Armenian population, the session of the Oblast Council, and the party obkom plenum justly, within the framework of the Constitution, demanded..." Yet how can we consider "just" the demands of merely a part of the multi-national make-up of the population of an autonomous oblast, without taking into consideration the interests of the entire republic of which the oblast is a part?! And why does the respected doctor of sciences so expand the "framework of the Constitution" that its limits are boundless and can be made to include methods of pressure on the party and state organs, meetings and non-reporting for work, and strikes which inflicted great loss upon the entire USSR national-economic complex, as well as the activity of the infamous "Karabakh" and "Krunka" with their instigating appeals and openly counterrevolutionary directionality, fraught with unpredictable consequences?!

Professor Kh. Barsegyan takes a unilateral approach to international problems. He "diplomatically" evades, and does not give a principle party evaluation to the events which took place in Yerevan and Stepanakert. He

characterizes only the tragic Sumgait as a "serious blow not only to proletarian internationalism, but also to the course of revolutionary perestroika."

In this connection we must say with all directness that the Azerbaijan party organization decisively condemns what happened in Sumgait, which was the result of many years of stagnation and the consequence of the errors of the republic's former leadership.

Both in his evaluation of recent events, and especially in his attempts to present the history of formation of the NKAO, the author, who is the chairman of the Interdepartmental Scientific Council on the Study of National Processes under the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, shows a rather weak knowledge of the processes taking place in the sphere of national and international relations.

The author of the article makes an effort to present the history of formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR. Evidently, such an effort must be preceded by a thorough study of reliable, first-hand historical sources. However, we get the impression that the doctor of historical sciences has a rather original approach to using the sources which are fully accessible to researchers. For example, he quotes N. M. Karamzin. However, instead of looking at the original, at the works of the leading Russian historian, he takes his quote "second-hand" and directs the readers to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Of course, this is a trifle, but it is characteristic of Kh. Barsegyan's style of work.

The author of the article, delving into the depths of history, arbitrarily refers to Karabakh (in his own expression "historical Artsakh"), and **all** of Karabakh, populated, as we well know, both by Azerbaijanis and Armenians, as "part of Armenia." This was, in his words, "the first bridge connecting the Armenian people with Russia." But why only the Armenian people? After all, the Azerbaijanis who populated the region were no less interested in annexation with Russia!

According to the unsubstantiated interpretation of the author, the status of Nagorno Karabakh in the 20's "was decided hastily, unjustly, and contradicted the Leninist principle of self-determination of nations."

We might expect that the author, in making such affirmations and presenting the history of the question in general, will at the same time give an analysis of the objective factors, the economic and social prerequisites for the formation of the NKAO and its retention within the make-up of the Azerbaijan SSR. However, instead he gives irresponsible, nebulous hints at the illness of Lenin, the hasty administration by I. V. Stalin (who, by the way, was not yet in a primary position of party leadership), the situation which arose in Armenia as a result of the Dashnak revolt, the absence of "ready examples for the development of national relations" (and how about the

experience of the national-state construction and creation of autonomous formations in the RSFSR?)—all of which, he claims, "played a fateful role."

As an "argument" in favor of his position, Kh. Barsegian presents only the national make-up of the population of Nagorny Karabakh. V. I. Lenin points out the inconsistency of such a one-sided approach: "However, the national make-up of the population is one of the most important economic factors, but not the only one, and not the most important among the others..." (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 24, p 149).

Analogous lapses, prejudices and actual scientific dishonesty have been allowed in the brochure entitled "Nagorny Karabakh, Historical Report," which was recently published under the signature stamp of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. The honorable professor is among the authors of this brochure.

We must say that Kh. Barsegian is not the only one who has dared to try his hand at the falsification of this long-suffering problem, which today has become a sore point in the deformation of national and international relations. The 4th April issue of the journal VESTNIK OBUHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK published by the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, contains a lengthy article by Professors Vardges Mikayelyan and Lendrush Khurshudyan entitled "Certain Questions of the History of Nagorny Karabakh." The article is written with pretensions of high scientific nature and abounds in source references. However, at the same time the authors allow arbitrary quotes cited out of context to support their anti-scientific interpretation of real and imagined events. This article, which bears the traces of national narrow-mindedness, requires special examination. However, we will deal here with only a few of its positions. V. Mikayelyan and L. Khurshudyan, like Kh. Barsegian, present a distorted text of the Azrevkom Declaration, containing the affirmation that it supposedly recognizes Nagorny Karabakh to be "a component part of the Armenian Socialist Republic." This falsified text of the document was presented from 7 December 1920 in the newspaper KOMMUNIST, published in Yerevan in the Armenian language.

We might add that N. Narimanov himself decisively objected against the distortion of the facts contained in his proclaimed Declaration: "If they (certain workers of Armenia—D.G.) refer to my Declaration, the declaration literally says the following: 'Nagorny Karabakh is given the right of free self-determination' (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, f. 64, op 1, sec. 31, p 86). It is surprising that Kh. Barsegian and a number of other Armenian historians do not refer to the primary documents in their publications, but rather to a secondary text which allows gross distortions."

The authors paint the image of the outstanding leader of the Communist party and the Soviet state, N. N. Narimanov, in a false light. They try to cast a shadow over the personality of this fiery internationalist. They allow slanderous fabrications, as if continuing the "traditions" which trace their beginnings back to the time of Stalin's personality cult.

The article by V. Mikayelyan and L. Khurshudyan to a significant degree bears an inciting character and certainly cannot facilitate the normalization of life in Armenia and Azerbaijan or the realization of the constructive decisions made by the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

Professor M. Melikyan, who published an article entitled "Union of Equals" in the newspaper SOVETAKAN AYASTAN dated 4 May 1988, is also out of tune with actual history. In this article, the author, without consideration for the many centuries of history of Karabakh, maintains that it was only under the rule of the Musavatists that Karabakh became a part of Azerbaijani land. The position of the government of Soviet Azerbaijan in regard to Nagorny Karabakh is also presented in a confused manner. Supposedly in 1920 this government declared the transfer of Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia. The author, without consulting the sources, speaks of the meeting of the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo in June of 1921. First of all, the author changes this date to a month earlier than it actually was. Secondly, he "turns" the meeting of the most authoritative party organ into some kind of indefinite "meeting of the leaders of the transcaucasian Soviet republics" which, with the participation of I. V. Stalin, supposedly made the decision to "take away" Nagorny Karabakh from Armenia.

In summarizing, we must say that the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was implemented in the spirit of regular internationalism, in accordance with the Leninist principle of national-state construction of the USSR, and on a truly democratic basis. In solving the problem, the entire combination of factors of economic, social, political, and cultural development was taken into consideration. The creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR was an important event in the cause of realizing CPSU Leninist national policy and creating the political prerequisites for overall progress of the oblast on socialist principles.

The Address of CPSU Central Committee Secretary General M. S. Gorbachev to the workers and people of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on measures for accelerating the socio-economic development of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR, as well as other party and state documents permeated with the spirit of successive socialist internationalism—all these open wide perspectives for renovating all aspects of life in the

oblast and increasing its achievements in implementing the political course of the 27th CPSU Congress and the strategy of revolutionary perestroika.

The principle position of the Communist Party in the sphere of international relations is clearly formulated in the resolution of the 19th Party Conference. "The Conference expresses its firm confidence that our present and our future lie in the consolidation and unity of all Soviet peoples. The patriotic and international duty of each citizen, each communist, is to cherish and augment all that which serves to unify Soviet society as a basis for the free development and flourishing of all the USSR peoples, and to strengthen the might of our common Homeland. V. I. Lenin summoned us to this cause, and this is the path which the Communist Party is following."

12322

UkSSR CP CC Examines State of Sociological Research in Republic

*18000616a Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 Jul 88 p 1*

[Report: "At the UkCP Central Committee"]

[Text] The Politburo of the UkCP Central Committee discussed the issue of fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee's resolution "On Increasing the Role of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in Resolving the Focal Social Problems of the Soviet Society" in the republic.

The adopted resolution notes that a network of sociological services and units is functioning at the academic institutes, VUZes, industrial enterprises, and ministries and departments of the republic.

In recent years, the efforts of sociologists were directed toward researching the theoretical and practical aspects of the development in the social sphere, production, and social prognostication. Sociological studies are being more widely used in the work of Party committees. Councils for studying public opinion are organized at the majority of Party obkoms.

At the same time the UkSSR CP Central Committee finds that the development of sociology in the republic and its practical output do not meet the modern requirements. The theoretical and methodical level of sociological studies is low, and the studies are not coordinated. The obtained results quite often are of a narrow empirical nature, and many recommendations do not have a clear scientific justification. Public opinion studies are not developed as required.

Measures directed toward further development of sociology in the republic and bringing it closer to practice were approved. The task of increasing the methodological and methodical level was raised. We must radically improve the use of results of studies in management and prognostication of social processes.

Organizing in the republic an efficient sociological service which would include a newly created Center for public opinion studies at the UkSSR CP Central Committee and the Institute of sociology at the UkSSR Academy of Sciences, and developing a polling network in the republic, were stipulated.

It was recognized to be necessary to widen the network of services for social development at enterprises and organization, to assure a step-by-step formation of sociological units based on interdepartmental cooperation and economic contract conditions, and to provide specialists for these units.

Special importance is attached to improving sociological education and preparing and improving qualifications of sociologist cadres. For this purpose it is scheduled to open a department of sociology at the Kiev State University and to specialize the Lvov State University, Kiev Institute of national economy, and other VUZes of the republic in sociology. Admissions to post-graduate and doctorate studies in sociology will be increased, and sociological education of social studies instructors and retraining of already working sociologists will be improved.

It is stipulated to widen for sociologists the access to statistical information, and to publish up-to-date statistical materials and specialized publications. The material-technical basis of sociological studies is scheduled to be substantially strengthened. The sociological units will be provided with modern equipment, computers, copying equipment, and other technical means.

The UkSSR CP Central Committee made it incumbent upon the Party committees to increase the organizational and ideological-political work directed toward development of the sociological science, public opinion studies, and implementation of the results of the studies into practice.

13355

BSSR CP CC Meets With Intelligentsia On Language, Other Issues

18000616b Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Jul 88 p 1

[BELTA report: "Meeting at the BSSR CP Central Committee"]

[Text] On 27 Jul 88 a meeting with a group of creative intelligentsia of the republic took place at the BSSR CP Central Committee. The meeting was dedicated to the

issues of further development of the Belorussian national culture, language, education, construction and architecture, and improving activities of the local Soviet and Party authorities, respective ministries and department, and mass information media.

The 1st Secretary of the BSSR CP Central Committee, Ye.Ye. Sokolov and the Chairman of the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet, G.S. Tarazevich addressed the participants. They described the measures being taken in the republic with regard to widening the sphere of active use of the ethnic language in different fields of the State, public, and cultural life, and further developing of interethnic ties between Belorussia and other republics. They stressed the unacceptability of any contraposition toward democratic principles of free choice in selecting the language being used in education and actions alienating ethnicities and ethnic groups. The speakers noted that the multinational socialist culture must continue to remain in the future the powerful factor of consolidating our society.

Writers M. Dubenetskiy, V. Semukha, and D. Bichel-Zagnetova; artists A. Marochkin, R. Sitnitsa, and V. Basalyga; journalists V. Voytkevich and V. Yagovdik; teachers A. Petkevich, K. Lapko, and V. Svistunov; and researchers V. Sivchik, E. Vetsier, V. Titov, S. Zapudsiky, N. Saskevich, V. Pavlovich, S. Urbanovich, A. Antonyuk, V. Polstyuk, and Ya. Yanushkevich, took part in the open, concerned discussion.

Comrades Ye.Ye. Sokolov and G.S. Tarazevich answered numerous questions of the participants. It was stressed that the discussed problems will become a subject of careful examination at the BSSR CP Central Committee and the Government of the republic.

13355

Kiev Gorkom Chief on Elections, Kiev's Social and Economic Development

18000534 Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 26,
25 Jun-2 Jul 88 pp 1-3

[Interview by OGONEK Staff Correspondent Stanislav Kalinichev with Kiev Gorispolkom Chairman Valentin Zgurskiy: "In Preparation for the 19th Party Congress"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Valentin Arsentevich, let's get right to the point. The Kiev city party organization was given a hearing at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo meeting. The appropriate resolution was adopted by the Central Committee. There was serious criticism of the incomplete development of the capital of the Ukraine and the lags in the social sphere. How did it turn out that a city which is famous in the country for its modern conveniences, its relatively well-developed sphere of comfort, and for being quite well-supplied with goods, has suddenly begun to lose its position?

[Answer] I don't think that the allegation that Kiev "suddenly" began to lose its positions is entirely in accord with the facts. It's true, we do have quite a few problems. There has been serious neglect. But this did not happen "suddenly." It is a consequence of the cost of planning the development of the social sphere by territory, which has taken place over the course of the last 25-30 years, and of the extensive method of development at Kiev enterprises and organizations belonging to numerous ministries and departments. We added it up: during just one five-year plan, "another Vinitsa" with a population of 250-300,000 people has appeared, figuratively speaking, in Kiev. To build housing, stores, public catering facilities, health-care and popular education facilities and so on for such a mass of people right away is far, far from easy, the more so, since the problems are growing. Just take transportation for example—just within the city, the territory of which is almost the same as Moscow's. People must be taken to their place of work and schooling, and back, on time.

At this point one has a right to ask—Well, what about the Soviets? Why did they not act more decisively on the situation; and why did they not exercise their rights in the matter of comprehensive development of the third largest city in the country? Everything is explained very simply: the Soviets do not yet have the necessary rights and authority they need. And it is only in recent years that we have turned to the problems of the Soviets. But previously we did not have real capabilities to control the many processes of comprehensive development. Voluntarism on the part of the ministries and departments led to the artificial "swelling" of the city, and to misalignments in the development of the social sphere. You see, departmental interests were always given preference. And Kiev grew at unprecedented rates for such a city. Between 1970 and 1987 its population increased by a million people, and now exceeds 2,600,000. It goes without saying, this occurred by virtue of a mechanical influx of population. What kind of social infrastructure and what kind of city budget could withstand such things?

[Question] Well, what about the union and republic organs? How could they not have known, and not have noticed these misalignments? Why did they not help Kiev?

[Answer] Of course they have helped, but on the whole only in extreme situations, when the situation had degenerated to "hopelessness," as they say. Such as it was, for example, with providing the city with children's pre-school institutions. But in a number of situations, to be blunt about it, they make our lives even more complicated. The union and republic-level state planning agencies, for example, when allocating resources, specify literally everything, line-by-line, dictating where to dispatch them. And we, the 600 deputies of the city Soviet, when approving the draft plans, simply raise our hands and do not have the right to change what was stipulated from on high... Or take for example our "bob-tailed" capabilities in planning the construction of projects in the socio-cultural sphere...

[Question] Pardon me, Valentin Arsentyevich, but couldn't you give one or two convincing examples of how such "over-regulation" brought about unhappy results?

[Answer] Why not? As many as you like. For example, every year Gosplan earmarks about a billion rubles for Kiev for capital investment. And only 1-1.5 million rubles of that amount goes to the development of cultural establishments. There you have it with respect to culture—one ruble out of a thousand. That is what is now called the "left-overs approach..." To make a long story short, it's in the spirit of the times. But after all, in the past one could not even mention such an approach. Cultural projects were under a "taboo." It's impossible! And that was that. And that is precisely why today we have several new theater groups that do not in general have their own accommodations. During my assignment as general director of the Production Association imeni S.P. Korolev I was forced to use my initiative to the fullest and violate a number of instructions in order to force through the construction of the Palace of Culture which we badly needed for our collective, which numbered in the many thousands. Officially we declared it...the assembly hall of an academic combine—and although I and even my inspector received a number of reprimands, the Palace has been in operation for quite some time now.

Yes, it's true. We the Soviets had a minimum of rights. Here is an eloquent example. In the city there is a Roman Catholic church building where a hall for organ music was established in honor of the 1,500th Anniversary of Kiev. Next to it was a little house in which the priest used to live, built at the turn of the century. What do you think is now in this house, which was intended for the family of the parish priest? You'd never guess: the ispolkom of the Moskovskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. In a rayon with 300,000 residents, an organ of Soviet power is, in essence, homeless. For two five-year plans in a row we have been requesting permission to construct a building for the rayon ispolkom—and completely without success. And at the very same time various government departments, receiving support from higher-up, have erected a large number of "prestigious" buildings. It's true that by virtue of the recent adopted Resolution on the Soviets, we will now finally be able to erect a building for the rayispolkom at the expense of redistribution of allotted funds. It's high time!

[Question] You have been depicting everything in not-too-cheerful colors, and with very good reason. Nevertheless, I would like to know how the city has been operating in recent years with respect to a number of key social positions; what it has resolved and what has it not yet managed to resolve?

[Answer] Kiev is one of the greenest, one of the coziest cities in the country. And that is not boastfulness, but a statement of fact. Counting the forest park zone, we have about 200 square meters of plant life per citizen. In addition, on the edge of the city along the Dnepr and

along our lakeshores there are about 100 kilometers of beaches... Presently, Ecology Saturdays occupy a special place in all the affairs and concerns of the Kievites. Seven mechanized car-washes are in operation at the approaches to the city. As they say, if you're going to visit someone, you wash up... But we we also understand the expression that one hears among the people that, "Kiev is Kiev," which obligates us to show maximum concern for the city's greenery, and for its environment. The ispolkom of the city Soviet, for example, has made serious demands on a chemical factory which is polluting the Dnepr, to ensure the ecological clean-up of the atmosphere in its zone in the shortest possible time.

[Question] As in the past, the city's housing problem is acute. Valentin Arsentyevich, how does the city soviet ispolkom plan to realize the program of furnishing every family its own apartment by the year 2000?

[Answer] There are several ways. We are beefing up our construction organizations, and above all Glavkievgorstroy [Kiev Main Construction Administration], we are increasing their capacities, and we are moving ahead on production of bricks. In addition, we are making use of the direct labor method of housing construction, and are coordinating all these questions with the active participation of the council of directors on problems of comprehensive urban development, which was set up several years ago at the city soviet ispolkom. Together we have taken up the in situ method of housing construction, which promises a considerable number of advantages.

We are developing ZhSK [Housing Construction Cooperatives] and MZhK [Young People's Housing Complexes]; moreover, the Young People's Housing Complexes are being established not only for new construction, but also in conjunction with comprehensive major repairs to apartment buildings. The participation of our MZhK in major housing repair, wherein they are offered half of the repaired housing, is a solid component of the solution to the housing problem.

We have also begun to introduce and create voluntary societies for housing construction. Just what are they? Here's what: With the permission of the gorispolkom, enterprises and organizations send to these societies, for a period of two or three years, those workers who need housing and are on a waiting list for an apartment. During this period every member of the society must build three apartments: one for the enterprise, one for the city, and one for himself. Today 3,000 Kievites have joined voluntary housing construction societies.

[Question] Valentin Arsentyevich, you are a doctor of economic sciences and a professor; and you have been a talented manager, as indicated by the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. For the past nine years you have been Mayor of Kiev. The question arises involuntarily: But how have you and the ispolkom that stands behind you made use of the economic levers on which perestroika is oriented?

[Answer] We have chosen several directions and have worked out the principal policy: to build the management of the comprehensive development of the city with the help of principally economic methods. How, for example, to stop the powerful wave of the mechanical population influx and at the same time derive maximum benefit from the attraction of Kiev to workers from outside the city? The more so that the city and its management were not operating on an equal basis with influential government departments. And so we made some calculations: what does it cost the municipal government (on an average) for every new resident brought in from elsewhere? It turns out to be 12,400 rubles. This is for the "first instance." And we decided to pass these costs on to the departments and appropriate these monies for the city budget. After all, in order to live one needs stores, a place to eat, kindergarten, a hospital, the movies—the entire complex of ordinary needs, in the final analysis—and much more.

In order to get the agreement of "those on high" we would have lost a great deal of time, and what's more we probably would not have been able to penetrate the thicket of instructions. We raised the question at a session of the city Soviet, which unanimously replied, "Yes!" Even the deputies who are directors were unable to withstand such a new trend and also voted for such a proposition.

They told me that our measure was the cause of stormy arguments at the USSR Finance Ministry. But finally the majority went along with the opinion that the Kiev Soviet acted properly, in the spirit of the times, and what is most important, in accordance with the "letter" of the decree on Soviets which had been adopted.

Now many administrators have begun to ponder on how to increase labor productivity, in order to avoid having to bring in workers from outside. After all, such expenditures are hard on the pockets of the collective...

And nevertheless some of the managers, by dint of various circumstances, have been forced to "open their purses." By virtue of their guaranteed obligations, the city budget should receive more than 20 million rubles.

[Question] But this, apparently, is not the only means of channeling funds from enterprises and organizations for the social development of the city and, in fact, for the practical realization of the idea of "the self-supporting city."

[Answer] Yes of course. Realizing the idea of "the self-supporting city" requires further intensification of economic management methods, which presuppose transition to a principally different financial relationship between the ispolkoms of local Soviets and the enterprises and organizations, based on payments. This derives directly from the Law on the State Enterprise (or Association). It is not only a question of introducing certain financial levers, but also one of formation of

special funds for monetary assets created at the expense of shared participation by the enterprises. The first steps in this direction have already been taken.

We have long since been conducting work on attracting shared assets for housing construction. This year, for example, it amounts to 189 million rubles, or 72.4 percent of all capital investments for housing. Here it would appear that we have things in order. But is it truly fair that most of the burden for providing a person with all kinds of urban services should be rest entirely on the shoulders of the Soviets? Our specialists have calculated the cost of all types of services on the basis of one person and came to the conclusion that for every ruble for housing, another 45 kopecks must be taken from the enterprises and organizations for the social sphere. Separate normatives for deductions for developing the social infrastructure were worked out and approved at that very same session of the city Soviet. And today these normatives are already working for perestroika, and for man.

[Question] Kievites have received extensive information on yet another valuable innovation, which was introduced in the interests of comprehensive development of the city. We are speaking about the normative documents on comprehensive economic analysis of the territory of Kiev recently approved at a session of the city Soviet, which you have already mentioned. It is believed that the document on cost analysis of the territory adopted at the session will serve as the basis for determining the enterprises' financial obligations to the city for their use of city land. How was this idea born and what is behind it?

[Answer] The city has expanded right out to the Green Belt. We have practically no unoccupied territory. The problem of unoccupied spaces will become more and more acute. The city will be developed at the expense of crowding existing built-up areas, by opening up inconvenient areas, or by relocating a number of enterprises. Of course our land is not free. But that which has already been built on it or laid in it (for example, the large underground mains and services) have their cost. The cost analysis appraised a single hectare of land at 3,000,000 rubles in the historic nucleus of the city, ranging down to 600,000 on the outskirts.

In terms of cost indicators the city has been divided into five economic planning zones. The cost assessment for use of city territory will depend on the zone. And many people will no doubt begin to think, whether to build one "prestigious" house in the center or, for the same amount of money, build two houses on territory that is still relatively undeveloped. I hope the enterprises will restrain themselves and will not keep scattering their one-story warehouses and shops all over the place, especially in densely built-up regions. This will also help us ensure the preservation of the historic appearance of the city.

The approach under consideration has interested many Soviets in major cities. Specialists are coming to visit and to inquire, and we willingly share every grain of our experience with them. Incidentally, in terms of propagating the actual work methods of the Soviets, and of mutual enrichment from our experiences, not everything sits well with us in our country. We devoted attention to this during the recent workshop held at the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee, with representatives of the gorispolkoms of Moscow, Leningrad, and the capital cities of union republics and oblast and kray centers. And there we all arrived at the conclusion that under conditions of perestroika it is necessary to organize systematic exchange of the work experience of Soviet organs on regional development, and on the comprehensive management of subordinate territories. Toward this end, the representatives of the gorispolkoms decided to set up their own working organ—the Permanent Conference of Gorispolkom Representatives of Moscow, Leningrad and Union Republic Capital Cities (PDS). Your interlocutor was elected chairman.

[Question] Valentin Arsentьевич, one senses the spirit of change and original approaches in these innovations. But does it not appear to you that the interrelations of the gorispolkom and the enterprises is somewhat akin to a "game with one set of goalposts"? It seems to me that you are embarking on a course of "squeezing" funds out of the enterprises. Does not such an approach encroach upon the interests of the collectives?

[Answer] Well, let's start with the fact that this "game with one set of goalposts" has until now always gone in favor of the enterprises and organizations, and the ministries and departments. And nevertheless what we are doing is entirely in the interests of the city, and consequently in the interests of those very working collectives as well. You will agree that this is a legitimate payment by the enterprises for the use of our regional resources. But in addition, we have found an acceptable form of social partnership between the ispolkoms of local Soviets and the working collectives. This is a social-municipal contract, designed to regulate the nature of the relationships between the rayon ispolkoms and the enterprises in the socio-domestic sphere, on the basis of economic accountability. Its essence can be expressed as follows: the ispolkom not only takes from the enterprise, but gives to it as well. Let's say the ispolkom and its services take upon themselves social problems: for example, establishing medical-sanitary facilities or health-care stations providing general dispensing of medicines, at the enterprises. The enterprises in turn provide assistance in supplying the medical establishments in the city. In addition, we could jointly build hospitals, polyclinics, sanatoria, and profilaktoria... There are also quite a few common features in such cooperation in the development of the services sphere, for example. Posing the question in this manner was dictated by the times themselves; after all, in accordance with the Law on Enterprises (or Associations), the working collective itself has the right to solve its own critical social problems.

What was it like before? The pressure method was used. The administrators of an enterprise, in attempting to solve this or that problem, would "cajole" the party raykom; the party raykom would "lean on" the ispolkom, and the latter would carry out the instructions... The ispolkom itself, which with the help of the ispolkom quite often would try to "wring out" as much as possible from the enterprise, had no further obligation... And this became the practice. To make a long story short, the system of interaction between the rayon and the enterprise functioned by virtue of the party card and report card of the communist-administrator, who was not about to risk spoiling his relations with the party raykom.

A socio-municipal contract between the local Soviets and the enterprises will help all of us get away from such "strong-arm" methods, and to get rid of them. And the interaction of the government authorities and the working collectives would be placed on a solid, businesslike basis.

[Question] That means one could say that the Kiev Gorispolkom is making maximum use of the opportunities opened by perestroika?

[Answer] What are you saying! For the time being, unfortunately, there is a lot of talk about expanding the rights of the Soviets and few deeds. The work of the ispolkom to this day is so over-regulated that many of its rights, declared from high rostrums, remain merely pretty phraseology... Just try to build a garage under your house here in the city.

[Question] One can only dream about such a garage...

[Answer] But our gorsovet is incapable of penetrating the thicket of instructions. According to the logic of the bureaucrats, such a garage would increase the cost of a project, and consequently the square meters of living space... It is impossible, and that's that. And so we are making the area ugly with one-story garage-slums. I've touched on only one of the multitude of pressing problems. And who knows how many other bans have been sent down from the various levels of administration, which are putting the brakes to perestroika! And so it turns out that they say one thing from the rostrums, but in life it turns out differently... We must hasten to eliminate the gap between words and deeds, and give the Soviets real rights, once and for all.

[Question] Recently a lot has been said about the need to decisively delineate the functions of the party organs and the Soviets. What in your view has caused the question to be put in this way?

[Answer] There is only one answer: the widespread democratization of our entire life. The soviets must finally become the true masters of the situation on their own territories. Just take a look at the resolutions of the buro and the plenums of the party gorkom and raykoms.

There you see left and right, "oblige the gorsovet," or "require of the ispolkoms," or "step up the work of the gorsovet," or "The Soviets are to discuss and resolve," and so on. But permit me to ask, by what right? Is the Kiev Soviet the authority, or an accountable organization? Such instructions are extralegal; they reek of party micromanagement, the desire to command the Soviets at all times and in all places, and to take charge of even the smallest details. They represent our everyday reality; moreover, a greater reality than our rights on paper.

We are all confronted with the phenomenon that in the system of government, the party organs have assumed the principal role themselves. But you see they are not supposed to command the system of the city government. In our opinion they should have decisive political influence, and the choice of strategic directions for development.

The question is a legitimate one: Should the party have people who hand out instructions, or should it have party organizers—people who have mastered political methods of leadership. It seems to me that party officials on the staff are themselves sick and tired of paperwork and office style. They need to get out "among the people," and must be able to put the party line into action. And the Soviets should in turn be required to engage in the practical work of solving the acute economic and social problems. And they should be required to justify themselves primarily before the people, before the electorate. But we must constantly justify ourselves to the party organs; moreover, as a rule, in written form.

[Question] And so, does this tendency still make itself known today?

[Answer] Even today... Although certain changes have already occurred. Well, for example, a resolution from a recent gorkom plenum contained the following entry: "recommend to the gorispolkom..." Although this is merely one point of a directive nature, on the whole it nevertheless represents a departure from tradition. On paper, that is. But in deeds... In terms of deeds, perestroika is not doing as well. Twice in recent years I was forced to speak sharply from the rostrum of the gorkom on cadre leap-frogging in the system of the city Soviet, which comes about "through the efforts" of the party organs. It came down to a matter of even using the position of rayispolkom chairman as a temporary "stopping point" for a comrade on the rotenkatura, with his subsequent promotion to the position of chief of the construction department or chief of municipal facilities at the gorkom. Is this really wise cadre policy? And there's more. Not so long ago a number of party raykoms were headed by new administrators—young people, full of strength and energy. But from the very first they applied their strength and energy to "squeezing out" rayispolkom chairmen and their deputies with whom they were uncomfortable. One may ask: Do we need such a "cadre policy," if one can call it that?

Members of the ispolkom are constantly being "lambasted" at plenums and at various party activities. We are not opposed to fair and objective criticism (although who loves it?). We are against tendentiousness, and one-sidedness in approaching the work of the soviet organs. In the past, it was mainly the ispolkoms who figured in the reports, and the primary party organizations and the party raykoms were literally on the sidelines... The tonality has now changed somewhat, but the spirit of "undressing" the Soviets has remained practically the same. I have repeatedly asked myself, why does the gorkom buro, and the first secretary himself personally sum up the results of the gorsovet meeting? This is the Soviet! Why should the chairman not summarize the results of the session; or the chairman of the standing commissions; or the members of the ispolkom, with the help of deputies who are officials on the gorkom; or even the representatives of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet, who are always present at our sessions? This is what is needed in order to make the work of the Soviets more democratic.

Departure from stereotypes is dictated by the times themselves. We have set about to change the habitual form of conducting sessions. No there is no longer the usual presidium comprised of members of the gorkom buro and members of the ispolkom. The presidium consists only of the chairman and secretary of the session; moreover, by our insistence ordinary worker-deputies, and even rayispolkom chairmen have begun to supervise the work of the sessions, and not raykom first secretaries. All these are superficial, but I would say very necessary elements of democratization. The deputies have received such procedures well.

Preparation for the session itself has required decisively rejecting the familiar displays of formalism and excessive organizational activity. After all, what was it that we were facing? Our sessions had two theatrical producers—the first was the Party Organization Work Department of the party gorkom; the second, our Organizational Instructor Department. But the latter was quite often the executor, and most things were controlled in the gorkom: both the time limits and the list of speakers, and so on.

Noteworthy changes for the better are occurring today, although of course from time to time the gorkom slips in its own "sheet music." But the customary edifying commands are becoming fewer and fewer. We ourselves are seeking new working methods for the Soviets, and for conducting sessions. For example, we conducted our last session in a somewhat unusual way. The deputies listened to the reports (and we were discussing the tasks of the city Soviets proceeding from the CPSU Central Committee resolution on the Kiev City Party Organization, as well as questions of improving the structure of the city administration); the deputies then gathered into groups (14 rayons and 14 groups), and separately examined the problems described in the reports, and expressed their comments, proposals and additions (and

394 of them were received). And they were given maximum consideration in the decisions of the session. You should have heard the energetic manner in which the deputies defended their proposals, and the lively discussions which took place at the session.

I want you to understand me correctly; I am posing no contrasts, but I want to say that the such work by the party group of the Soviet is what is required by perestroika. During two convocations the party group gave hearings to four chiefs of gorispolkom administrations on economic questions and one chairman of a gorsovet standing commission. Incidentally, no one questioned the four chiefs of administration in the manner as communist deputies are questioned for their work as deputies... These were simply the ordinary "jacking-up" from the first secretary, for the most part. But where is the democratization here? And where is the genuine party influence on the communist-deputies? And later, the party group works only on the day of the session, and then not every time; moreover just for an hour or two. This is formalism of the purest sort. Perhaps it is now the time for it to operate continuously and not just in "stand-by" mode.

[Question] Valentin Arsentyevich, when I transcribe our conversation from the tape and bring it to you, would you object to signing the transcript?

[Answer] Well, after all, I am telling you things which everyone knows to be true. And to state what the urgent problems are means one has already set out on the path to solving them. I believe that the time has come to give genuine consideration to the soviets, to respect their status, and to delegate broad powers to them. They must neither be replaced nor trampled upon. It is well known that soviet construction is an entire science; but in life it quite often turns out that certain party officials lacking in-depth knowledge of the work of the soviets try to "take charge" of them even in minor matters. Today the question heard throughout the country is very timely: Why have we in our real lives departed from Lenin's splendid formula: "All Power to the Soviets!"?

[Question] You are a member of the party gorkom buro. You always have an opportunity to raise sharp questions before the buro members and to defend your own opinion... But how does this in fact take place?

[Answer] I do raise questions, and I do defend my positions—if of course, I sense that they are correct. But decisions are adopted by the majority. And at times my proposals "do not pass." And it is not the members of the gorkom who are guilty here... Such are the procedures and traditions. The system operates with precision, under which the deciding word is left to the party chain of command...

[Question] Currently there is a lot of talk about glasnost, and about providing extensive information to the public. But if one looks at the local city press, and specifically, at

the two newspapers which are the organs of the party gorkom and the City Soviet, there is still not enough material about the deputies and about the many-faceted work of the Soviet organs. Why is this, and why are you not actively trying to influence the given process?

[Answer] What kind of influence do we have over them? None whatsoever! If you have gathered from newspaper columns that the newspaper is an organ of the Kiev Soviet, then neither the deputies nor the ordinary reader have noticed. After all, you know that the newspapers are subordinate to the party and only to party organs (except for newspapers of certain departments...). And if I somehow manage to ask the editor of "Vecherka," V.A. Karpenko, "Well why has information on a matter of interest to the city, taken up at the ispolkom session, come out in an abbreviated and generalized form?" He would answer that at the gorkom they said to give it just so many lines! Meanwhile, just take a look at how they depict raykom plenums in the newspapers! They give extensive reports, and they expound upon the speeches of members of the gorkom buro (measured out, of course, according to their rank). But of the sessions of the rayon soviets they carry scant information at best. This is clearly unfair and is not objective! Perhaps it would make sense to have a newspaper in the republic and in the city as the organ of the Soviets? But we already have a newspaper of the Soviets in the country—IZVESTIYA. This question, I believe, also deserves the attention of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

[Question] We have already touched upon the business of the deputies. What do you think? Are the deputies of the Kiev Soviet carrying out their mission for the Kievites?

[Answer] On the whole, yes! The deputies have become more energetic in their work, both in the electoral districts and in the permanent committees. The concerns of the deputies are now heard more often, to include hearings before the chairman of the gorispolkom as well. At one of the sessions, V.I. Dubodelov, the deputy from Leningradskiy Rayon "chased into a corner," one might say, the directors of Glavuks and the Main Administration for Health Care. He took the floor several times in an attempt to clarify why no one had stipulated construction of a polyclinic at the Novo-Belichi housing tract, which is sorely needed there. As a result an authoritative commission went out to the site and arrived at the conclusion that a polyclinic must be built there immediately. Deputy Dubodelov proved the correctness of his position, and stood up for the interests of the electors with distinction.

At one of the sessions of the city soviet, another of our deputies, O.A. Medvid, foreman of a metal-working shop at one of the plants in Leningradskiy Rayon, while heading up one of the best deputy groups, called several leading officials of the party gorkom to account, who had never visited their districts, since they were "honorary" deputies. The criticism worked that time. But now we are once again forced to speak of the fact that for some

secretaries who are the heads of party gorkom departments, their "deputyship" remains an "addendum" to their positions. As a rule they do not receive people, and do not meet with the electors. Thus, by virtue of their heavy official workloads, perhaps they should not be nominated as candidates for deputy at the next election?

Incidentally, not long ago we conducted an extensive survey of the deputies of the city and rayon Soviets, entitled "Democratization and Us." The deputies were presented with 80 questions, including in particular: "What do you think: why were you yourself elected as a deputy?" An entire group of comrades answered approximately as follows: "Apparently the information on our questionnaire was suitable..." We thank such people for their frankness. But such a practice must be stopped. The Soviets need genuine people's deputies, and not those who merely go through the motions.

[Question] Don't take offense, Valentin Arsentyevich, but you too were elected under the same conditions... Your candidature was proposed from above, and after that you were already supported by the electors. On the whole everything went as usual. Just as with other candidates... What bothers me personally in the given situation is not the formality of the elections (I've somehow gotten used to it), but the violence done to the Russian language. Well, how can one be chosen from a field of one? Or three out of three? In any case, when a like number of candidates is presented, be it for 17 or 27 positions, it is not proper to call it an election—at best, it is a confirmation.

[Answer] I agree with you. And the survey showed that many deputies agree with you too. Formalism and elections are incompatible...

[Question] And one more "delicate" question. Are you not afraid, that in the company of two or three candidates, you may not be elected?

[Answer] I'm not afraid. I've tasted the bread of chairmanship, and it is hard bread. Just look at my daily calendar. For two or three weeks ahead every minute is scheduled, including Saturdays and in many cases even Sunday. I do not disdain my position; after all, in such a chair one can more fully disclose one's capabilities, than one can in the role of administrator of a major enterprise. The main thing is that it is precisely here that one can do more for one's native city. And nevertheless... If I have to surrender my position to a more worthy, in the eyes of the electors, recipient—I will accept this philosophically and will find someplace to apply my efforts. But if the electors give preference to me from among several candidates, and if I once again become mayor in accordance with their freely-expressed will, then I will strive to utilize every opportunity, as well as the experience I possess in the new conditions—the conditions of perestroyka. Of course some people will think that, while it's not easy to be gorispolkom chairman, on the other hand he has no personal problems, he has a prestigious apartment, and so on.

[Question] Incidentally, about the apartment... Forgive me for my lack of modesty, but is it truly "prestigious" for you?

[Answer] For me, yes. I received it 30 years ago, when I was an ordinary engineer at a plant which was famous even before the Revolution, in Solomenka. Then they built with a minimum of conveniences. There is no elevator nor any hot water in the house where I live (there is a standpipe!), and the kitchen measures five meters... But this apartment is dear to me; I have spent the greater part my life here. Some people believe that the Mayor has another, more comfortable house. I already know the address at least...of the ten apartments where I supposedly live. That's what they think. Well, let them... There was, of course, a suggestion to move closer to my place of work. But I am somehow accustomed to my Solomenka. What's more, any Kievite whom I receive (and I receive for 5-6 hours, and see 25-27 people in a row), I can calmly look right in the eye.

[Question] Does the mayor have enough working hours? After all, you still conduct a great deal of responsible work as the chairman of the Commission on Housing and Municipal Facilities of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Answer] This is a very important sector of work. Letters and appeals come in from all parts of the country. They must be examined, explained, and replies must be sent; after all, in them one encounters their most stirring problems, associated chiefly with housing, or with their socio-domestic situation. At the same time a great deal of work is carried out at the standing commission on preparation for examination of planning problems as well. You see there are problems enough, both in the branch and in many regions of the country. In both cases this sometimes involves business trips, and the necessity to study the state of affairs in the localities.

But I'm not afraid of the workload. I grow weary of other things: from vanity, from turnover, from the white-hot telephones. Just look how many I have on my desk. Do you think that I can command someone with them? More likely the other way around. On these special lines, every five minutes there are two calls. Of course in such circumstances for an ordinary citizen to get in contact with the chairman of the gorispolkom is highly problematic. On the most critical problems I receive timely reports in my reception room. But in general we are beginning to introduce a "direct line" on certain days at certain hours.

Why do we nevertheless quite often receive calls from the rayons of the city? Well, because for many years the gorispolkom has traditionally taken an interest in a great number of problems which could be solved by the ispolkoms of the rayon soviets. We were very properly criticized for this at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. We drew our conclusions and derived our lessons.

Truly, the situation that has come to pass is not a simple one. We at the gorispolkom have taken upon ourselves a number of problems, which we are physically incapable of "swallowing."

[Question] And now, on working with citizen appeals. You have introduced a system for receiving people in the city. What does it provide?

[Answer] The reception points are subdivisions of the ispolkoms. They are staffed by experienced officials, many of whom have a juridical education. They take upon themselves a huge flow of appeals; have an influence on the resolution of problems; and arrange receptions for visitors with the leadership of the ispolkoms. Several years ago we set up a reception point at the gorispolkom and in every rayon. The people have come to believe in them, and they go there quite often for consultation and advice. The appeals of the citizens are entered into an electronic computer, and they are summarized. Not a single one goes unanswered. As a result, the number of appeals and collective letters to higher authorities has been reduced. Many problems which are of concern to Kievites are solved on the spot. We are improving the work of the reception points, and see in them vital channels of communication with the public.

[Question] Please describe the very latest initiatives of the ispolkom—those which are already "on the way" as they say, and will soon be promulgated...

[Answer] We continue to be troubled by the problem of labor resources, and the most rational use of them. In Kiev, out of 1,500,000 working people, half are employed in the sphere of material production. In this sphere everything has its place, and there are specific measures, subject to direct accounting, for output and measures for non-productive losses. But how is one to determine the labor effectiveness of the 750,000 Kievites employed in the non-industrial sphere?

How can one determine non-productive losses here? According to our estimates, on a city-wide scale the situation is approximately as follows: On the average every worker loses an amount of work time equal to two additional annual vacations...

[Question] We have made the estimates, we have generalized... Well, what next?

[Answer] Next, we must work on more effectively utilizing the labor resources in the non-industrial sphere. This is a global problem and we are taking up its realization.

[Question] Valentin Arsentyevich, what kind of conclusions have you drawn personally, for yourself, from the hearings on the work of the Kiev City Party Organization at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo?

[Answer] The most serious conclusions. My eyes were opened once again to the many things, the many problems and shortcomings. I have touched on certain of these problems in our conversation. I am organizing my own work in the light of those demands which were expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and by the members of the Politburo, which were directed toward me. As a citizen and a communist I believe that in my position of responsibility I am obliged to do the maximum for the Kievites, and for our native city.

[OGONEK] We would like to wish you success in the realization of everything that life and the times have decreed for us. Thank you for the interview.

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Baku Party Aktiv Meets on USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution

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[Azerinform report: "For the Sake of the Homeland's Highest Interests: A Conference of the Party Aktiv in Baku"]

[Text] Azerbaijan's workers fervently approve and fully support the resolution passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July 1988. It will unquestionably play an enormous role in the establishment of good, fraternal relations between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples, the strengthening of labor discipline and absolute observance of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws.

An expanded conference of the party aktiv was held in Baku. It was addressed by A.Kh. Vezirov, First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party CC. It discussed in detail the results of the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the large and important tasks of the republic party organization in light of the tenets and conclusions contained in the speech by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC.

Permit me at Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's instructions, Comrade Vezirov said, to express to the Communists and to all of the workers of Baku and our republic his profound appreciation for the great restraint which you have demonstrated during these difficult and complex days, weeks and months. He greatly appreciated the internationalist position taken by our comrades who have not succumbed to emotions but are guided by intelligence and the highest interests of our state.

We must not lose sight of current matters because of the past events. The restructuring involves vigorous and selfless work and must be supported not just verbally, but with action.

Based on the 6-month results, Azerbaijan's industry is functioning smoothly, with the exception of Stepanakert, and a number of indices are better than last year's. We note with satisfaction that many of Baku's labor collectives are working a second Saturday in a fitting response to decisions of the 19th Party Conference to make up for lost time.

Things are going fairly well in agriculture. The plan for the first 6 months for sales of livestock and poultry, milk, eggs and wool to the state has been fulfilled. As of 16 July output was greater than for the corresponding period last year: 104 percent for meat, 102 for milk, 105 for eggs and 110 percent for wool. A total of 5,500 tons of cocoons has been delivered, with the plan calling for 5,000.

A total of 214,000 tons of grain was delivered to the state, which is 73 percent of the annual plan. A total of 1.15 million tons of grain was produced, which is 155,000 tons more than last year. A large quantity of feed has been laid in.

Permit me to express my most heartfelt gratitude to the Azerbaijani Communist Party CC and to all the workers in our industry and agriculture for the fact that they have correctly understood the restructuring requirements and are ensuring its realization with good results in their work.

We can achieve far more, however, and this applies also in the area of food production. For example, we could obtain an additional 7,000 tons of meat by eliminating the undisguised race for gross output figures in the processing of livestock products. We could obtain an additional 750 tons of butter by reducing by 2,000 tons the production of ewe's milk cheese, which is not in demand.

There are many such reserves. The main thing right now is to make active use of all of them, thinking primarily of the people and not just gross output figures.

In the near future we want to assemble the agricultural workers who have gone over to the brigade, lease or family contract and to economic accountability, and listen carefully to what they have to say. One is amazed at the enormous results achieved by many of these people. Nonetheless, they have many opponents, who include even some managerial cadres—kolkhoz chairmen and those who are over them. This is strange. Could they truly not want our nation and our people to receive as much food as possible?

I think that we shall make our forthcoming discussion public, so that the people can see who is performing well and who is hampering them.

When we were in Moscow we told party and state leaders about our housing, public health and livestock production programs and about how we intend to get out of the complex situation in which the republic has found itself in the social area.

One of the main tasks facing us, A.Kh. Vezirov went on to say, is to ensure absolute fulfillment of the decree passed by the CPSU CC and the USSR Council of Ministers on the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], which contains a system of measures for the dynamic development of that part of our republic.

The republic's intelligentsia have a great deal to do to improve relations between our two peoples. We have reached agreement on a meeting of representatives of the intelligentsia of the Transcaucasian republics, exchanged opinions and jointly sought a way out of the complex situation in order to end the frictions which have developed in international relations.

Unfortunately, it was rightly stressed at the session of the Presidium—in M.A. Ibragimov's address, among others—the intelligentsia have not always done a good job. This applies also to our Baku intelligentsia. Workers in literature, art and science must thoroughly understand the authority which their words command. They do not always recognize this responsibility, however, and sometimes demonstrate arrogance, forgetting that this can seriously affect the fate of our people and, in the final analysis, the fate of the restructuring. We must find that which unites our peoples and not sow distrust between them.

Attention was directed to the importance of overcoming many difficulties and problems in order to stabilize the situation in Nagorny Karabakh as rapidly as possible. We can only resolve them with cooperation and respect. Unfortunately, the situation has progressed a long way. We have had trouble, so now let us spare no effort to correct the situation. We need to do everything possible to regain what we had won and move ahead.

Steps are being taken also to stabilize the situation in the Armenian SSR. We wish Armenia success in this difficult work and shall do everything possible to help our friends to correct the situation.

As you know, progress has been made toward a possible cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. We know what a large contribution the Soviet Union has made to the elimination of the conflict and that it is doing everything possible to halt the bloody war between the two neighbors. You know also how solutions were found to the Afghan question and other international problems with those with whom it previously appeared impossible to find a common language. All of this was discussed when the NKAO issue was considered at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. And the valid question was asked: What is preventing our two peoples, who have common fundamental interests, common

goals and a common destiny, from finding a common language? The fact was stressed that everything possible must be done to resolve the problem by political means.

A very democratic, respectful, congenial discussion based on principle took place at the Presidium session. The problem was discussed for 8 hours, with 32 comrades speaking. Representatives from our entire nation discussed the matter with enormous concern.

On the one hand, I was extremely ashamed during the session that this question even had to come up. On the other, I had a sense of great pride in my party and in our leadership for the fact that the pain from what had happened on a small piece of land would immediately become the pain of the entire nation, of our powerful homeland. And this guarantees that we will not permit events to develop further in an undesirable direction.

Meetings have recently been held at enterprises and scientific institutions, in creative organizations and VUZs in the republic, at which tens of thousands of people have spoken. They totally support the principles set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's speech and approve of the resolution passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Here are just a few of the thoughts expressed by the comrades. N. Mamedov, machine builder from Baku: "There is unanimous approval of the resolution passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is not a victorious mood, however. Not just one of "we got our way," but a perfectly serious one. This is our common concern, that of both the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, of all those who value friendship, the homeland, justice and the future of our children—finally, the future of the restructuring. This is our main interest, which knows no national differences. And since this is the case, we shall repair the damage done to the edifice of our friendship."

Incidentally, day before yesterday one of the comrades came up to me and said: "Congratulations on the victory!" I asked him "What Victory? Victories are gained over enemies. We have a quarrel between brothers, and we need to make peace. No one side can have a victory at the expense of the other. There can only be victory when it serves the interests of both peoples and the highest interests of our state."

Cotton grower Sh. Mekhtiyev from Barda feels this way: "A just decision was made. How could one dare to raise a hand against that which is most sacred to the Soviet people, friendship and internationalism? How could two fraternal peoples whose lives are closely interwoven think of having a falling out? Azerbaijanis have given their children Armenian names, and Armenians have given their children Azerbaijani names. I totally agree with M.S. Gorbachev that the Karabakh issue is a clever maneuver by the enemies of the restructuring."

B. Makhmudova, tobacco grower from Kelbadzhlar, member of the bureau of the party raykom: "The decision was intelligent. It was correctly stated at the Presidium session that what happened in Nagornyy Karabakh is primarily the fault of republic leaders to blame for serious deficiencies in national policy. Everyone to blame for this must answer. Everything possible must be done to restore good, fraternal relations between the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, so that a person of any nationality feels at home in any corner of our nation."

A. Ashrafov, construction worker from Shusha: "I listened with great excitement to M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I liked it first of all for the concern it showed for the fate of people and each individual, regardless of nationality, and for the fate of the restructuring in our nation. We know that the leaders of the party and the nation are concerned about the situation. The decision adopted conforms first of all to the nation's interests. And this is mainly what helped us to demonstrate restraint, to avoid giving in to acts of provocation and to continue working."

Drilling expert S. Akopyan: "The interests of the entire nation, the interests of a united Soviet people, come before anything else for us Soviet people. The decision on Nagornyy Karabakh passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was based on precisely this fact, and I am prepared to sign that decision. Some of us sometimes forget that we are first of all Communists, builders of a new society, and only after that members of nationalities. The difficult tasks involved in the restructuring which has been launched in our nation can only be accomplished jointly, by uniting the efforts of all nations and nationalities and by ridding ourselves of reprisals and distrust between nations. The success which we will without a doubt achieve will certainly be a common success."

What the comrades say is correct. These are very good words. I share and welcome the intelligent, calm, communist, correct approach.

The address by the General Secretary of the CPSU CC defines the priority tasks of the party organization. We intend to consider all of these matters thoroughly and in detail at a CC plenum at the beginning of August, at which we shall discuss steps toward the practical realization of decisions coming out of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and questions having to do with enhancing the international indoctrination of the workers. We shall also discuss the restoration of principles of social justice in the life of our republic and other pressing problems, of course. I call upon the party aktiv to make its contribution to preparations for this plenum, to submit its ideas and suggestions. I want very much for us to tell, in a spirit of openness and glasnost, what is preventing us from living in the new way, what is hampering the restructuring.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a decision to leave the NKAO as part of the Azerbaijani SSR. There was also a very explicit statement of the importance of taking steps to truly develop this oblast and in the future to prevent the developments of such factors as those which gave rise to this tragedy.

We must think about and work on that which steadily brings the Soviet peoples together. You recall how many various meetings there have been in this hall with friends from Moldavia, Turkmenia, Dagestan and other republics. I am not even talking about Georgia and Armenia, since we have always considered them to be not just neighbors but brothers.

What a lot we have lost today! And just who has gained anything? Only those who are interested in various negative things hidden from sight. Aware that the restructuring will inevitably deprive them of all their privileges, they are giving battle in opposition, having decided that the more powerful the counteraction, the better it is for them. The law is not for them.

Comrade Vezirov presented a report on measures to develop international ties with fraternal Soviet republics and underscored the necessity of strengthening and adding to the remarkable internationalist traditions of Azerbaijan's party organization and its workers.

He went on to acquaint those assembled with his speech at the meeting of the Presidium on 18 July of this year.

It is annoying and painful that at this first session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet since the 19th party conference we have to discuss a problem thrust upon us by openly anti-restructuring forces.

All of us can now see that the very fact the matter of the NKAO's separation from the Azerbaijani SSR was brought up was a significant blow to the friendship between the two fraternal neighboring peoples, which brought pain and suffering to thousands of Azerbaijani and Armenian families and destabilized the situation in the entire region.

On the other hand, this produced an unprecedented flair-up of nationalism in our republic. In short, enormous damage was done to the cause of the restructuring.

This is why preservation of the situation with its unpredictable consequences holds the promise of even greater troubles. Steps must be taken immediately to restore public order and socialist legality, and to halt the strike in Stepanakert, which has lasted 55 days and is unprecedented in the history of the USSR.

The campaign, actively supported by nationalistic and other anti-Soviet forces and hypocritically clothed in slogans of democratization and glasnost, has lasted more than 5 months.

A situation has developed in which, in response to orders coming into Stepanakert, strikes are being initiated and sessions of the oblast soviet are being convened and adopting decisions in conflict with the law. This in turn is destabilizing the situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan. A dangerous chain reaction is in effect.

In Azerbaijan and Armenia we have an alliance of the most disparate elements hostile to the CPSU's course toward the society's revolutionary renewal. Although they make antithetical demands, their goal is the same: to undermine the restructuring for the sake of narrow, egotistical aspirations.

The peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia have lived as good neighbors from time immemorial. We are of the same ethnic type and have the same songs and rug patterns. We have the same sayings. The word "namus" has the same meaning in both languages: honor or shame. Our fortunes have truly been achieved through suffering in a joint struggle for freedom and happiness.

Today we are becoming especially convinced that the restructuring is in great need of the force of socialist patriotism. We are alarmed by the attempt to separate among our own national quarters, to look at the world through the narrow peephole of national problems. Some people have been very timid about discussing the nation's highest state interests of late. There can be no national prospering without a united and strong socialist homeland.

We shall have to work hard to overcome the stratifications and deformations which have developed in international relations in order to totally accomplish the task set by M.S. Gorbachev: a person of any nationality must feel at home at any spot in the USSR.

When one studies the situation, one concludes that those who are raising the NKAO issue are apparently little concerned about the fate of the Armenian population in that area. A shroud has recently been placed over the true objectives and schemes of those who initiated the movement for separation of the NKAO. Social, economic and cultural needs have been shoved aside. Many people pretend there is no Article 78 of the Constitution of the USSR, which guarantees that the territory of a Union republic cannot be altered without its agreement.

The interests and rights of the Armenians of Nagornyy Karabakh can and must be secured by the existing oblast autonomy within the Azerbaijani SSR. And we know that we have a lot to do to accomplish this. Any other statement of the question is legally invalid and politically harmful.

I would also like to mention the following. The antisocialist forces know very well that new generations have entered life and are therefore attempting to seduce their minds with nationalistic and religious ideology. You know that some individuals blasphemously exaggerate

the tragedy which occurred in Sumgait. It evoked rage and acute condemnation in all of us. And we Communists and internationalists must do everything possible, even more than that, to see that such a tragedy is never repeated.

What won't the instigators do by way of provocation? Recently, leaflets and other printed material have made their way here, which accuse Moscow of inflaming hostility between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples and dragging out resolution of the Nagornyy Karabakh question. We cannot close our eyes to this.

We will never permit anyone to cause us to fall out with the great Russian people, who have had an enormous role in the true flowering of all peoples of the USSR. We see the generous assistance and fraternal support of the Russian people in everything achieved by the Azerbaijani people on the path to national rebirth. And every worker of our republic always remembers this with a sense of gratitude.

I have recently been receiving many telegrams and letters supporting the line of developing the traditional relations with all the fraternal republics in every possible way. Unfortunately, these have been forgotten in great part in recent years—and I believe that this applies not to the Azerbaijani SSR alone. We must learn how to collect the nuggets of that which helps bring people together. This requires profound respect for the dignity, the culture, the language and history of each people, and mutual communication among them.

Just look at who is making common cause with and supporting the organizers of the movement for the NKAO's separation. These are representatives of the so-called "democratic alliance." One of its leaders is a certain Zhirinovskiy, who recently issued a call "to rouse Russia with blood." Dressed in the garb of the Armenian people's tribune, I. Muradyan, in the emigre rag RUSS-KAYA MYSL, accuses the leaders of Azerbaijan and the CPSU Central Committee of crimes against the entire Armenian people. And P. Ayrikyan, leader of the National Self-Determination Organization, states that the USSR has not justified the Armenians' hopes for justice at all.

There is a reason for all of this. Every time difficulties arise in our country, those people rise up who want to exploit them in the struggle against the Soviet Union.

Nationalism in the contemporary situation actually poses a serious danger to the practical implementation of the restructuring.

The leaders of Azerbaijan and the autonomous oblast bear an enormous amount of the blame—and we have openly acknowledged this—for what has happened in Nagornyy Karabakh and in connection with it. Urgent problems had not been addressed for years. Neglect of

the international, patriotic indoctrination and other negative developments during the stagnant years created an environment in the NKAO which nourished the growth of nationalistic sentiments. I would like particularly to underscore the fact that we have clearly delineated between the people, between those who have gone astray and become victims of deception, and those who are deliberately exploiting the situation for mercenary purposes.

Azerbaijan's party organization is striving to correct the situation. Comrade S.G. Arutyunyan and I visited the regions of the two republics. The people there frankly told us: Don't permit them to destroy the centuries-old friendship between our peoples.

In this difficult time we constantly see the leaders of the CPSU and the state endeavoring to find a way out of the situation at last, a way to resolve the conflict by political means.

M.S. Gorbachev's appeal to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia has a special place. This document carries an enormous charge of internationalism and is designed for long-term effect. We are doing a poor job of working with the document at the present time and taking little advantage of its enormous potential.

The speech by Comrade Ye.K. Ligachev at the plenum of the Azerbaijani Communist Party CC, which precisely set forth the position of the CPSU CC, had a real effect with respect to normalizing the situation in Baku. Comrades P.N. Demichev and G.P. Razumovskiy visited Azerbaijan at the time of the events.

Comrades A.N. Yakovlev, V.I. Dolgikh and A.I. Lukyanov visited Yerevan at the time of the events. There were also substantive meetings between Comrade A.A. Gromyko and a group of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from our republics. This is the answer to those who say that the Kremlin is unconcerned.

The Communists and workers of the republic fully support the principled and consistent line taken by the Politburo of the CPSU CC toward improving the situation in the region as the only correct one, the only one in keeping with the highest interests of the homeland and all of the peoples inhabiting it.

The decree passed by the CPSU CC points out absolutely correctly that actions and demands for a review of the existing national-territorial arrangement are contrary to the interests of the workers of the Azerbaijani and Armenian SSRs and would damage international relations. The 19th party congress underscored the fact that all pressing problems must be resolved only within the framework of socialism and for the sake of socialism.

I am thoroughly convinced and confident that these bitter days and weeks will finally recede into the past and be just a sad episode which could not wipe out the

centuries-old friendship of the fraternal peoples. We want very much and shall do everything possible to see that that which has united and will always unite our two peoples is not destroyed.

Contacts between the leaders of the two republics are being actively utilized, regular relations are being maintained with S.G. Arutyunyan and other leaders of Armenia, and adjustments are being made in our joint actions for these purposes. We are prepared, united, to find joint resolutions to the urgent problems. Are the NKAO's troubles isolated from the other difficulties of our two republics? After all, the negative effects of our stagnant years, for example, are being felt to no less a degree by the Azerbaijani people themselves and members of the republic's other nationalities.

We consider it a matter of honor to ensure absolute fulfillment of the decree passed by the CPSU CC and the USSR Council of Ministers on the NKAO. It is a good foundation for the dynamic and comprehensive development of this area of our republic. Much has been done within a brief period of time, although far more could have been accomplished. The open resistance of certain party, soviet and managerial leaders of the oblast is hampering things.

Our republic's workers accepted with heart and soul the party's course toward restructuring. This is the guarantee that many problems which we inherited from the stagnant times will be resolved for certain. We must cleanse our social life of numerous deformations, stratifications and crimes. A great deal of work is going to have to be done with the cadres to enable them to use authority for the good of the people and to combine local interests with general state interests. A great deal needs to be done also to instill respect for the law and the observance of state discipline. We also believe, however, that those who violate them must be undeviatingly pursued and punished. Unfortunately, events in and surrounding the NKAO are greatly hampering the restructuring process. I want to say, however, that nothing will divert us from the path of revolutionary reforms! There is no other way for us.

Comrades, today's discussion has demonstrated how important it is to put an end to the explosive situation. People are tired of the unrest and uncertainty.

We totally support the principles contained in the draft resolution on the inadmissibility of altering the territorial makeup of our republic and on the taking of immediate steps to establish order in the region.

So many problems have been brought up today. So let us resolve them! Particularly since there is every possibility for this in the era of restructuring. It is time to move on from insults, reproaches and historical digressions to concrete action.

In conclusion I would like to answer the questions I have been asked. Among other things, I was asked about the point in the Presidium's decision which states: "Consider it expedient to assign the study of the issues relating to this matter which were brought up at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to a specially established commission of the Council of Nationalities, which will submit its recommendations as they are ready to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for consideration."

This is a very important suggestion. You will recall that the speeches at the 19th party conference, including my own, discussed enhancing the role of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Naturally, no question will ever in any case be resolved without the participation of or consideration for the opinion of this or that republic. This was convincingly confirmed at the last session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was truly a lesson in internationalism. So many ideas, thoughts and reflections were presented, and not just on the NKAO, but problems of international relations in general. They need to be studied and resolved for the good of all the nations and peoples of our country.

The second question: They say that in my speech in the Presidium nothing was said about the Azerbaijanis arriving from Armenia during that time. I spoke of this at the party conference, and Comrade S.B. Tatliyev discussed it at the Presidium session. We raised the issue pointedly, and we must deal seriously with the problem. In the days ahead we will have to meet and talk with dozens of people. It has been decided that right now the commission on these matters will be headed by Comrade G.N. Saidov, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, and that it will include Comrade T.Kh. Orudzhev, the CC secretary, and other responsible comrades.

Similar commissions have been set up in all of the rayons, headed by the chairmen of the rayon ispolkoms. Responsible workers from the CPSU CC are now in Armenia, devoting special attention to the areas in which Azerbaijanis are concentrated.

We have to devote sincere attention to and show concern for these people. They have fallen into trouble, and we must help them. We shall keep a close eye on all of this and hold people accountable.

We have rid ourselves of one of the party raykom first secretaries for demonstrating indifference in this matter.

This entire set of issues is at the center of the daily attention of the republic's leaders, who are maintaining constant contact with the leaders of the Armenian SSR.

A third question: "The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet considers it expedient to send representatives to Nagornyy Karabakh, who will operate there in cooperation with representatives of the Azerbaijani and Armenian SSRs to ensure fulfillment of the decisions

adopted." This proposal was introduced by the first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party CC, and we supported it. There is an enormous amount of work to be done with respect to implementing the decree passed by the CPSU CC and the USSR Council of Ministers on the NKAO. In addition to our republic, assignments were issued also to the Armenian SSR and to Union ministries and departments. Proper coordination and assistance will be required, of course. We are interested in totally fulfilling this decree, which will serve the further development of this area of our republic and, most importantly, will beat the aces held by foes of the restructuring with respect to social and economic injustices.

In conclusion A.Kh. Vezirov expressed his confidence that the republic Communists and the party aktiv will do everything possible to ensure implementation of the decree passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the accomplishment of the tasks set forth by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC.

11499

Turkmenia's New Presidium Chairman Bazarova Interviewed

18300426 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
20 Aug 88 p 2

[Interview by *IZVESTIYA*'s correspondent V. Kuleshov with Roza Atamuradovna Bazarova, who several days ago at the special session of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet was elected as the Chairman of the Presidium of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet: "Head of Republic"]

[Text] She was born in July 1933 in Chardzhou and is an ethnic Turkmen. She is a Party member since 1956. She graduated from the Turkmen State University imeni A.M. Gorkiy and holds a degree of a Doctor of Historical Sciences. She was a prorector and later the rector of the Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute imeni Lenin. Since 1975 she was the Deputy Chairman of the TuSSR Council of Ministers, and since 1985 she was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Question] Roza Atamuradovna, I was told that you were never leaving the office earlier than 8 p.m.

[Answer] The secret of success is not in when one comes to or leaves the office. One may work day and night and achieve nothing. Sometimes I worked in my office until late night preparing a document or a decision to no result. In spite of my supposedly high position as the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, when I tried to resolve a problem and to get it through bureaucracy, I felt that I cannot make it.

The years of perestroyka have changed the situation in the republic. The attitude toward construction of health care, preschool child care, and social and cultural life facilities has been also changed. The opportunity to

resolve these problems in an operative manner has appeared. Look, if 3 years ago we practically could not fulfill the plans for construction of social and cultural life facilities and use money assigned for capital investments, during these years we doubled the number of student places in schools and hospital beds in towns and villages. If during the whole 11th 5-year plan period we put in service 1,700 hospital beds, only in 1986 we put in service 1,800 hospital beds. And that is a large reserve.

[Question] Why could not these reserves be used before? What was the obstacle?

[Answer] Of course, much was depending on cadres and, first of all, on the heads of local authoritative bodies, both Soviet and Party.

If people were lucky, they would receive an honest, practical and energetic man, who would organize both the production and social and cultural life. However, as you know, such people were few during the 70's and the first half of the 80's. For years an atmosphere of complacency and self-laudation by the cadres representing the leading group was being formed. The top positions we assigned based on personal devotion, clannishness, and family ties. One could not expect any effective actions from such leaders.

I remember how in the early 80's I came to the Farabskiy rayon in order to help victims of an earthquake. I went to one kolkhoz and asked them to show me the Palace of Culture. I beg your pardon, but it reminded me of a run-down horse stable: windows broken, ceilings caved in, and walls in cracks. Kolkhoz's chairman said that they will repair it. I asked him why they would do such a thing when they must build a new one. He answered that they do not have another building but to build a new one is very costly. I approached the deputy chairman of the rayispolkom but he only shrugged his shoulders indicating that they have not received any instructions from the raykom on the subject.

[Question] Those were the ways. . .However, today as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, who has the real power, you, of course, cannot only make decisions, but also achieve their realization with greater success.

[Answer] Obviously it is not enough to make a good decision. To raise self-consciousness of the people and to persuade each in what you and your fellow workers believe, this is the way to increase the output of the Soviet authorities. Today, as it is required by the resolutions of the 19th Party commissions in order for them to understand and realize their rights and responsibilities toward people. Until recent time, all decisions were made by ispolkoms rather than by deputies. Deputies would come to a session, sit there, take a nap, and go home, and everything would remain as before. To increase output of everybody is what we need today. In order to achieve it we must approach each person.

examine his possibilities and abilities, and to find out what he is good for. Among the 330 deputies of the Supreme Soviet there are deputies-ministers, and also dairymaids and herdsmen. I recently proposed to my fellows that if a deputy has done nothing constructive and he is only present for the count, he must be removed. However, if this herdsman or dairymaid is an active worker and honest person, let us give him additional civic work. For example, the deputy-dairymaid may be assigned to inspect the operation of her farm.

[Question] Recently I was given the following figures: of 330 deputies elected in 1985 to the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, 8 people were called back because they were relieved of their positions due to negative reasons and 82 people left before their term expired. What were the reasons for that?

[Answer] All kinds of reasons. I consider that the Bureau of the TuSSR CP Central Committee was correct when it recognized the actions of many former leaders of the republic and oblast and rayon authorities to be incompatible with the requirements of Party ethics. I think that the work of studying and selecting cadres for the Soviet authorities will continue. We have many competent specialists and professionals, able active fighters for perestroika. They must head the work of the local and central Soviets in order to reach new summits in economics and social building.

[Question] Are you happy in your personal life?

[Answer] I have a very good and harmonious family. My husband is a scientist-historian. My son is a student at the radiophysics and electronics department. Evenings and days when we meet together because our family celebrates...

13355

Excessive Secrecy of Departmental Information Criticized

18000614 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 6 Aug 88 p 6

[Article by A.Pokrovskiy: "What Is There, in the P.O.Box: Of State and Departmental Secrets"; first paragraph is a boldface introduction]

[Text] I still blush whenever I think of that letter: a worker—a shop floor propagandist, as he introduced himself—asked what happened at the Baykonur launching site in September 1983. "Rumors were flying all over our shop," he wrote, "that there had been a fire at the launching pad. I told people not to listen to foreign Russian-language radio broadcasts which come up with all sorts of lies. Some time later, however, people brought newspapers from other socialist countries to work (some of our workers buy them regularly); those papers confirmed reports of a fire at Baykonur. Tell me how I am going to face my co-workers now?"

What could I reply to him? I myself, along with the entire world, had known about the fire: in a space age, an accident like that could not be kept under covers and many foreign publications printed authentic photographs. In response to pressure from correspondents stationed in Moscow, a press conference was held; everyone was free to use the materials of that press conference, except representatives of the Soviet mass media. Thus reliable information about events at a Soviet space launching site came from abroad. We were left red-faced, ashamed both for ourselves and for those who so humiliatingly divided information into "for us" and "for them."

Times have changed. The difficult moments experienced in September 1983 by Vladimir Titov and Gennadiy Strekalov at the launch pad have been covered in sufficient detail by the Soviet press. Knowing about it makes one even more proud today, as one follows the exploits of Vladimir Titov and Musa Manarov aboard space station "Mir." Truly do they know how to train cosmonauts at the Zvezdnyi space center, so that those cosmonauts do not get thrown off balance by an unexpected mishap. Besides, every cloud has its silver lining. When recently "Mir's" crew had to execute an unforeseen move to a higher orbit in order to enhance the reception of a telescope, Titov's fortitude was most certainly taken into account when the operation was planned.

But the question remains: how did it happen that the secret—even if the fire at the launching pad was viewed as such—was guarded with the secret on the outside, so to speak? I am certain that it was the same administrative managerial apparatus—which has been so often in the news lately because it spares no effort to escape public scrutiny—that at the time used secrecy regulations to its own advantage.

Let us take a closer look. Those who develop and use space technology work or serve at so-called numbered enterprises, offices and units—known simply as "post office boxes"—each with its own level of secrecy. This is totally justified. There are things there that have to be carefully guarded from outsiders' eyes. However, there are other things that should be shown, both to domestic industry and the outside world. There is also a potential there to earn hard currency which our state needs.

The matter requires a flexible approach: achievements that can be applied in other areas of the economy or profited from commercially should not be hidden at secret enterprises but actively applied, taking appropriate measures not to divulge state secrets. Instead of obeying all required secrecy regulations, the "boxes" should approach the task creatively, strangely though the word may sound in this context.

Examples can be found even at Baykonur. At one time, S.P.Korolev personally guarded the first Soviet journalist allowed to visit it; since then, however, it has been

visited by hundreds, if not thousands, specialists, astronauts and journalists from a dozen countries. Recently, on the request of the USSR Glavkosmos, representatives of foreign insurance firms were allowed in—which is totally unheard-of—to assess the reliability of Soviet space technology. And nothing has been heard of state secrets leaking out, even though there is plenty of them at Baykonur. This means that they know how to protect those secrets.

Alas, the decades-old habit of banning everything out of hand is still strong. Naturally, it is easier to slap the secrecy stamp on everything than to open something up after giving it some thought. Not only equipment, technology, patents and ideas used to be marked secret but individuals and entire organizations as well. We still recall the time when there were "secret" Heroes of the Soviet Union and of Socialist Labor and Lenin and State Prize laureates. Those were truly the nameless heroes. Such approach has moral drawbacks, but its economic consequences are even more damaging.

Let me state something in advance. In discussing this complex and sensitive subject—which could be raised in the press only in the climate of glasnost created by the party after the 27th Congress—I will use only the data which I as a journalist have come across in the course of open editorial correspondence. I will do so in order not to damage, however unintentionally, the economic interests of our state.

Judging by the letters, the application of the new technology created by the space exploration program in other sectors of the machine building industry has been very slow. After every article in PRAVDA in which a specialist describes a new spaceship, space station or various machinery aboard them, the editorial office gets letters inquiring where one could learn more about this or that pump, alloy or instrument (that can also be used in medicine) mentioned in the article and therefore not secret. They should ask us an easier question.

The same thing happens with satellite photographs. They are needed in many sectors of the economy, but go primarily to places equipped with safes for secret papers. A kolkhoz or a forest farm will not get such a photograph since there is no place to hide it there. Meanwhile, at the world market, you can order a shot of practically any part of the globe—but it will cost you dearly. Who are we hiding this from?

This situation is similar to the one I encountered in Murmansk, where I was working in the 1950s. In Murmansk, fishing boat captains had to sign for navigation maps, which they received at the security office. At sea, however, anything can happen: a sudden storm, or a wave rolling over the ship. What would happen then to the map for which you have signed? The captains, therefore, used to buy their maps in the FRG or England,

which were no worse than ours and at times even more detailed. Have we not learned in the past 30 years to tell true vigilance from false? Or are we doing this on purpose?

Look at the veil of secrecy that surrounds the production of consumer electronics, computers and communications equipment in our press. These are areas in which we have admittedly fallen full decades behind the rest of the world. Plenty of legal tricks have been devised to preserve secrecy. If an article names the enterprise, the ministry must remain a secret; if it mentions the ministry, nothing is to be said about the enterprise, etc. What are the secrets that are being so carefully guarded? Who are they being guarded from, to be more exact? Probably the aim is to prevent speculation that there was some sort of a fire there too; or, in other words, that their "box" is simply empty.

Unfortunately, many departments are highly skilled at using their power to determine what constitutes their departmental secrets. Experienced graduate students know that a "secret" dissertation topic has a better chance of being accepted; similarly, departments have created their own secrecy strategy to make their life easier. Journalists are often criticized for keeping silent for so long about the state of the Aral and Caspian Seas and the excesses of land reclamation activities. Yet, what could we do if without the permission of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources such articles were not even considered for publication? Now, after public protests, that dam has been torn down, but entities of the USSR State Committee on Water and Meteorology still withhold data on the level of environmental pollution in specific regions, for instance. This breeds rumors and people get nervous while agencies guard their secrets.

In short, the following thesis in the resolution "On Glasnost," passed by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, is extremely relevant: "We must create a system of providing full and steady information about the situation at the work place, on the countryside, in cities, oblasts, republics and the country, establishing the legal right of citizens, mass media, working collectives and public organizations to gain access to information that is of interest to them. We must strictly define the extent of the necessary secrecy and departmental secrets and establish the responsibility for divulging state and military secrets or disseminating information that violates legal rights of citizens or damages public order and the security, health or morality of the people, as well as the responsibility for violating the right of citizens to obtain information and for concealing, distorting or misusing information."

It has been put plainly enough. One can only wish that there were no secrecy buffs who think that this does not concern them. Experience has shown that complex situations may at times arise. For instance, recently enterprises of the former Ministry of Machine Building for the

Light and Food Industry and Consumer Appliances have been placed under the supervision of defense agencies. With all due respect for the secrets of the defense industry, the public wants to know how those enterprises are doing in the new environment and how those industries, which have been assigned a high priority by the party, will develop in the future. In other words, the means of national defense and consumer goods should not be kept behind the same fence. In order to advance toward a socialist state based on principles of legality, well-thought out, mutually acceptable rules and regulations, ones that can not be hidden in a "box," should be devised in this area.

12892

State Responsibility for Formation of Youth Policy Examined

18000604 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by D. Muratov under rubric of "Social Portrait of a Phenomenon": "Substitution: Whose Interests Do the Youth Affairs Commissions Represent in the USSR Supreme Soviet?"]

[Text] Be alert: a clattering is heard. In various interviews and statements the decisions of the 19th party conference are being called "epochal," and "outstanding." Even though, it seems, experience has taught us that a judgment on any given decision can be given not before but only after its implementation; anticipation of the result is irrepressible, faith in incantation is deeply ingrained and strong. Magic in general is alive: they say that in ancient times the bread-winner was congratulated on the beaten mammoth before the hunt, and the guests licked their fingers, imitating a feast, which was thought to bring good luck. I do not think that the mammoth shared this confidence.

More than once in our memory the very best beginnings have cast a spell—by means of modern methods not unlike the primeval ones—and come to nothing. Yu. Vorontsov from Severodvinsk was absolutely right when he wrote in a letter to the editor: "It must be determined today who specifically answers not only for the approval but also for the fulfillment of party conference decisions, through which current state structures any one of them will be carried out."

Today let us touch on one concrete point—the formulation of an integral state policy on youth. And we shall try to find out exactly who must work it out and implement it. Answers of the type "it is everybody's concern" "and let us do it all together" I suggest we leave as parenthetical remarks.

But the task is this: "The conference supports the full restoration of the Leninist traditions of party leadership of the Komsomol and the observance of its organizational independence, its right to participate in political activity and the development of policy, and its right to defend the interests of young people in party, soviet and economic organs."

("From the Resolution "On the Course of Work to Realize the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks Related to the Intensification of Perestroika").

Question: How and through whom are these interests to be defended and this policy to be formulated? In his speech to the party conference Viktor Mirenko, the first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, proposed support for a number of social measures included in the law concerning youth which is being drafted at present, a search for ways to implement them, and the establishment within USSR Goskomstat, USSR Gosplan, and the Buro of the USSR Council of Ministers of small subdivisions concerned with social development which could participate in the formulation of the country's social and economic development plans and the state budget, while working to ensure consideration for the interests of young people; he also proposed the formation of a youth fund with monies from social organizations as well as state financial resources.

All this is good but what disturbs me personally is this. The law on youth has not yet been brought forward for discussion. The establishment of new "small subdivisions" which would come under the executive organs is also quite problematic.

Well, tell me, who has heard about any benefit derived from the youth commissions which are attached to practically all of the ministries and which are directed personally by the deputy ministers? The mass emergence of all kinds of "headquarters" to coordinate various centers produces only the illusion of activity. Here is another example: a special commission under the leadership of the former Politburo member G.A. Aliyev did not produce any tangible results in the resolution of the socio-economic problems of young people, and after the Year of Youth it concluded its work. And all the more doubtful is the assertion that the above-mentioned subdivisions will be able to work to achieve consideration for the interests of the younger generation. And why, in fact, should they work to achieve this if up to now the activities of the ministries and agencies have practically ignored the interests of young people? After, all, in that same speech the first secretary of the Komsomol said correctly that only 15 percent of small families have been provided with dormitory space, while 1.5 million (!) applications for places in kindergartens remain unsatisfied.

It seems to me that if we are now working to reform the political system of society and if we are reviving the soviets, then it is worth looking to them for the resolution of youth problems; concrete policy should be carried out through them.

And so.

The USSR Supreme Soviet (the highest organ of state power in the USSR) has youth affairs commissions, one attached to the Council of the Union (34 people) and one attached to the Council of Nationalities (34 people). The chairman of one is A.A. Logunov, rector of Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov, and the chairman of the other is B.K. Pugo, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. The commissions have enormous powers. They can examine in advance the corresponding sections and indicators of the state plans (Article 13, point 3 of the regulations concerning standing commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities). Their recommendations are subject to mandatory examination by state and social organs (Article 23). And the main point is that the standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet have the right of legislative initiative (Article 18).

It turns out that everything is here. Nothing needs to be invented. Here it is, the most reliable mechanism for the implementation of youth policy. However, that is only at first glance. If you take a close look, the grandiose mechanism reminds you of Robinson Crusoe's boat: he made it from the very best wood in the forest, but he could not drag it to the shore or lower it into the water—it was sturdy to look at but impossible to lift.

I will say more firmly and definitely: in their present state the youth affairs commissions are practically ineffective.

The current USSR Supreme Soviet has been working since March 1984. Since that time its youth affairs commissions have not once exercised their basic rights: the right of legislative initiative and the right to make substantial amendments to the country's development plans remain unexercised.

Of course, judging by available information, "definite work" has been carried out. They "listened to" Bryansk Oblast on the question of party leadership of the Komsomol; recommendations were made to ministries and agencies on the implementation of school reform (judging by available information, "in addition to definite positive shifts, inadequacies were noted"). Using the example of Mangyshlak (why Mangyshlak?) they examined the organization of the "work on instilling in young people an active life position and on developing a socialist way of life." And certain others.

Please forgive me for enumerating "agendas" which are quite far removed from life. They sound simply inappropriate when four million young families are waiting in line for housing, when young workers are being let go as part of staff reductions, when the system of credits for newly-weds is a fiction, when the mother of the dead soldier-internationalist, Vasiliy Zhukovskiy, has not yet been successful in her long struggle to have P.N. Kostiv,

head of the route division of the Lvov Railway, transfer her son Boris, her sole remaining source of support, to a similar position nearer home...

Why is it happening this way?

The answer is simple. It is the apparatus of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium which puts forward the questions for consideration by the commission (usually it meets only twice a year). The information on any given problem is prepared for the deputies most frequently by the employees and experts of those ministries and agencies to which a judgment must be presented...

Deputy Pavel Grigoryevich Berdnikov, a furnace worker from Cherepovets and a commission member, is a sharp and direct person, who said to me: "The commission does not decide real matters."

Why? Because it is made up that way. Why any given deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet have ended up on it is a mystery.

L.A. Steshenko, an employee of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, after reproaching me for a certain lack of comprehension, explained: "All the deputies have expressed their desire to work on precisely this commission."

Vitaliy Mikhaylovich Shabanov, an army general and USSR deputy defense minister, replied to my question about how he ended up "on precisely this" commission, saying "absolutely accidentally. No one asked me."

Nor did they ask Pavel Grigoryevich Berdnikov. And he was not the only one.

Here are the figures. The youth affairs commission of the Council of the Union includes 13 major leaders (including the minister V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of RSFSR Gosagroporm; Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin, commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy; five first secretaries of party obkoms); in addition to 16 workers and peasants, it includes five white-collar workers (a pilot, telegraph operator, an editor, a kolkhoz chairman and a livestock expert). And not one (!) sociologist, teacher, lawyer, economist or social scientist.

What is there to say: neither commission has even one Komsomol worker. Thus, it is difficult to agree with commission chairman A.A. Logunov's claim that all the deputies have some connection with young people through their work; in fact, this claim can be made only if one considers that in general everything in the world is interrelated.

Why was such a careful calculation necessary? In order to prove again and again that any system, including ours, in which the number of officials is "balanced" against the number of workers who perform physical labor, is

defective. It makes it possible to be present at a commission and not work. It makes it possible—even with the best motives—to manipulate the commission by means of the agenda, the system for providing information and the drafts of decisions prepared in advance. In brief, it eliminates independence. And in that case any initiative not sanctioned by the apparatus of government arouses in that apparatus first hidden and then open dissatisfaction.

I remember perfectly how the workers of the Supreme Soviet Presidium tried to silence the newspaper when V. Lukonin, a commission member, published his question about the creation of a society of invalids in KOMSOMOLKA. It was illegal and it was not put in the correct form...So who sets the conditions for whom? Does a deputy set them for the apparatus or does the apparatus set them for the deputy?

The party conference provided an answer to this question. The apparatuses and ispolkoms must be subordinate to the deputies. The legislative power and the executive power must be separated. The role of the standing commissions has changed. But as a minimum the deputies must have the time to implement their—speaking in legal language—“power functions.”

The 19th party congress resolution “Concerning the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System” talks about periodically freeing deputies from their primary work. If this proposal needs experimental verification, it could be tested by the youth affairs commissions. According to a 19 January 1938 law of the USSR, which is little known but still in effect, deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet are paid 200 rubles every month, regardless of their salary, as compensation for expenses related to the exercise of their powers as deputies.

Why could not some of the deputies on various standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet—those most competent and capable of taking upon themselves the role of experts—keep their (perhaps large?) “salary” and be freed from work? Maybe such a measure would eliminate the monopoly which the apparatus has on the preparation of “agendas” and drafts of decisions?

However, neither this nor other decisions will yield the desired result if the actual procedure for establishing the membership of the commissions is not changed.

The resolution “Concerning the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System” says: the congress of people’s deputies of the USSR (and

the congress will form the USSR Supreme Soviet), in addition to deputies from the electoral districts, should include deputies representing the basic units of the political system—the party, the trade unions, the Komsomol and other mass social organizations. This means that the coming 12th USSR Supreme Soviet might include a certain number of deputies chosen by a plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee.

And what if those deputies were to form the youth affairs commissions of the Supreme Soviet! At the grass roots there could be preliminary campaigns during which the candidates put forward by Komsomol organizations on a competitive basis would defend their platforms through the youth newspapers, and those who survived the first round of the “local” elections would come to the Central Committee plenum.

The plenum would supplement the platforms of the candidates for deputies and would propose to the congress of deputies pre-formed youth affairs commissions for the USSR Supreme Soviet’s Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities after presenting mandates to their chairmen.

And thus it would be possible—through the Komsomol deputies—to actually carry out an integral, realistic policy which takes account of the interests of young people. This is not Utopia. This is chance. There are examples: the Makeyevskiy Komsomol Gorkom and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried out a successful experiment on the creation of a youth group within the soviet, and a Komsomol organization of deputies operates within the Donetsk Oblast Soviet. A similar group in Surgut convinced a session of the municipal soviet to re-examine plans for the development of the city taking the problems of young people into account.

When nominating deputies from the Komsomol, it is probably worth granting a certain number of mandates to representatives of other youth associations as well.

Of course, much that is as yet unclear and unfamiliar has been done, and the first experience may be bitter. But it is worth trying. Moreover, there is not a lot of time remaining. It is necessary to carefully think through democratic procedures for nomination, to work out a system for surveying public opinion, and to prepare for an active election campaign.

There is a real opportunity to formulate and adopt rather than simply execute state decisions. And it is high time to get to know one’s deputies by sight.

Journalist Calls for New Approaches in Portrayal of Nationalists

18000559 Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
5 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by P. Shafeta, UkrSSR Honored Journalist, Ya. Galan Prize Laureate: "Whom Are We Ashamed Of? Theme of Struggle with Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism in Journals of Republic"]

[Text] The nationalistic newspaper **UKRAYNSKE SLOVO** which is published in Paris, does not have a humor section, but nevertheless it can arouse a reader's ironical smile. Is it not funny when one finds on its pages naive complaints on today's Ukrainian social and political journalism, which, you see, for some reason does not give a break to the members of OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] even under the conditions of *perestroyka*.

Yes, it is so. Nobody should expect an armistice on this front, because everybody knows what is the OUN. We never used euphemisms describing this malicious enemy and never held back anything.

Today we have another problem. We must get rid of old propaganda stereotypes.

Devaluation of certain topical genres has taken place. For example, in the late 40's Yaroslav Galan had differences with the editing board of **NOVYY MIR**, which refused to publish a pamphlet it ordered from the journalist complaining that it is too encyclopedic with regard to the submitted literary material. Today such conflicts are unheard of. As to the "pamphlet" rubric it quite often appears above mediocre, boring jabber having nothing in common with literature.

Addressing the theme of struggle with bourgeois nationalism the "thick" journals prefer semi-dissertational articles, which are intended not so much for readers, as for so-called thematic "firing back" designed to show that they also unmask an ideological enemy.

But good factual literature always has had a priority with the readers.

I remember the success of a book of reports "Sensation: Murder!" by the journalist from GDR Dietrich Ryukman published in Moscow in the 70's, where the author examined the causes of a series of political murders. The well-known French journalist Allen Gerin in his historical-publicistic book "Gray General" had shown in an interesting way the connections of Ukrainian nationalists with German fascists. Recently, during my visit to Poland, I witnessed how in bookstores of many cities, from Chelm to Warsaw, buyers were asking for the new book of the Polish historian and publicist Edward Prus "Atamans of UPA."

We can provide many such examples, old and recent. A good political book finds its way to readers fast. Those were, so to say, examples of foreign origin. And how about us?

Recently at the meeting of the editing board of the Kamenyar publishing house, we discussed with concern how to make the collection of articles "Yaroslav Galan's Post," which is published twice a year, more readable. What is its main problem? In my opinion, it is how the book converses with a reader. In publications of this type we are still using a scientific-like style, providing a quotation after a quotation, and repeating over and over again well-known facts, and adding to them the traditional morals. Why is it and what for?

The time has come to radically restructure the work of publicistic sections of journals and to raise it to the modern level.

I once more re-read the materials in our republican "Thick" literary journals for the past 2 years and came to the conclusion that the struggle with the nationalistic ideology in most of the cases is carried out on yesterday's level.

Let us take for example, one of our newest monthlies, **KYYV**, and pay attention to the rubric "Na chatakh." Let us ignore this childish title and read what is published under it, for example, a story by B. Martynenko about post-war diversions of the US special services against the USSR. Is this theme actual? Of course. However, this subject is presented as such old hat that the interest to read it disappears after the first paragraphs.

The article "Preserving Revolutionary Vigilance" published in **DNIPR**, No 12, 1987, is also quite scholastic. Describing the 70 years of our chekist service, the author tries to talk to young readers using old, worn out stereotypes. One reads it and thinks: instead of this banal stuff, why not publish the memoirs of real chekists (for example, how the OUN emissaries Klimchuk, or Dobosh, were unmasked).

And why not start publishing in journals a series of political portraits? To tell who is who about the ideologists and leaders of nationalism such as Dontsov, Konovalets, Bandera, and Stetsko.

In my opinion, the time has come to satisfy the legitimate interest of the readers toward historical details and describe many political events in a new way based on the position of *glasnost*, without repeating well-known facts, using proper publicistic skills. For example, we should tell who organized the OUN and how it was done, who wrote the scenario of declaration of the "independent Ukraine" in Lvov on 30 Jun 41, how because of that a shoot-out between the followers of Bandera and Melnikov took place, how in 1946 at the Lvov church synod the Brest union was abolished, etc.

The old themes require a new approach. This is obvious. However, even when such an approach starts to shape, it is difficult for it to reach the readers. And who is opposing it? The editors, both those who correct the text by adjusting it to the averaged stereotype, and those who try to keep a monopoly on information, facts, and even their interpretation.

As before, they look on publicists as on small children which should not play with matches. Let history be a subject for historians.

I think that exactly because of this the creative group of publicists organized several years ago at the Board of the Ukrainian journalist union has produced nothing. Great hopes were placed on this group. It was anticipated that interesting with regard to contents and stylistically new materials saturated with actual political information would appear in press. However. . . it was learned that "unauthorized persons are prohibited" to read certain foreign publications. And those who were "authorized" lacked the skills to write interestingly. A vicious circle.

Let me tell you about a case in my own experience. I read in one foreign newspaper that a group of Zionists is demanding to erect in Jerusalem a monument to the metropolitan of the Uniate Church Sheptitskiy, the same Sheptitskiy who during the war collaborated with fascists. After studying the foreign sources, I have found very interesting facts, still unknown to the wide readers circles, showing the Pharisical face of the Uniate metropolitan. I learned, in particular, that one of his brothers was executed by fascists in the Polish town of Zamostye in 1943. Another brother together with the brother's wife were tortured to death by Ukrainian nationalists. As to the Sheptitskiy, during this time he was discussing with Kanaris the formation of the nationalistic SS division Galichina, was courting the chief of abwehr, and was making jokes. . . The metropolitan did not admit into his heart the death cries of his own brothers! I wrote an article "Advocates of Sinful Metropolitan"; it was published, but those horrible facts were deleted by the editors as. . . "disadvantageous."

Another example. While working on materials about Sheptitskiy, I went to Poland. Colleagues at the Zamostye's weekly had shown me a diary of a nationalistic writer who was a member of an OUN gang acting in the Polish territory in 1944-1946. I found in this chronicle of nationalistic agony many interesting materials about how after the war the population opposed nationalists, both Polish and Ukrainian. I wrote an article, which was published in a republican newspaper, and later included it in my publicistic book "Black Legion." However, alas, the article did not appear in the book.

All these are vestiges of the old malady known as "just in case."

Speaking of journals, one cannot ignore the journal ZHOVTEN published in Lvov. It seems it is our only journal where history has a constant and strong contact with journalism. It is no surprise that the journal is becoming with confidence the leader with regard to copies being sold. It has published a documentary essay by B. Antonenko "One of AK," story "To Capture Kruk" by Ya. Yakovlev, pamphlet "Stone in Tel-Aviv" by Yu. Shulmeyster, eyewitnesses' stories of crimes committed by nationalists in Zaleschiki of Ternopol oblast, and other interesting materials. The editing board carries out a persistent search for enriching the genres, in particular, it practices documentary stories told in the first person singular.

The healing processes taking place in our country require new literary thinking. For example, we are learning to appreciate the merits of works created in emigration and to separate these merits from today's or yesterday's political biases of their authors. However, we cannot agree with one tendency which appeared during the process of building literary bridges. I would call this tendency a "non-resistance."

For example, why does the journal VITCHYZNA shun a confrontation with literary banderovtsy? For the last 2 years they did not publish a single important article on the subject. Why are they so shy?

To some degree shortcomings of this and other journals are made up by collections of articles published by the publishing house Radyanskyy Pismennyk. For example, just recently, the readers received an interesting book "Answer to 'Fellow-Countrymen'" by Nikolay Dubina, who compiled fictions and publicistic works of Ukrainian writers dedicated to the struggle with the nationalistic ideology. It is a good thing. However, collections of article are published irregularly and they, as a rule, lack fresh materials.

Here we must remember the best of Yaroslav Galan's creative works. Written on the topic of the day, his words, nevertheless, do not disappear from the serious literature.

Shortly before his death, Galan has noted in a letter to Petr Panch: "I have written a lot during my life, but if somebody would offer to make a book of it, I would not have the materials to do it." Let us render the due to the high exactingness of the writer and publicist. But do not his words sound like a reproach to those of us who continue his work and his struggle?

**APN Correspondent Finds Local Resistance to
Journalistic Freedoms**

18300354 Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
7 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by APN Correspondent Natalya Buldyk: "The Journalist, the Official, and Glasnost: A Tight Fit in the Boat"]

[Text] The five million copies of newspapers published daily in Belorussia (10 million population) are sold out literally instantly. Interest in the press, which brings reader attention to pressing problems, is extremely strong. However, the journalists draw their share of complaints: they do not write about everything, and they are not as communicative as they should be.

Yes, we do not discuss everything. And, indeed, we are not always as communicative as we should be. But it often happens that the fault is our own. For example, there are the correctional institutions, which we for so long considered to be an area closed to the press. We later learned that no one ever forbade us entry. It was simply a case of our failing to try to visit them, since we were convinced that we would not be admitted. And that if we were to receive such permission, there would be nothing published on the visit.

When did we become possessed by this conviction, this unshakable certainty, that this is forbidden, that is forbidden? Can it be that journalism has a special attraction for people who are cautious and fearful? It is probably more a matter of our being taught "not to poke our noses into places where we do not belong" by life itself, or, more likely, by bureaucrats, without whom the journalist often would not make a move.

For example, I still wince when I think of the crowd of curious people that surrounded us at a market in Minsk, where overzealous militiamen inappropriately asked me and a French journalist to show our papers. In their opinion, we had no right to a discussion with people there, let alone photograph them, even though the people themselves were happy to answer our questions and pose for our cameras. On the next day we were given an official apology for the "unpleasant incident," but what purpose did that serve then? It was just one more item which my colleague could report.

I can cite another occurrence in which a foreign journalist was involved. This time he was from Japan. You see, he wanted to take a snapshot (just imagine!) of Soviet kiddies who were enjoying a meal in a very nice small restaurant for children. This intent, from the restaurant manager's point of view, was criminal. She stood in our way (literally blocking the doorway with her body) and demanded that we present permission to photograph signed by the trade administration chief.

Was that an incident from the past, the pre-perestroika era? All right—how about a newer example. To take two shots at an exhibition of paintings by an amateur artist, I was required to telephone none other than the republican minister of culture! In this case the official having authority over the exhibition hall stated that "several canvases are religious in content, and, if you write an article about the exhibition, we will be accused of religious propaganda..." The minister, after being told about this argument, had a long laugh, but his laugh was not particularly merry.

There probably is no point to citing other cases of this nature—they are too numerous to list. But I, the same as other regular correspondents working for the central publications, enjoy a more or less favorable situation, since I am less dependent on local authorities than are local journalists. Colleagues of mine who are not protected by a large "firm" cannot make a single move at times, especially if the piece they are writing strikes any of the managers as being negative, or if the writing casts aspersions on "our" city, "our" oblast. An example follows.

Not long ago two journalists who were disturbed by the deteriorating ecological situation in their city gathered information on the subject, with supporting facts and figures. However, after the item was published in the newspaper, the authors and the editor associated with the article were called into a session of the party gorkom bureau, to answer for a trivial inaccuracy in the article. There can be no doubt that the journalists should have checked their facts carefully. However, even if an error did creep in, was that a reason to hurl accusations at my colleagues? Something about their presenting distorted information and creating a tense atmosphere in the city...

I hope that the journalists' tribulation will not discourage them from writing penetratingly and truthfully. All the more since the changes, the fresh winds of perestroika blowing over the country have made it possible for us to become aware of our strengths and capabilities. However, newspaper people are finding it difficult to make a complete break from subordination, since they answer directly to party and soviet organs, in which some workers exert not so much general supervision as petty guardianship over not only what is to be written, but also how it is to be written. Very indicative is the fact that the two journalists discussed above asked me not to cite their names or cities; otherwise, they could be subjected to a new avalanche of accusations - for washing dirty linen in public.

If city newspapers are in such a situation, what can be said about industrial and large-circulation papers? How can journalists who are paid by a construction trust write sharply critical articles about the managers of that trust? A woman I know who works for a large-circulation paper

bitterly complained: "I was told that I would be given a lower priority on the waiting list for apartments if I write another piece of unpleasant journalism."

What to do to rectify the situation? What can be done to make the local press as well as the central press into an instrument of the *glasnost* so necessary to society?

First and foremost, in my opinion, it is necessary to pass a law which in addition to other provisions states exactly what information is to be classified as a state secret or administrative secret, and which, in accordance with the principle "if it is not forbidden, it is permitted," is open to the public. But this is not sufficient. The promise of *glasnost*, in my opinion, holds that the entire press activity should be independent.

For example, why cannot we render (to start as an experiment, at least) the *MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA* an organ of physicians, medical scientists, and society, instead of one of the Ministry of Health? Or what about removing the *SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA* from the wardship of the Ministry of Trade? Especially since we already have something on this order and need not look far for an example: the *Novosti* press agency—the information organ under the aegis of social organizations.

For the time being, we all must think about all this seriously. But of one thing we can be sure: There is not enough space in a small boat for the journalist, the bureaucrat, and *glasnost*. One of them must disembark.

13005

Better Availability Sought for Uzbekistan's Tajik-Language Newspaper
18300423a Moscow *ZHURNALIST* in Russian No 7, Jul 88 p 38

[Letter by M. Sayfiddinov, student of the Tashkent Highest Party School: "To Return Former Fame"]

[Text] "What did you say? *KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON*?" The man at the newsstand made a helpless gesture. "I work so many years but never heard about this newspaper..."

This statement surprised me also because I heard it not in some remote place but in the center of Tashkent at the always crowded newsstand near the Navoi theater.

Only after checking on some ten other newsstands, I found in the window of one of them the only issue of this newspaper. Indeed, it is easier to find a needle in a haystack..

KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON (*UZBEKISTANSKAYA PRAVDA*) is the newspaper of the UzSSR CP Central Committee, UzSSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and UzSSR Council of Ministers. Are not these respectable organizations interested in the popularity and

strengthening the authority of their newspaper? Especially when this newspaper is the only Tajik-language newspaper in the republic, where many Tajiks reside.

KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON is more than 70 years old. There was a time when it was called *OVOZI TAJIK* which means "Voice of a Tajik." The newspaper was a mouthpiece for revolutionary ideas. The founders of the Tajik Soviet literature Sadriddin Ayni and Abulkasim Lakhuti were publishing in it their ardent poems and passionate publicistic articles. The newspaper was always sold out and people read it until holes were formed. Today only dreams about such fame are left.

How to return the former popularity to *KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON*? At the readers meeting in Samarkand, where the newspaper has the majority of subscribers, people were asking plainly: why is it that each issue is overloaded with official materials and outdated "news."

Well, the complaints are justified. But it is not enough to address them to the editing board. It is difficult to be at the top when the newspaper is published only three times a week. This creates difficulties with subscriptions, and the very small number of copies, slightly over 30,000, remain at the same level for many years. It is not surprising, because it is easy to lose an interest toward a newspaper which does not closely follow events and falls behind in describing them.

Readers in Samarkand, as it was described in the report about the meeting, were asking whether *KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON* will be published 6 times a week as *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* and *SOVET UZBEKISTONI*. This issue should be discussed at the UzSSR CP Central Committee, but obviously, they do not care too much about the newspaper. One can make this judgment already based on the following fact. During all the time since the 27th Party Congress no member of the Central Committee's Bureau, secretary, or department head has ever spoken on the pages of *KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON*, as if this newspaper does not belong to the central Committee.

Meanwhile, for some part of the Tajik population of Uzbekistan, especially for those who live in rural areas and insufficiently know Russian, the newspaper *KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTON* is almost the only window to the world.

13355

Reader Chides Central Press for Handling of Uzbek Language References
18300423b Moscow *ZHURNALIST* in Russian No 7, Jul 88 p 38

[Letter by V. Degtyarev from Sevastopol: "Respect Brother's Language"]

[Text] When I was young I had the opportunity to live more than 20 years in Uzbekistan. For a resume, I know the Uzbek language poorly, but nevertheless, I do speak

the language. This language belongs to the Turkic group of languages, which also includes the Turkmen, Kazakh, Tatar, Azeri, and many other languages of the peoples of our country.

Reading materials published in the central press and concerning the Turkic-language regions, I unintentionally pay attention to absurdities and mistakes. Long ago the journal SELSKAYA MOLODEZH published an article about Turkmenia, I remember this article, not for its contents, in spite of the fact that it was describing a case of murder investigation, but for language errors. For example, the article states that "...the seemingly forgotten 'turkmen-chilik' got into action and Yagdyyev killed Tagan. . ." The Turkmen language indeed has a word "Turkmenchilik," which can be translated as "Turkmenness," that is, the set of customs and habits typical for Turkmens. But "turkmen-chilik" with a hyphen is so absurd as "Turkmen-ness." And not only Turkmens see it, but all people speaking Turkic languages. Another example: "...I saw a young man in kolkhoz Sovet Turkmenistana. . ." The correct name of the Kolkhoz is Sovet Turkmenistany (the republic has also a newspaper with the same title) and it means Soviet Turkmenistan. Instead, the reader is presented with a nonexistent in nature Soviet of Turkmenistan. Unfortunately, this mistake appears quite often in our press when unqualified attempts are made to translate such seemingly understandable combinations of words as Sovet Uzbekistoni (Soviet Uzbekistan) and other similar names.

One of the articles in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA describes a permit submitted at a market by one seller who came from the South. It reads: there is a personal plot of 17 'sutki.' [There is a play of words, namely, in Russian 'sutki' is a 24 hour day and 'sotka' is 100 sq. meter plot.] What is growing on these 'sotki-sutki?' It is written by hand 'aples,' 'peaeres,' 'tamatos,' 'flowers,' and 'dried apricots.' In short, for all occurrences." [In

the Russian original: yabluk, gurush, pamidor, tsvety, uruk. Those are illiterate renderings of Russian words and they sound quite funny for a Russian ear.]

"Sutki" instead of "sotki" sounds seemingly funny. But let us try to proceed from the opposite, namely, would we Russians be able to correctly write or pronounce all the mentioned words in quotation marks in the language of that Southern republic? Definitely not. We are laughing at how they speak and write in Russian. However, they very often even do not have anything to laugh at since many Russians while living in that republic are absolutely ignorant of the native language. . . And again, with regret, we must admit that the mentioned example is not unique. Alas, we are laughing. . .

The essay by V. Loshak "We Run Into Mafia" (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI) begins with the lines in large print "'The Uzbek Case' is the largest in the post-war history of the country. . ." Why use such categorical words! The hero of this essay, the senior investigator for especially important cases at the USSR General Procurator office, Telman Gdlyan during all press conferences is objecting to the name "Uzbek Case." And he is right! It is our case, of all of us, that is, Uzbeks, and Russians living both in the North and in the South. . . For example, IZVESTIYA has found for it an accurate name, namely, "Case About Cotton." And in two-times-ten languages of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI [MOSCOW NEWS] the expression "Cotton Case" would sound no less sensational than the "Uzbek Case" without unfoundedly offending all Uzbeks as a group. "After 5 years in Uzbekistan, Gdlyan is using all the time Uzbek words: 'opa' for wife." And again, alas! "Opa" in Uzbek means an older sister. As to the word "wife (woman)" it is "khotyn." And the person responsible for the mistakes is not, of course, Gdlyan, but the author of the essay who did not obtain a more accurate information and did not check at the spot the meaning of Uzbek words.

13355

Role of Lenin, Others, in Formation of USSR National, State Structure
18300345 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 8 Jul 88 p 3

[Report by A.A. Ilin under the "Pages of History" rubric: "The Formation of the USSR": "V.I. Lenin—Together, on an Equal Footing"]

[Text] Standing at the source of the fraternal unity of the nations of the USSR was Vladimir Ilich Lenin. And today, as we try to solve the complex problems of developing national relations and cleansing them from all kinds of distortions, we cannot but turn to those sources, to Lenin's principles for the party's policy on the nationalities, and preserve and develop them under contemporary conditions.

The current "Pages of History," which was prepared in conjunction with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism [IML] at the CPSU Central Committee under the editorship of IML Director, Academician G.L. Smirnov, describes on the basis of already-available documents, as well as new archival materials, the quest for forms of national-state construction after the October victory.

Taking part in the discussion were Professor V.V. Zharov, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the IML at the CPSU Central Committee; A.P. Nenarokov, senior scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of History; and *PRAVDA* Correspondent A.A. Ilin.

In Heated Discussions

[Question] The quest for a just solution of the nationalities question after the October victory was, as is well-known, complicated by the legacy of tsarist Russia. Would it not be proper to give a brief description of that legacy?

[Answer] Yes, the October Revolution received a very difficult legacy in that sense. The Russian Empire was one of the most multinational states on Earth. Moreover, various nations were at widely varied levels of socio-economic and cultural development.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the ruling circles of the empire, in order to preserve their own privileges, waged a great-power chauvinistic policy in their relations with the nations in the country. This was in addition to their striving for Russification, their incitement of national enmity and dissension, and their attempts to legislate the economic, political and cultural inequality and backwardness of the nations.

[Question] In his own works, written prior to the October Revolution, Lenin turned many times to questions of national relations. And still, when these problems were dealt with in practical terms and put on the agenda as they say, it was necessary to do a lot of research and give new meaning to them. What is the explanation for this?

[Answer] These works of Lenin, and these party documents became the theoretical basis, and a compass in our search for the optimal approach to building a nation-state in the post-October period, when the question of transition from a military-political alliance of Soviet republics to nationwide unification had objectively matured. But it goes without saying that it was not possible to stipulate all the ways and means for practical solution of these problems beforehand. An enormous, and one can say, historical responsibility lay on the shoulders of the leaders of the party and the state which had to solve them. Hence the high degree of attention which Lenin devoted to these problems and his highly emotional attitude toward deviation from party principles in the nationalities policy. This was shown quite vividly in Lenin's famous article, "On the Nationalities Question" or "On Becoming Autonomous," in the sharp criticism of the violations committed by G.K. Ordzhonikidze and the Dzerzhinsky Commission in the so-called Frunze Incident; and in the haste and increased rule by orders and decrees of Stalin, and his disdain for national feelings. *PRAVDA* has already written on this (25 March 1988).

I would like to stress at this time that the quest for forms of building a national state took place in an atmosphere of sharp discussions and the clashing of different opinions.

From the very beginning, a portion of the party figures, including Stalin, considered the creation of independent national republics as a strictly temporary solution of political problems. They elevated to the absolute the previously-proclaimed principles of broad areas of autonomy in consideration of national peculiarities. In order not to incite the so-called "nationalistic tendencies," the proponents of these views stood up every time for the possibility of larger territorial associations. Of course, "in consideration of national specifics." This was expressed in the drafts and in the practical experience of establishing the Tataro-Bashkir and Gorskaya Republics and Turkestan; and in their negative attitude toward a Belorussian Republic, which here was almost turned into the Lithuanian-Belorussian Republic; in their objections to strengthening the sovereignty of the Ukraine; and in the hasty manner in which an association of transcaucasian republics was initially expanded into a Transcaucasian Federation.

It is true that as early as the winter of 1919 a study was begun on the initiative of Ya.M. Sverdlov, on the practices and trends of nation-state aspirations among the nations in the country in its various regions—in the Baltic Littoral and in Central Asia. After the death of Sverdlov, the reports of representatives specially dispatched to study these questions were never assimilated.

What was Lenin's approach? Vladimir Ilich, proceeding from the inalienable right of nations to self-determination, stood for national-territorial principles of formation of independent state formations, both on the level of autonomy of the RSFSR, and on agreements on self-defined republics.

The first practical steps in the direction of legally formalizing federations on these principles were taken in June, 1919. The VTsIK [All Russian Central Executive Committee], under the chairmanship of L.V. Kamenev, created a working commission on the question of specific forms of association of the RSFSR and Soviet Republics. The membership of the commission included RKP(b) Central Committee Secretary N.N. Krestinskiy, RSFSR People's Commissar of Justice D.I. Kurskiy—secretary of the commission, and UkrSSR Soviet of People's Commissars Chairman Kh.G. Rakovskiy. Also taking part in the work of the commission were L.M. Karakhan, deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs; A.I. Rykhov, chairman of VSNKh [All Russian Council on the National Economy]; and E.M. Sklyanskiy, deputy chairman of the Republic RVS [Revolutionary War Council]. The commission examined questions on the forms of "permanent and temporary" association.

At the 2 June 1919 session of the commission, Rakovskiy stated that permanent association "is possible only on the basis of a federated structure (federated constitution), when a single organ of supreme rule is created in the form of a Federated Soviet of Republics." As a temporary, preliminary step, it was proposed "to include representatives of the republics in the VTsIK," and to subordinate a number of republic narkomats to the appropriate department of the RSFSR.

A year later, in June of 1920, 30 representatives from the Ukrainian TsIK joined the VTsIK, and somewhat later, from Belorussia as well. The 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1921) decided to include representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in the VTsIK as well. In addition the unification of a number of narkomats was begun. But the agreements among the Soviet republics did not envisage subordination of the highest organs of their state administration to the analogous organs of the RSFSR, and this gave birth to conflicts.

The party was forced to take under consideration the fact that under conditions of transition to NEP, an increase in great-power tendencies was noted on the one hand, and on the other, parochialism and nationalism. Certain party officials saw the aspirations of the republics toward strengthening their own sovereign rights as the chief obstacle on the path to unity. And Lenin was required to explain specifically that the establishment and development of national statehood is not in conflict with the aspiration of the Soviet peoples to unification. "The federation," he noted in the summer of 1920, "has already been found expedient both in relations with the RSFSR and other Soviet republics (the Hungarian, Finnish, and Latvian Republics in the past, and the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian in the present), as well as within the RSFSR with respect to the nationalities who previously did not exist as a state, and to their autonomy (for example, the Bashkir and Tatar Autonomous Republics in the RSFSR, established in 1919 and 1920)."

This brought an objection from Stalin, who saw no significant difference between the Ukrainian and Bashkir type of federative association. Delivering the main speech at the 10th RKP(b) Congress, he flatly stated that the RSFSR is the "living embodiment" of the form of a state union of republics being sought.

The resolution adopted by the congress, "On the Party's Current Tasks on the National Question," stressed, in accordance with Leninist principles, the expedience and flexibility of using various kinds of federation: those based on treaty relationships with independent republics, federations based on autonomy, and intermediate stages among them. The resolution reflected the striving to generalize the accumulated party experience in practical work on building a national state, and on defining and implementing a national policy, "which would truly enliven the process of revolutionary development" in the regions.

The examination at the congress was of the nature of a discussion.

V.P. Zatonskiy, a member of the Ukrainian KP(b) Central Committee, criticized Stalin's theses rather sharply: "It seems that these theses were written outside of time and space. In general and on the whole they could have been written down either before the October Revolution, or in 1917 after the October Revolution, or in 1919, or in 1918..."

A.I. Mikoyan, who was at that time secretary of the Nizhegorodskiy Provincial Committee (gubkom), also expressed the opinion that, "The national question should stand on completely different grounds... We need to consider the experience and determine the forms of Soviet construction and class interactions in the outlying areas; for the program indicates that the Soviet system is subject to change in the outlying areas in accordance with the economic way of life and cultural needs of the region. This requirement obligates us at the party meetings and congresses to determine what kind of changes must be made in this system, and what type of Soviet system should be established in the outlying areas. Unfortunately, Comrade Stalin did not have a thing to say in this area."

Proposing a "more precise definition of the interaction of the parts of the federation," Zatonskiy said, "We must put out of our minds the comrades' conception of a Soviet federation as a federation which is at once 'Russian'; for it is not a matter of being Russian, but one of being Soviet... A 'Russian' federation presents a huge dilemma to the minds of the party comrades."

[Question] There must have been some basis for posing the question so sharply!

[Answer] Yes there were. For example, national peculiarities were not taken into account from the beginning when dividing the country up into economic regions.

The intervention of Lenin and the RKP(b) Central Committee was required in order that the division into regions could be carried out without violating the rights of the Soviet republics.

Consideration of Peculiarities

Two different approaches to the problems of national sovereignty appeared among the leading party officials of the Transcaucasus as well. Unfortunately even today, an objective analysis of the disagreement is hindered by the stamp of tendentious interpretation which came to pass under the influence of a Stalinist analysis. We are talking about the events which took place in the summer of 1921, when the Caucasus Kray Buro of the RKP(b) Central Committee under the supervision of G.K. Ordzhonikidze began to implement Lenin's instructions on the economic unification of the transcaucasian republics.

Vladimir Ilich raised a question on this account in his 9 April 1921 telegram to Ordzhonikidze. However, in persistently demanding the creation of an oblast economic organ for the Transcaucasus, Lenin was orienting the transcaucasian and especially the Georgian communists primarily toward an understanding of what the new domestic and international conductions would require of them—that they "would not follow the Russian pattern, but that they would skillfully and flexibly establish their own tactics," capable of more fully considering the unique situation of the transcaucasus republics.

[Question] What did this uniqueness consist of?

[Answer] The fact of the matter is that Georgia was the only one of the Soviet republics which had already developed commercial ties with the capitalist world, via Batumi. The creation of an oblast economic center, "which is up to Baku and Batumi," Lenin wrote, opened a genuine opportunity "...to take advantage of the capitalist West through economics; by every means, intensively, and rapidly, in a policy of concessions and trade with it; for improving the situation of the workers and peasants, and for enlisting the intelligentsiya to build the economy."

In turn, the latter required, in Lenin's opinion, "greater tractability in every way to petit bourgeois elements," and particularly to the intelligentsia, the small tradesmen and even to those mensheviks who "are not absolutely hostile to the idea of the Soviet system."

The approaches defined by Lenin, while forestalling excessive haste in realizing the trends toward unification, presumed the need to change the Soviet system in the national regions, in accordance with their economic way of life and the cultural needs of the populace.

[Question] How were these trends actually put into practice by the communists in the Transcaucasus? So far as we know, Stalin's attitude toward these questions had an influence on the estimate of their effectiveness.

[Answer] That's right, and that also had an influence on the evaluation of the line of the Kavburo, and subsequently on the Zakkraykom and on Ordzhonikidze personally; it also had an influence on the accusation brought against the membership of the Georgian party Central Committee at that time for national deviation. In our opinion, further research work on these problems is impossible without rejecting stereotypes.

How did things actually stand? We can pursue this on the bases of the facts and documents. After receiving Lenin's telegram of 9 April, Ordzhonikidze, with no preliminary discussion whatsoever, declared at the 11 April session of the Baku Soviet, that "...Everything necessary for the economic power of the three republics, and for strengthening their military power, must be unified," and that the party would wage a decisive struggle with any and all vestiges of nationalism which hinder the close unity of the transcaucasian republics among themselves and with Russia. Subsequently, all practical decisions in this direction, including the decision of the Kavburo Plenum of 2 November on the creation of the Transcaucasus Federation, were presented as instructions from higher party authorities, for mandatory execution by local organizations.

Involving Stalin in this conflict as he was visiting in Georgia in 1921 turned out to be a fateful move. He explained the influence of the Mensheviks which was still felt there at the time, by declaring that "the comrades in Georgia have made a fetish of the tactic of concessions; whereas, it is not a time for political concessions—on the contrary, it is a time for a political offensive, as in Russia." This was fundamentally different from Lenin's estimates and instructions.

Repeating in the most general way Lenin's judgement on the necessity for uniting the efforts of the transcaucasian republics for economic construction and on what should come from taking stock of their specific internal capabilities, the peculiarities of the international situation, and the preservation of their independence, Stalin in essence, distanced himself from them. Typical of him were calls to "liquidate the vestiges of nationalism, and destroy them with a red hot iron," or to "crush the hydra-headed monster of nationalism." Remembering the words of La Salle, that a party becomes stronger by purging itself of filth, he looked upon any objection to decisions adopted by the Kavburo as deviation; that is, filth. For appealing to the RKP(b) Central Committee and declaring their disagreement on the question of the forms and methods of economic unification, the first of those accused of national deviationism were labeled "alarmists."

Unfortunately, quite often the historians forget that it was precisely in this that the "alarmists" found the support of V.I. Lenin. On 29 November 1921, the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo adopted a resolution, written by Lenin, which declared the idea of a federation of transcaucasian republics "in the sense of immediate practical implementation, premature." The resolution noted that "the proper and unconditionally appropriate implementation" idea of a Transcaucasus Federation required "a certain period of time for discussion and propagation at the grass-roots level by the Soviets..."

The words, "a certain period of time," are Stalin's amendment to Lenin's initial text, "several weeks," which Vladimir Ilich had approved. This in essence was in accordance with Lenin's position. But Stalin for some reason found it necessary to present this entire episode at the 12th Party Congress in a distorted manner, ascribing to himself alone the desire not to hasten the establishment of the Transcaucasus Federation...

During the spring and summer of 1922, intensive work was under way for developing the constitutional foundation for the Federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Transcaucasus, which had been proclaimed in March. Many figures in the Transcaucasus had presented their own drafts. The final variation was adopted on 24 July, over the signatures of A. Myasnikov, N. Narimanov, V. Mdivani and S. Kirov. It proposed that the association be carried out with maximum respect to the sovereign rights of the republics. Not a single one of them were limited by the new union. But these quests were quickly put to an end. First by Stalin's plan for autonomization, and subsequently by his own variant of the ZSFSR [Transcaucasus Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (1922-1936)].

[Question] Just when did the plan for autonomization appear, and how did Lenin react to it?

[Answer] Questions of developing the relationship of other republics with the RSFSR was raised at almost the same time in the spring of 1922 by the Central Committees of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Communist Parties. In July of that same year a similar resolution from the transcaucasian republics was adopted at the Zakkaykom Plenum. These questions were also examined by the republic TSLK's.

On the basis of the initiative of the republic party and soviet organs, the RKP(b) Central Committee adopted on 10 August 1922 a resolution to create a commission which was to prepare a draft for developing the federative relationships between the RSFSR and the other fraternal republics. On 11 August the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo confirmed the following persons as members of the commission: V.V. Kuybyshev (chairman), J.V. Stalin, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, and Kh.G. Rakovskiy; representatives of the republics were S.A. Agamali-ogly (Azerbaijan), A.F.

Myasnikov (Armenia), P.G. (Budu) Mdivani (Georgia), G.I. Petrovskiy (Ukraine), A.G. Chervyakov (Belorussia), Ya. D. Yanson (DVR), and A. Khodzhayev (Khorezm).

The draft resolution of the commission's Orgburo, worked out by Stalin, "On the Interrelations of the RSFSR and the Independent Republics," envisaged their entry into the Russian Federation with the rights of autonomous republics. During the second half of August this draft was sent off for discussion to the central committees of the republic communist parties. However, as it soon became clear, it was not their opinions, but simply their approval that was expected.

Lenin did not take part in the preliminary examination of the question—he was ill. But even after his health had improved, and Vladimir Ilich began to meet again in July and August with the party and state figures, including Stalin, not once did Stalin raise this problem with him in the talks.

Most likely Lenin became acquainted with the basic tenets of Stalin's draft, in general terms, when Vladimir Ilich met with Kh.G. Rakovskiy in Gorkiy on 25 August. The chairman of the Sovnarkom of the Ukraine did not hide his negative attitude toward the plan for autonomization and intended to speak out against it. Incidentally, it is entirely possible that it was precisely upon the advice of Vladimir Ilich, who had planned to begin work in late September or early October, that Kh.G. Rakovskiy attempted to put off the planned assembly of commission until a later date. Having received on 16 September a telegram from Kuybyshev, chairman of the Orgburo commission, to the effect that the session was to be held on 23 September, he and Petrovskiy sent an appeal to change the date to 15 October. At the behest of Stalin, Assistant General Secretary A.M. Nazaretyan replied: It's impossible. On 19 September this was approved by Kuybyshev as well. Apparently Stalin had forced the adoption of a decision prior to Lenin's active intervention.

On 1 September Vladimir Ilich had a conversation with Ukrainian KP(b) Central Committee Secretary D.Z. Manuilskiy. Did they touch on the question of the interrelations of the Soviet republics in their conversation? One can assume that they did, since after the meeting Manuilskiy, most likely on his request, made it a point of leaving a letter for Stalin, in which he supported and even tried to lay the theoretical basis for the idea of turning the treaty republics into autonomous republics.

On 17 September Lenin's secretaries made a record of the dispatching of a sealed envelope to Stalin, serial number 8457. There is a note that Stalin replied that very day. But we have not yet managed to discover Lenin's letter, nor Stalin's reply. One can surmise that it was in this very note that Vladimir Ilich asked [Stalin] to familiarize him with the Orgburo's draft.

Indirect proof of this can be found in the superscript, in Stalin's own handwriting, at the top of the typewritten text of his letter to Lenin of 22 September: "Answer to note." Expounding on the basic position of his plan, he asserted, "If we do not at this time try to adapt the form (this and subsequent emphasis by Stalin—Author's note) of the interrelationship between the centers and the outlying regions to the actual interrelationships, by virtue of which the outlying regions must unconditionally be subordinate to the center in all things; that is, if we do not at this time replace the formal (factual) independence with formal autonomy, in a year it will be incomparably more difficult to defend the unity of the republics."

Finishing the letter, Stalin noted that he is attaching to it the opinion of "that false Ukrainian," as he put it, Manuilskiy—who, as we know, supported Stalin's draft; and here too lets fall a remark that, "that false Ukrainian" Rakovskiy, is, they say, against autonomization. Stalin's letter contains yet another very carefully-put piece of information, although it is reported in a rather casual manner, on the fact that the majority of the commission members support his proposed draft. He made special mention of the support of G.Y. Sokolnikov, RSFSR Narkom for Finance, whose meeting with Lenin had already been set for 25 September.

Stalin's draft project, the tone of his letter, and his conversation with Sokolnikov could not help but cause Lenin some discomfort. At the request of Vladimir Ilich, Nazaretyan, in accordance with Stalin's instruction, sent to Gorkiy on 25 September both the initial draft of the Orgburo Commission, and the materials discussed at the republic communist party central committees. The dispatch also contained materials from the two sessions of the Orgburo Commission held on 23 and 24 September under the chairmanship of V.M. Molotov, who substituted for Kuybyshev who had gone on vacation. The decisions of the commission must have been the basis for the corresponding resolutions of the Politburo and thence that of the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum on the given question.

Acquaintance with these materials has shown that the support for Stalin's draft was extremely relative. Only the central committees of the Azerbaijan and Armenian CP spoke out in favor of it with no special objections. The Belorussian CP Central Committee gave its preference to preserving the treat relationships. And the Georgian CP Central Committee cast the majority of its votes on 15 September to reject Stalin's plan in general, stating: "The unification proposed on the basis of Comrade Stalin's theses, in the form of autonomization of independent republics, is considered premature. We consider unification of economic efforts and a common policy to be necessary, but with preservation of all attributes of independence."

Usually this last sentence in the resolution of the Georgian Central Committee is considered an error—which is precisely the way it was regarded by the Orgburo commission, under Stalin's pressure, in its decision. However,

today, having access to the documents, one can confirm that the Georgian CP Central Committee did not speak out against unification, and the topic of the attributes of independence was discussed within the framework of Lenin's interpretation of democratic centralism.

The Ukrainian CP(b) Central Committee did not manage to hold special discussion of Stalin's plan for autonomization. But Kh.G. Rakovskiy, a member of the commission and one of the leaders of the Ukrainian communists, stated in his letter of 28 September, that the plan introduced by Stalin requires re-examination, for "...instead of bringing the construction which we have begun to a conclusion, and posing for ourselves clearly and definitely the question of the forms of our state system and on setting up our central organs; instead of working out an actual federation, which would provide everyone identical conditions for revolutionary construction, and would unite the working class of all the nationalities of Russia on the basis of equal rights—the given draft bypasses this task."

It is true that during the two days of the commission's work certain changes were nevertheless introduced to the draft by Stalin. Whereas it was initially proposed that independent Soviet republics would formally become a part of the RSFSR and that the formal scope of the VTsIK, the SNK [Council Soviet of People's Commissioners] and the STO [Council on Labor and Defense] of the RSFSR would be extended to the corresponding republic institutions, in the final variation of the commission's resolution, both of these points were somewhat changed. It was deemed expedient to conclude an agreement among the republics concerning their voluntary entrance into the RSFSR, and it was proposed for the second point that, "in connection with this," that is, the agreements, that "decrees of the VTsIK are to be considered mandatory for the central institutions" of the republics. It was characteristic that the second point was adopted by eight votes against one—Mdivani, and with one abstention—Petrovskiy, who represented the largest republic party organizations.

One can also judge the atmosphere in which the commission worked by the special resolution which condemned the decision of the Georgian CP Central Committee and on the fact that the proposal of G.I. Petrovskiy to permit discussion of adopted resolutions in the buro of the party gubkoms in the republics was tabled by five votes to four—the representatives of the Ukraine, Georgia, Belorussia and Azerbaijan.

It was only natural that when Vladimir Ilich received the documents sent to him, he noticed in them tendencies toward severe forms of centralization and the desire to put them into practice in unacceptably short periods of time, and by means of utilizing the unlimited power which in a short time turned out to have accumulated in the hands of the general secretary.

[Question] Lenin, in his "Letter to the Congress," speaks of the concentration of unlimited power in Stalin's hands, to which you have just alluded. Judging by the questions of the readers, this is not understood by everyone, and then for many people it was, probably, simply not anticipated.

[Answer] You are correct. Lenin's assertion on the concentration of unlimited power in the hands of the general secretary in a short time was for many people truly unexpected and not entirely understood. Incidentally, Vladimir Ilich based his assertions on a number of precise facts and observations. First of all, he had in mind the role which the Secretariat and Stalin personally had begun to play in deciding cadre questions: the appointment of gubkom secretaries, the selection of the members of commissions, and transfers on the principle of promotion of people loyal to him. Secondly, there was the increasing assertion of a directive tone in the decisions of the Orgburo and the Secretariat. Thirdly, there was the use of the authority of the Central Committee for foisting on and forcing the passage of decisions necessary to the gensek. And yes, on the personal plane Lenin had every reason for such assertions. Stalin, on a number of questions, hastened to assert his own approaches and opinions, without consulting with Vladimir Ilich; and it was not because of the illness that he did not want to upset him during his illness, but because of his desire to do things in his own way, presenting Lenin with a fait accompli. This pertained altogether to the questions of the formation of the USSR as well.

As early as 26 September, after an extended—2 hours and 40 minutes—conversation with Stalin, Lenin, summing up, hot on the trail of his suspicions, in a letter to L.B. Kamenev for the members of the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo, stresses: "In my opinion, the question is one of arch-importance. Stalin tends to be a bit hasty. You must (And at one time you had intended to take this up and did indeed take it up a bit) think it over quite carefully; Zinov'yev also."

Considering the idea of "autonomization," that is direct entry of independent republics into the RSFSR, to be a retreat from the principles of proletarian internationalism, Lenin promoted a new form of voluntary association of independent Soviet republics, enjoying equal rights. He warned against excessive centralism. He spoke out for the necessity to strengthen sovereignty and the attributes of independence of each republic as a mandatory condition for bringing the people together. Enjoying complete equality of rights, sincerity, mutual respect, friendship, fraternal cooperation, and mutual understanding—these are what in his opinion should be the basis of international relations in the new state of the Soviet Union. He wrote: "We acknowledge for ourselves equal rights with the Ukrainian SSR and the others, and together with them, on an equal basis with them, we enter into a new union, a new federation."

Together, and on a equal basis—that is how Lenin put the question.

In that same letter of 26 September there are also other details to which one must pay attention. Let us take the very first sentence: "Comrade Kamenev! You have probably already received from Stalin the resolution of his commission on the entry of independent republics into the RSFSR." The words, "his commission," and instead of the official title of the resolution, "On the Interrelationships of the RSFSR and the Independent Republics"—"on the entry of independent republics into the RSFSR," show that Vladimir Ilich knew about the special role of Stalin; although the commission, as already stated, was headed by Kuybyshev.

Lenin could not help but condemn the administrative methods, the haste, and the lack of attention to national feelings.

Also characteristic is the following note from Lenin: "Tomorrow I will be seeing Mdivani (the Georgian communist under suspicion for "independence tendencies")." Lenin does not employ the label of "national-deviationist" which had been applied to Mdivani, and by using a word which signifies lack of legal proof of guilt, "under suspicion," and not for "national deviationism," but for "independence tendencies."

Vladimir Ilich writes further: "Stalin has agreed to put off the introduction of the resolution to the Central Committee Politburo until I arrive. I will be arriving on Monday, 2 October."

But Stalin violated the word he had given. The Politburo sessions were held on 27 and 28 September, which is confirmed by notes in Lenin's archives.

His attitude toward Lenin is characterized also in two new documents which should be cited.

The first is an exchange of letters between Kamenev and Stalin, which took place as one can now determine, at the session of the Politburo on 27 September, that is, the day after he had received Lenin's letter.

"Kamenev! Ilich has decided on war in defense of independence. He proposes that I meet with the Georgians. He even rejects yesterday's amendments. M.K. (Mariya Ilinichna—Author's note) rang up.

"Stalin: In my opinion, we must be firm against Ilich. If a couple of Georgian Mensheviks can influence the Georgian Communists, and the latter can influence Ilich, then one might ask, what good is 'independence' here?"

And "firmness against Ilich" was the purpose of the Politburo session, in spite of the request of Lenin in his absence.

Agreeing with Lenin's amendments on the necessity to speak about the unification of the independent republics with the RSFSR in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

of Europe and Asia, Stalin spoke out against any proposals on the necessity for creating federal (nationwide) organs of power. He mistakenly believed that this would directly lead to the creation of a Russian TsiK and to the withdrawal of "eight autonomous republics (Tatar Republic, Turkmen Republic and so on)" from the RSFSR, and to the "unification of the latter independent republics along with the Ukraine and other independent republics;" to the creation of "two houses in Moscow (a Russian and a Federal House); and in general, to profound restructuring, which at the given time is not called for, neither by internal nor by external necessity."

With respect to Vladimir Ilich's reasons for combining at the federal level the people's commissariats of finance, food, labor and the national economy, Stalin noted: "In my opinion, Comrade Lenin 'was hasty.' One can hardly doubt the fact that this 'haste' will 'give nourishment to the proponents of independence' to the detriment of the national liberalism of Comrade Lenin."

The attempts to attribute to Lenin his own remarks about haste and his reluctance to give "nourishment" to the proponents of independence, and the very tone and terminology of the letter reveal Stalin's extreme bad temperment. This is felt also in the tone of his response to Kamenev's note, received during the second session of the Politburo on 28 September:

"Kamenev: I think that if Vl(adimir) Il(ich) insists, worse will follow (Kamenev underlined the latter word three times—Author's note).

"Stalin: I don't know. Let him act according to his own discretion."

However, as he was introducing major amendments to his draft, Stalin tried to avoid disagreement with Vladimir Ilich; and having concealed the fact that he was the actual author of the new variant of the commission's resolution, he sent them off to all members and candidate members of the RKP(b) Central Committee with the signatures of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov and Molotov. Moreover, in the introductory part of this document the fundamental difference between the agreement on entry into the RSFSR and the agreement on creating a Union of SSR's was glossed over and it was asserted that it was merely a question of "a few changes, more precise formulations," which clarify the previously-distributed final resolution of the commission of the Central Committee Orgburo, which was "on the whole correct and unconditionally acceptable."

[Question] If Vladimir Ilich played such an active role in the more precise definition of Stalin's draft for the formation of a new multinational Soviet state, how can one explain his phrase from his December 1922 dictation: "...The question bypassed me almost completely?"

[Answer] The fact of the matter is that, as we now know, Stalin deprived Vladimir Ilich of the opportunity to expound his thoughts personally at the Politburo session, breaking the promise he had given to him. Vladimir Ilich was unable to do this at the 6 October session of the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum either, when contrary to the ordinary practice, discussion of this question occupied an entire three hours. The arguments, apparently, were serious; and because of his illness Lenin was not present at this very session.

The Central Committee Plenum completely supported Lenin's proposals. As Mdivani wrote, "The matter took a turn on the side of communist wisdom." A resolution was adopted, compiled on the basis of instructions and recommendations from Lenin. And at the end of the plenum's work, Kamenev read for the information of those present, a note sent to him from Vladimir Ilich: "Comrade Kamenev! I am declaring war on great Russian chauvinism not for life, but to the death..."

"I must absolutely insist, that the chairmanship of the Union TsiK should be, in turn

a Russian.

a Ukrainian.

a Georgian, and so on.

Absolutely!

Yours, Lenin."

Several months later, the authorized representatives of the fraternal republics would announce in Moscow the formation of the USSR. The choice was made: together on an equal footing...

09006

Azerbaijani on Stalin's 'Destructive War Against His People'

*18300395a Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
23 Jun 88 p 4*

[Article by Vladimir Sinitsyn, Azerbaijan SSR: "The Shemakha Tragedy: Or, A Death Notification That Was Not the Result of War..."]

[Text] A death notification. For a father... For a husband... For a son... Yellowed with the passage of time, worn at the folds, and with faded ink, even after more than 40 years years it still is burningly painful: "Your husband (son, father) has died the death of the brave..."

A tragic line from the Great Patriotic War...

Another death notification, on a piece of paper that is still white, that was put out by an efficient typewriter—in our time. Afghanistan.

But recently in the small village of Tekle, which is near Shemakha, I read a third one—attached to a notification of the death of Valekh Dzhebrailov, "who fell in the combat actions for the freedom and independence of our Motherland"—was a small piece of paper concerning his father: "The sentence of the military board, dated 3 January 1938, with respect to Dzhebrailov, Zakaren Nagdali oglu, has been revoked on the basis of newly revealed circumstances. The case has been closed for lack of a *corpus delicti* and he has been posthumously rehabilitated. 23 July 1956. Colonel of Justice Likachev, chairman of the Legal Staff of the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court."

Forty-two peasants from Tekle did not return from the war. Three internationalist fighters did not return from Afghanistan. But 60 of them failed to return from camps and prisons in the times of the Stalinist repressions.

Each of them has his own death notification. All of them have our eternal memory and pain.

On a hot noon in June 1937 the chairman of Kolkhoz imeni Molotov, who in the recent past had been a Baku petroleum worker, the creator of the rayon's first agricultural artel, Zakaren Dzhebrailov received the instructions. Signed for some reason by the chief of the rayon department of the NKVD, Gamzat Shabanbekov, it stated that by 2000 hours he was to name and to approve at a kolkhoz meeting "70 advanced kolkhoz members for participation in a republic rally of Stakhanovite innovators in vegetable and animal husbandry."

Incidentally, that "for some reason" is a question that is raised in our time. At that time, in 1937, it seemed to be completely natural: the agencies of internal affairs decided many things. The entire country was resounding with trials of persons who had organized "terroristic acts," and of deviationists, chauvinists, and pan-Turkic nationalists. Trials of wreckers, spies, saboteurs...

Enemies of the people were everywhere. It was easy for us children of the 1930's to find the traces of their dirty paws. In a drawing of the famous opening line of Pushkin's "Ruslan and Lyudmila," A green oak tree stands near the cove..." we can clearly see the fascist sign. On a nonspilling inkwell, if one looks at it from an angle, one can read, "Down with the USSR."

For several nights people were taken out of our home, and our mother, as though in a fever, would put onto the phonograph the first record that her hand would touch, so that my brother and I could not hear the heart-rending cry, "I'm not guilty of anything, comrades!"

Nevertheless we could not believe that the chief of the Baku militia, Yanosh Tsintsar, was an enemy. We knew that in 1917 he had been the organizer of an uprising by Hungarian prisoners on Nagren Island, had fought the Turks during the days of the Baku Commune, and had been a friend of Sergey Mironovich Kirov. He always wore on his old soldier's shirt the Order of the Red Banner, and under it, close to his heart, two bullets. He was a legendary person. He used to give us kids rides on his bicycle. And now we were supposed to think that he was an enemy?

It was a mistake, the older people said. It will be corrected and he'll come back soon. We believed them. We wanted very much to believe them. But when his wife, Zarifa Mamedovna, shot herself to death and his sons, our schoolmates, were taken away to a special orphanage, even we realized what kind of an adroit spy he was.

It is only now that I understand that this was a process of cutting the threads that bound us to those who had made the revolution, who had lived and breathed it. But back then, in 1937, they were taking away the "enemies."

Alarming rumors swept over us in increasingly large and evil waves: yet another plot against Stalin, Voroshilov, and Budennyy had been unmasked, and a plot against Bagirov. In the Caspian Steamship Agency, in the Baku Komsomol Committee, at Azneft. Vicious murderers had aimed at the very heart of the nation—Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the AKP(b) [Azerbaijan Communist Party (Bolsheviks)].

So the instructions from the Shemakha NKVD were perceived by the kolkhoz chairman as being completely proper. And although on that difficult day grain was ripening for the first time, at 1700 hours the kolkhoz members left their horse-drawn mowers and their sickles and gathered alongside the board building, one of two brick structures that had previously been occupied by a saboteur mullah and the former tsarist village elder. There were no other buildings in the village. The peasants, having lived through collectivization, but not yet aware of why five laying hens and two sheep per family created the "prerequisites for the restoration of capitalism," handed over their livestock without a murmur and then, free of it, continued to live in their *alachyga* tents that were made of smoke-blackened wool. Just as their nomadic grandfathers and great-grandfathers had done.

But, of course, they had gone far ahead of their ancestors, and for that reason they at first discussed at the meeting, approved, and assumed socialist pledges in honor of Molotov's article "Our Tasks in the Fight Against Trotskyites, Saboteurs, and Spies" (three whole newspaper pages contained instructional materials on how to locate and punish enemies of the people), and then a second question—the civil war in Spain. Surprisingly, shepherds who had never seen Baku, who had never left their mountain pastures, knew about the legendary republican

General Lister, spoke, probably more than he did himself, about the combat actions at Ebro, and kept hopeful watch on the offensive being waged by "our" troops at Guadalajara and on the defense of Madrid. They spoke of Spanish children whom each was ready to take into his own family. And although their own children were dying like candle flames, the Spanish children were the peasants' anguish.

But the main question was treated only incidentally. The chairman included in the list of rally participants almost all the men who were 30 years of age or older. With that, everyone left. But as it got closer to nighttime, cries of despair went flying to the mountains. Strictly in accordance with the list, the persons who were older than 30 were led out of the 70 smoke-darkened tents. Only one, Safar Safarov, a shepherd who had fled with his flock into the mountains, was not caught at home "That's no problem," Shabanbekov said indifferently, "we'll just take someone like him." So they took another shepherd, Safarali Safaraliyev. That night all 70 were delivered to Baku, to an internal prison of the NKVD.

That was the signal. Every day from Marazy, Chukhuryurd, Sagiyany, Khilmili, and other villages in Shemakhinskiy Rayon and other rayons, one-and-a-half-ton trucks covered with tarpaulins rushed to Baku. People were taken in the field, at the threshing floors, in irrigation canals, and in pastures, and they were taken up off their sour sheepskins... The loud, terrible, dirty Shemakha situation was fabricated rapidly and broadly in Azerbaijan.

Properly speaking, situations such as this were knocked together and chopped down by hatchets in the Smolensk area, in the trans-Urals, in the Vologda and Poltava areas, in Kakhetia, Fergana, the Altay. If one were to mark with a red pencil on a map of the country the cities and villages that were oppressed as though by a steamroller by the excesses of the Yezhov and Beriya era, that map would burst into flames today from the human sufferings "from Moscow to the farthest borderlands." I know that those are good words from a song that is dear to all of us. Nevertheless, after millions of victims of collectivization, when, as was said today, the peasants had their knees broken, columns of "enemies of the people" wandered as a second wave to those very same borderlands—columns of workers, peasants, old specialists, and their young replacements. Unknown, nameless... And people with a name, Leninist revolutionaries, civil war heroes, people who had been lied to and who had been deprived of their honor were put up against the wall.

Every oblast, kray, and republic offered to Stalin its own trials, with their own national coloration. He valued that, as the former people's commissar of nationalities who had so perverted national policy that the exiling of the outcast peoples became its shamefully sad practice. And if today we want to analyze thoroughly in a real way

the reasons for the Nagorno-Karabakh explosion and the Sumgait tragedy, we must search for the dynamite in the ideological heritage of the people's commissar of nationalities.

But the Bickford fuse from the explosives goes all the way back to 1937, to Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, who was particularly zealous in serving "the father of nations." An intelligent, stern, experienced political intriguer, he was probably one of the few who was feared by Beriya himself. The former paid agent of Mussavat intelligence, who had worked in the early 1920's as the chief of SOCh (Secret Operations Unit of Azcheka [Azerbaijan Cheka]), Beriya was only dashing to the position of first hangman, but Bagirov had already had time to slander Ordzhonikidze, Kosarev, Rudzutak, Vareykin, Serebrovskiy, and everyone whom Lenin had known and loved...

But he was looking for something else, something larger, that, first of all, was supposed to keep himself out of the prison cell, and, secondly, to reinforce the canopy of his autocratic rule in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Bolsheviks knew this and fought it. The legendary Gamil Sultanov—the very same person who, in the predawn hours of 28 April 1920, on instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, to the accompaniment of whistles and catcalls, imperturbably rose to take the rostrum of the Mussavat parliament and gave the ultimatum of immediately handing over the power to the soviets. Sultan Medzhid Efendiyyev, an experienced propagandist, with an encyclopedic knowledge of Marxism and with unusual talent. Dadash Buniatzade, a surprising eccentric when judged by today's yardstick. When he was a people's commissar, he wrote a statement to the republic's Council of People's Commissars, requesting the allocation of a military tunic and cavalry jodhpurs. Then, by some means, the request found its way to its author, and he imposed the resolution: "You ought to be ashamed, Dadash! At such a time! The trousers, yes. But the shirt, no..."

Is that humorous? Not very. If you recall that, "under the roof" of the public nutrition combine (KOP) for three years, on instructions from G. Aliyev and under his supervision, a palace had been erected in Baku "personally for Comrade Brezhnev," where he stayed overnight twice.

Soldier's trousers, and hundreds of thousands of rubles "for fatherly concern" and a gold star. It is painful and shameful... But it is apropos to understand that the time of stagnation developed by no means because everyone voted in favor of it, of course, "standing." But because the Bolsheviks had been beaten out of life.

It was necessary to possess true bravery in order to stand up in June 1937 at the 13th AzCP Congress and tell the truth about Bagirov. To his face!

Did they know how that truth would turn out for them? Yes, they knew. Kirov, with whom they had worked hand in hand, had already been killed. Zinov'yev, who, together with Nariman Narimanov, had been a cochairman of the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku, had been executed by firing squad. In February Sergo Ordzhonikidze has ended his life by suicide... The Bolsheviks knew what they were doing.

Immediately after the congress, it was announced that "an anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary, insurgent, terroristic-espionage, wrecking-and-sabotage, bourgeois-nationalistic organization headed by Gamid Sultanov had been discovered in Shemakhinskiy Rayon."

I would like to direct the reader's attention to two nonstandard terms that had been fabricated by Bagirov. The first: "insurgent." That meant not a petty group, but masses of people. In rural areas, that would mean "peasants." Second: "bourgeois-nationalistic." A month later, Bagirov's find, approved by Stalin, would be duplicated in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Armenia, the Ukraine, Tajikistan... Nevertheless the authorship belongs to hangman Bagirov.

It was by no means for the purpose of stirring up passions that I wrote that word—hangman. What sadistic tortures on his instructions was Gamid Sultanov supposed to be subjected to, and was he indeed subjected to, before he signed the slanderous statement about himself, "We took the path of the dirty betrayal of our Motherland, the path of enslaving the happy and free Azerbaijani nation..."

A week later, on the basis of a decree issued by the "troika," G. Sultanov, S. M. Efendi'yev, and D. Buniyat-zade, as well as their comrades, were executed.

But earlier, before the trial began, 60 of the 70 peasants from the village of Tekle, who had never even heard the word "insurgents," were taken over the threshold of life. And they were not even asked if they knew what it meant. None of them—not Zakaren Dzhebrailov, not Ibad Atali oglu, not the brothers Akhmed and Mamed Khankishi oglu, not a single one of the Stakhanovites who had been called by the NKVD to the rally that was not held. And what could they have answered if, in the official record of the number of days worked, there were thumbprints? The meager minutes of the interrogations contain the most absurd confessions... And instead of a sentence, the harsh notation, like the gnashing of teeth: "VM." Which stood for "vysshaya mera" [highest measure [of punishment], i.e. death]. And that was all...

In the mid-1970's senior Baku journalist Aleksandr Alekseyevich Borin, a Communist going back to Lenin's day, a person who had carefully saved his own "death notification," told how, in early 1938, together with a consignment of peasants, he had been taken to Bulla Island to be executed by firing squad. "People were led out by tens. One group of ten, then another, then the

twelfth... Then there was silence. Probably the consignment of prisoners was just too large and unplanned," that is how he put it, "if the executioners simply did not have enough bullets for everyone who had been involved in that time in the Shemakha case."

They were sent by sea to Krasnovodsk. Once again an unexpected interruption of the juggernaut's operation. "In a word, Kolyma. Seventeen years... I had begun working at a village forge. My trade put me in good stead."

Two decades later, he again visited the island of death. "Skulls. The bullet-ridden skulls of my comrades..." It was there that the Shemakha peasants had lain down, peasants who were infinitely distant from political passions, but ones who had become their victims. They lay down for several months until the unjust sentence was approved by the troika.

That year the kolkhoz remained without grain.

According to certain computations, approximately 70,000 prisoners were shipped to the camps, and according to others, more than 100,000. According to some estimates, rifle salvos carried away more than 3000 peasant lives. According to others, more than 5000. Bagirov needed an "anti-Soviet, bourgeois-nationalistic organization." That organization was invented, and then, after being invented, it was subjected to a hail of fire. In only one of the reports sent by Bagirov in 1937 to Moscow, it was reported that the persons arrested in Azerbaijan included 32 secretaries of party raykoms, 28 chairmen of rayispolkoms, 18 people's commissars and their deputies, and 88 Red Army commanders and political workers.

The witness for the prosecution, a gray-bearded, firmly beaten old man, spoke animatedly in Russian, sprinkling his speech with the typical Siberian "however" and "what can you do?" We extend our thanks to the very great linguistic theoretician: the 17 years of linguistic practice that the Azerbaijani shepherd had spent behind the rusty barbed wire at the camp put him in good stead in 1956. In the trial of Bagirov and his stooges, former administrators of the republic NKVD—Atakishi'yev, Borshev, Grigoryan, Yemelyanov, Markaryan. At that time, after the 20th party congress, which censured the Stalin cult, after the letters sent by the CPSU Central Committee to the country's Communists, which revealed by no means all the crimes that are known today that had been committed by the tyrant truly "of all times and peoples," testimony was provided to the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court by Shemakha peasant Gabib Dzhebrail oglu. From the village of Tekle, which later became Leninabad.

He had not only learned the Russian language. In one of the camps he met Zinaida Gavrilovna Ordzhonikidze, Sergo's widow. No direct accusation had been leveled at her for participation in the Shemakha case. However,

she knew so much about the Baku period of Stalin activities and about Beriya's intrigues and provocations, that Bagirov could not fail to establish a dossier for her also. So that it could be reported to the Kremlin. And it was she who, in 1939, had given Gabib his first lesson in political literacy—the aggravation of the class "struggle" during the period of the socialist victories. So Gabib made the conclusion by himself: on the threshold of the brightest future, it had simply been necessary for an internecine war to flare up.

Fifteen years later they met in Baku, the witnesses for the prosecution. I remember hearing a bitter groan fill the auditorium when Zinaida Gavrilovna took off her jacket and showed the court her back, which were covered by welts where she had been burned by hot iron... After she had testified, Gabib gave his testimony:

"We all tried to guess. We asked, 'Comrade procurator, why didn't you, however, execute us by firing squad?' We were ashamed that others had died, but we had not. We had been tortured equally. We had stood in urine up to our throats for 12 hours at a time. But what can you do? The cell was made like a coffin—it was about 20 meters high. You couldn't straighten up, you couldn't lie down. All day long you had to stand half bent-over. Your legs became like columns. Two people died in that coffin... We were tortured equally. However, they executed 60 by firing squad. Why? You really don't know? The prisoners were jam-packed together in the prison. So those people," he said, looking in the direction of the prisoners' bench, "kept hurrying to free the bunks for others to fill. However, groups of ten would be led out to be shot. Six groups of our people were led away, but the seventh landed on Bulla Island in Turukhan Kray. That's where Comrade Stalin himself spent his exile!"

At that time, during the "thaw period," the party's Baku gorkom sent out passes to attend the court sessions to the plants, kolkhozes, and primary party organizations. Several times I myself, as a young correspondent for the Komsomol newspaper, heard the witnesses. A lot has gone by and has been erased from my memory. But that phrase "in Turukhan Kray" has been engraved in my memory forever. Why? Because the person who was being judged was not Stalin, but Bagirov, who, so far as I can remember, was called the boss. But we continued to believe in Stalin devoutly.

At that time we thought that the guilty person, of course, was Iosif Vissarionovich [Stalin] for having put too much trust in those blackguards Yagoda, Yezhov, Beriya, Bagirov... And that was why he had been taken out of the Mausoleum.

We thought that way and that was natural. But what about him? For whom, after he had returned from the other world, his family had received a "death notification"? "Your husband Gabib Dzhebrail oglu has been posthumously rehabilitated." But here he is, alive. And with unconcealable pride he describes the hut where the

leader spent his exile, the hut under a glass sarcophagus! And, to be completely honest about it, I envied the former prisoner. He had seen it twice! In 17 years... No, Comrade Stalin had been deceived.

But now the light of knowledge is dawning. It was not Stalin who was deceived. Stalin had deceived us. A peasant who had been sentenced, according to Article 58, as an "enemy wrecker and bourgeois nationalist." His son, a frontliner who had died in the snow around Moscow as a ChSIR—"member of a family of a traitor to the Motherland." During the war the son had had only one right: to fall in battle in a penal company on a mine field. For his traitor father. For his mother and his younger sisters and brothers, who had to go on living. They also were deceived.

Yes, it is the truth that on all the fronts the soldiers rose to the attack with the frenzied cry, "For the Motherland! For Stalin!" But that is not the whole truth about the war. But whereas bread is still bread, whether it is a slice of bread or a crust, "not the whole truth" is always a lie.

Today we know that Stalin not only knew about the repressions, but also planned them, he stage-directed the terror, for 30 years he waged a destructive war about his own people. And that shoreless sea of blood from all the innocent people also contains the blood shed by the participants of the Shemakh tragedy.

Recently, in Leninabad, which long ago consigned the name of Molotov to the archives, on the Sovetskaya Ukraina Sovkhoz, a strong and authoritative farm, I had several meetings with great-grandson Zakaren Dzhebrailov. As a sovkhoz driver, for years he kept on the windshield of his truck a photograph of the genius with the squinty glance of a rifleman and the heavy mustache of a prison guard. There are a lot of these family portraits that are rolling over the country roads of the trans-Caucasus with an alcoholic son or a refugee daughter. And not only in our villages!

And they still exist in former Tekle. The great-grandson of a chairman who had been shot to death tore off his windshield the most recent one. He said that he wanted to tear it up, but then he thought it over and put it alongside of various other family death certificates. One was for a plowman, and one was for a member of a penal company who died near Moscow, neither of whom had allowed their peasant origin to die out. He did not say that. He said something completely different.

"It's also a death notification," the lad said, sadly moving the photograph aside. "I will know who I owe for these—for my great-grandfather and for my grandfather. And my grandchildren will know..."

And then I recalled what I had heard recently: Stalin died yesterday...

**Reader Recalls 1933 Ukraine Famine Horrors;
Event Seen as Preventable**
18300414a Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in
Russian No 32, 6-12 Aug 88 p 6

[Article by S. Latyshev: "How It Happened"; first two paragraphs are ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] Cherkassy—Issue No 19, 1988 of AIF [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] published an article entitled "Following the Tracks of Hunger." It talked about the famine in the Volga area in 1921. Is it known that the same thing occurred in the Ukraine in 1933? (M. Vishiyevskaya, Poltava Oblast)

We have found the testimony of an eyewitness to these tragic events in the editorial mail.

The picture, which I saw one April morning in 1933, shook me, a 20-year-old student, and has remained in my memory all my life. It occurred in the Ukraine, in the village of Yefremovka in Kharkov Oblast, during the hard times of famine.

I stepped into one of the huts and froze.

An almost emaciated child of about five or six lay on a wooden bench near the wall. His mother was bent over him, holding a knife in her hand. She was trying with difficulty to cut off his head. Her hands and the knife were covered in blood, and the child was twitching his legs convulsively. She did not see me but instinctively felt the presence of a stranger. She slowly turned in my direction and there and then threw herself at me with the knife. In an instant, I caught her gaze. She was looking at me but she hardly saw me. Her eyes were dry and devoid of any lustre. They reminded me of the eyes of a corpse whose eyelids they had not closed yet. Her arms and legs were so skinny that it seemed they were on the point of breaking. She raised the knife to me and fell down as if shot.

I do not remember rushing out of that hut or how long I ran. I came to my senses only at the doors of the village council. The chairmen and two duty attendants, who had still managed not to waste away—although the famine had already touched their appearance—noted with indifference that cases, where parents ate their own children, were not unusual in the village. We entered the hut an hour later in order to record this case of cannibalism, but we saw the woman, whom I had mentioned, lying face up on the dirt floor with lifeless open eyes staring glassily at the ceiling which was black with soot. She was pressing the cut-off head of her child to her breast.

That spring, there was no farmstead where someone did not die from starvation. Entire families died and there was no one to dig common graves. The people, whom the village council mobilized, dug up the earth with difficulty and many died themselves there and then. Stacked bodies lay for weeks in the huts. The stench spread far

beyond the limits of the villages. No more than a quarter of the population remained in the villages at the beginning of July, and these were incapable of working.

Besides famine, cold raged in the republic during the winter of 1932-1933. The villages had no fuel, and everyone, who still had the strength, broke up fences, tore down empty huts, cut down gardens, and burned all of this.

There were no domestic animals in the villages; there were no dogs, cats and other small animals. Sparrows—and those cautiously—appeared on the streets. Everything was eaten. They ate what lived and what died and boiled leather footwear, wooden shavings, straw, and chaff. After the snow melted, they caught gophers, moles, mice and other rodents—they ate everything.

The streets of the cities had few people. There was an incredible noise only at the markets and their outskirts where the sale of "commercial" grain took place in cramped shops.

Enormous masses of people in several rows extending for entire blocks moved and wriggled like a gigantic boa constrictor; they shouted, groaned and wept. The people stood in line for several days in order to buy a kilogram of rye grain, half of which was chaff.

The line of many thousands moved slowly; some sat down and others simply lay on the roadway in the dust and dirt—they did not have the strength to stand. Some of them were so emaciated and thin that they reminded one of skeletons covered with skin; others were incredibly stout—swollen from hunger. Their bodies were almost transparent and their eyes—barely noticeable slits.

By the end of the day, hundreds of bodies could be counted in the lines. During the night, they gathered them up and loaded them like firewood into vehicles and carts specially allocated for this purpose. They were carried outside the city where they were thrown into pits dug earlier and covered with earth. These burials continued until the month of July.

No one was interested in who they were or where they were from—it was impossible to even find out. You see, there was no passport system in the country at the time. They used certificates from residences but there were few who had them. The villages did not give out certificates, and the railroad would not sell train tickets without them. People traveled on foot for hundreds of kilometers to the cities.

Especially large numbers of people died from starvation in Kharkov, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Lugansk, and other large cities. There were no commercial stores for the sale of grain in the villages; there, death mowed down everyone with even greater fury and tragedy.

That year saw an unprecedented harvest of winter crops. The starving people went by the thousands to the fields. They cut and picked the ears, stuffed bags with them or separated the still unripened grain there and then and greedily ate it.

The emaciated stomachs were not able to digest the raw swollen grain and many found their death then and there on the field.

How did it happen that more than a million people died from hunger in the Ukraine alone? You see, there should not have been any famine. There was grain in the country. The facts of the commercial grain trade in the cities eloquently testified to this, without considering the network of stores selling grain in accordance with worker cards.

In order to evaluate correctly what happened, it is necessary to know the situation during those years in the country as a whole. It was an extremely difficult one, especially in the village. The complete collectivization of agriculture should have been completed in the Ukraine during the fall of 1931 or the spring of 1932. It was actually completed much earlier since the methods for drawing the farmers into kolkhozes were basically compulsory ones—threats and blackmail.

The poor peasants, who did not wish to go to a kolkhoz, were called little kulaks and threatened with exile. At the same time that the kolkhozes were being organized, a campaign was waged to eliminate the kulaks as a class. Middle peasants also frequently fell into this category.

The local "aktiv"—basically illiterate people, mentally narrow-minded and embittered—carried out the entire process of collectivization and elimination of the kulaks. They dispossessed families who had never used hired labor and who were not in the kulak category at all. They evicted them half-clothed from their huts in the cold, they took all of their property and clothing from them, they put them in carts and sent them to the railroad stations. Many children and old persons froze to death on the way.

Numerous authorized agents from the rayons and oblasts encouraged the aktiv's actions. The people became embittered. Before joining the kolkhozes, they destroyed their domestic animals and even the poultry, thinking that it would make no difference—everything would be collectivized. Whereas the highly productive farms of the "kulaks" and middle peasants were the main supplier of grain to the state in 1931, the situation had sharply changed in the fall of 1932.

The "kulaks" and many middle farms had been eliminated; however, the kolkhozes, which had been established, were poor, there was no agricultural machinery and there were not enough tools, draught animals and manpower. The harvest decreased sharply because of the poor cultivation of the soil. Grain deliveries to the state

were reduced. The harvest collected was not able to insure the fulfillment of the plan and the republic and oblast leaders decided not to ask the central government to reduce the plan especially since the rayons and oblasts had submitted exaggerated reports.

Thousands of authorized agents of every type were sent from the rayons and oblasts to the villages after the winter crops were sown in the fall of 1932. With their "help," the kolkhoz storehouses were almost swept clean and everything was sent to the state delivery reception points. There was no grain for the personal use of the kolkhoz members. They received nothing for the work-day and were thereby doomed to death by starvation.

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Formation, Potential Benefits of Uzbek Historians Society Lauded

18300414b Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
13 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Professor B. Lunin: "There Is No 'General History' Without 'Local History'"]

[Text] The information on the founding conference of the Society of Uzbekistan's Historians has flown through the republic's press.

Will the society be worthy of its high purpose? This is far from being an idle question. The broad and interested participation of historians in the work of the founding conference has already answered this question to a certain degree. However, we will be completely frank. Besides the cries of "Finally!" a pessimistic "Another one!" has also sounded in scientific circles.

Indeed, every type of still-born, far-fetched and frequently dead-at-the-roots association has occurred in the life of scientists, especially historians. Nevertheless, I can state that such pessimism is devoid of any foundation in this specific case.

Life itself and the times themselves with their new authoritative requirements testify in favor of establishing the Society of Historians—it is a subject that is extremely necessary and urgent and one that promises much.

At one time, N. G. Chernyshevskiy pointed out that historians should be able not only to "transmit the past" but also to "explain it and pass judgment on it." Alas! In light of the critical examination of the works of scholars on the history of Soviet Uzbekistan that were published during the years of the personality cult and during the time of stagnation, it is not difficult to convince oneself that the ideas of subjectivism, time-serving, lack of understanding, and embellished and incomplete statistics inevitably had an effect on both "the transmission of the past" and the "judgments" of historians. This is absolutely opposed to historical science.

One should not, of course, indiscriminately accuse all historians of the sins found in the works written during those years, completely deny their scientific importance and ignore that which is positive and often unquestionably valuable in them because of all their other flaws. However, the fact that the further we go the more frequently we find a multitude of "white spots" in our historical knowledge and research remains indisputable. Of course, historians still have a large debt to a society that primarily expects from them the creation of the history of post-October Uzbekistan (an integral part of the history of the Country of the Soviets), which would reveal—speaking in the words of M. S. Gorbachev—the "heroic journey of the country and the party in all of its grandeur—the path of the trail blazers," without avoiding the "drama of events and human fate" and the values, which "do not depend on a time-serving craze," when doing this.

In this area, the field of activity of the Society of Uzbekistan's Historians is exceptionally wide—the more so since not only the history of most recent times but also the very rich history of Uzbekistan and the contiguous countries of ancient, medieval and modern times should be included in its sphere of interest.

As we see, the Society of Uzbekistan's Historians, if it is able to develop its work on a thorough and broad scale, can considerably help science—as V. I. Lenin pointed out—pose questions "not in the sense of only explaining the past but also in the sense of fearlessly foretelling the future and acting boldly to bring it about."

The steadily growing interest of the broadest layers of the country's population in its past marks our time. The social consciousness of the people is being formed to a great extent using principles of scientific historical methods and truth. More than that, history is becoming more and more a policy during the time of restructuring since we are indeed talking about how to study and interpret our achievements and the problems that have accumulated during the past 70 years, drawing lessons for successful work to update Soviet society. In this regard, the Society of Historians has been called upon to play an effective role as the creative connecting link between historians in scientific establishments, higher and secondary educational institutions and museums.

The contacts, which matured long ago between the specialist historians and the writers of the republic, are important. The society's role in conducting broad public discussions on historical questions of vital importance should be significant especially since the search for truth should now take place by comparing different points of view, discussing and breaking old stereotypes.

The Society of Historians can and should do much to revive and expand the publication of mass scientific popular literature about Uzbekistan's and Central Asia's past and present which the broad readership needs and pines for. Popular scientific literature should include

essays on those who were defamed and illegally repressed and who were wrongly forgotten or deliberately expunged from human memory.

Consequently, there is a multitude of work. It is necessary, however, to proclaim in a loud voice that a serious and unforgivable mistake would be committed if the activity of the members of the Society of Historians is reduced to the function of performing scientific research work as such using social principles. This society should in no way become an appendage or back-up man for the republic's state-budgeted scientific research institutes.

We are talking about the society's active participation in the rebirth and expansion—under the new conditions—of the mass historical study of local lore which previously made an important contribution to science and tradition and whose vital threads were broken by the repressive measures of the Thirties.

Let us take, for example, the school study of local lore. There now exist not very few (there is no accurate count of them) school museums, local lore reading rooms, inquisitive young archaeologists and historians, leading teachers of them, and enthusiasts of the study of one's native kray and its past and present. However, they lack a unifying and directing social center from which a word of praise and encouragement, kind comradeship, parting words, wise counsel, and competent advice could come in a timely fashion. Here, of course, the role of the Society of Historians in overcoming amateurish work and incidentalism is considerable. We repeat, this society is a society of historians in which the academician and the teacher, student, senior classmate, specialist historian, and amateur student of local lore from among the workers, employees and labor and war veterans should work hand in hand.

It is necessary to bring historical and local lore study problems to the level of the tasks being solved by the republic's and country's historical science in general since, as V. O. Klyuchevskiy wrote, there is no "general history" without "local history".... Those young pathfinders could do a lot to expand the range of their interest and tasks with the participation of teachers.

For example, it is sufficient to point out the very broad opportunities for the necessary collection of instances of fraternal cooperation and mutual help among people of different nationalities during every stage in Soviet society's history, of material on the history of the republic's cities and villages, of data describing notable places of the past, etc.

An enormous indoctrinal and cognitive potential and charge is present here. It is impermissible to disregard this and to underestimate it. It goes without saying that the Society of Uzbekistan's Historians has a right to rely on the sympathetic and effective help of party and soviet organizations, newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other mass information media.

If all of this indeed begins to come true, then the birth of the society of the republic's historians will rightfully call into existence the word: "Finally!"

I would like to believe this with my whole heart.

08802

Butenko on 'Usurpation of Power' by Stalin
18300422 Moscow *VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS* in
Russian No 7, Jul 88 pp 139-141

[Letter from Professor A.P. Butenko, Doctor of Philosophy: "On the Usurpation of Power"]

[Text] The magazine *VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS* (No. 2, 1988, pp. 110- 133) contained a report on a round-table discussion conducted at the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism on the subject "Certain Problems of the Society's Development in the '70s: The Effect of the Braking Mechanism." Professor A.P. Butenko, Doctor of Philosophy, was among the scholars participating in it. Describing in his speech the process of the Soviet State's development since the death of V.I. Lenin, he commented that Stalin and his circle, and the bureaucratic apparatus created by him had "usurped power" from the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry. Other speeches (those of V.S. Lipitskiy, Yu.S. Aksenov and V.V. Zhuravlev) commented that A.P. Butenko's hypothesis was not supported by a specific historical analysis of the Soviet society's social structure from the '30s to the beginning of the '50s. He then stressed the fact that Stalin's regime of personal power with all of its perversions, distortions and massive, unwarranted acts of repression was alien to socialism and could not alter the nature or the essence of the Soviet public-political system or the class essence of soviet power. "Neither the grossest of errors nor deviations from the principles of socialism," M.S. Gorbachev commented, "could divert our people and our nation from the path which they took when they made their choice in 1917. The impetus of October was too great! The ideals of communism which captured the minds of the masses were too powerful!" (Footnote 1) (M.S. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroyka: revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya" [October and the Restructuring: The Revolution continues], Moscow, 1987, p.22)

Disagreeing with the conclusions of his opponents, A.P. Butenko wrote a letter to the magazine's editors. The editors are publishing it in the belief that certain pressing questions raised by A.P. Butenko in connection with the building of socialism in our nation demand in-depth, scientific study.

Respected Comrades:

It is apparent from the magazine's report on the discussion that my position on one extremely basic matter, the usurpation of power by I. Stalin and his circle, met with objections on the part of a number of the speakers (V.S. Lipitskiy, Yu.S. Aksenov and V.V. Zhuravlev). I did not

have the opportunity to respond to my opponents during the discussion, and the readers who read the report might therefore think that I had nothing to say to my critics, that the criticism was valid and that the position of my opponents was consistent with our party's real history. This is not the main thing, however. The principle of the matter is what is important. All of this is what has forced me to write a letter to the magazine.

My position, which was set forth during the discussion, is the following. The braking mechanism was an aggregate of interrelated, stagnant economic forms and antidemocratic organizational and political structures, ineffective management methods and administrative devices illuminated by a corresponding ideology and psychology, which were all alien to socialism and socialist progress. All of this blocked the resolution of growing conflicts, prevented socialism's advantages from being utilized and prevented it from successfully developing. The braking mechanism developed in the Soviet society as a by-product of the bureaucratic-administrative usurpation of class supremacy by Stalin and his circle, and it had all of the distortions of the economic and political system, of the ideology and psychology.

This is what gave rise to the debate as to whether the braking mechanism and the usurpation of power were connected. Was there even a usurpation of power in the Soviet society at all?

In support of my position, I turn to the Marxist definition of "usurpation of class supremacy" and apply it to the era of the Stalin regime. My opponents, of course, expressed only their point of view—just as I did—and, motivated by their own convictions, disputed my position, a position set forth, incidentally, not just in the oral speech but also in the weekly *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*. What was the essence of my critics' objections?

Those who speak out against Marx' definition of "government usurpation of class supremacy" as applied to that stage in the Soviet society's history in which despotic Stalinist control was perpetrating large-scale acts of repression and committing illegal acts are outwardly pursuing thoroughly good goals: to prevent our society from reality and its gains from being "smeared" by "unsubstantiated" formulations of issues in "the abstract, in isolation from the specific historical processes of the time," V.V. Zhuravlev stated. (Footnote 2) (*VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS*, No. 2, 1988, p. 132)

One should calmly examine what my opponents are striving for and what is actually occurring, however.

Almost every one of those who would defend their previous position (it was generally acknowledged by almost all of us prior to April 1985), the decades-old "logic of development of the Leninist party and the socialist society," whereby in the situation of the personality cult there was no shoving the working class away

from political power—nor could there have been—with its appropriation by Stalin and the party and state bureaucracy which he created, almost every one of them approaches his goal by one of two routes: either denying Stalin's usurpation of class supremacy altogether or considering the usurpation of power to be a way of implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat inevitable for the Soviet Union. Both of these points of view, which I consider to be erroneous, were fully manifested in the discussion. Let us consider each of them.

Let us go first to the position taken by those who deny the usurpation of class supremacy by Stalin and his circle. They are convinced that their position is justified and based on principle. It appears "patriotic" and "ideologically consistent" to them. But is this really the case?

In their effort to defend the immutability of the Soviet State's class-proletarian nature, the adherents of this approach are prepared to defame the dictatorship of the proletariat as a type of power. Think about that. By insisting on the existence of this kind of power in the Soviet society in the '30s, they are thereby asserting that everything done by Stalin and his circle—large-scale repression, illegal acts, despotism—was possible in the situation of power of the working class and its allies.

In reality, however, Stalin's power did not just represent a complete revision of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat, but was actually a rejection of it. Marx, Engels and Lenin repeatedly pointed out that proletarian power would direct its punitive agencies only against the resistance of the exploiters, that "the general means of coercion" would be "employed in the struggle against them," as Marx wrote. (Footnote 3) (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol. 18, p. 615) Engels underscored the same thing, noting that the proletariat needs a state "not in the interest of freedom, but in the interest of suppressing its enemies." (Footnote 4) (Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 5) Lenin believed that the proletarian state "must be a state democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and the indigent in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie)." (Footnote 5) (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 33, p. 35) Was this the way it was under Stalin? Did he not turn the existing power into arbitrary rule, into his own dictatorship directed not against the exploiters but against the workers and their best representatives? This is a complete break not just with Leninism but with socialism in general. Can this kind of arbitrary rule and despotism really be described as a dictatorship of the proletariat?

Another methodological error of my critics is highly important. They probably do not understand the interaction between the form and the substance of power and do not take into account the fact that its essence is defined not just by the actual functions carried out by the authorities. As a form of organization of the masses and political power, the soviets therefore could and can have diverse social and class substance: one kind, during the

period between the two first Russian revolutions, when the soviets functioned as agencies of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry; another, when Great October confirmed them as a state form of dictatorship of the proletariat. And the functioning of the soviets, its substance and social significance, changed entirely when Stalin began to use these agencies to bolster his own personal power, to take reprisals against people who disagreed and to destroy the Lenin guard. He even "validated" the need to use torture ("a method of physical pressure") against prisoners.

Nonetheless, there are scholars who call Stalin's power a dictatorship of the proletariat, power of the working class.

I cannot understand why my opponents do not consider it possible to apply Marx' warning about "the constant danger of government usurpation of class supremacy" to Soviet society in the era of Stalin's despotic rule. Why do they depict the matter as though I thought up the "usurpation of class supremacy" and the quarrel is only with me, as though it is a matter of refuting the "idea of 'usurpation of power' advanced by A. Butenko" and not a tenet of Marx? (Footnote 6) (VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No. 2, 1988, p. 132)

Finally, considering their position to be in conformity with the truth and the party approach and my point of view as erroneous and unacceptable, the opponents for some reason "shy away from" acknowledging that they are also going against the principles contained in CPSU documents of the period between the 20th and 22nd party congresses. The 22nd congress pointed out: "In the situation of the personality cult the party was deprived of a normal life. The people who usurped power became unaccountable to the party and moved beyond its control. Therein lies the main danger of the personality cult." (Footnote 7) ("MATERIALY XXII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 22nd CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1961, p. 256) We can see that the congress acknowledged the fact that individual people had usurped power. Furthermore, it stressed the fact that the main danger of the personality cult lay in the usurpation and lack of control over the usurpers. And how does one assess Yu.S. Aksenov's statement: "We can and must... speak at the top of our voices about the cult of Stalin's personality and its negative consequences, of the unjustified repression which took the lives of totally innocent people and destroyed that 'most delicate segment' of the party, which Lenin called 'the old party guard.'" He went on to say: "But is it valid in general to speak of 'usurpation' of power as applicable to the circumstances of socialist construction in our nation? Hardly." (Footnote 8) (VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No. 2, 1988, p. 131)

Now for the second route taken by my opponents: without denying Stalin's usurpation of power, to present his personal power and personal power in general as a form of implementing a dictatorship of the proletariat which is inevitable for the Soviet Union.

"...The regime of personal power," V.S. Lipitskiy says, "constitutes a political form which can have the most diverse class substance. History has known slave-owning, feudal and bourgeois types of such regimes. It would seem that under certain historical conditions a dictatorship of the proletariat could also be expressed through a personal power regime, if the latter mainly implements the basic objective interests of the working class and its allies." (Footnote 9) (Ibid., p. 115) He maintains on the basis of this that the power which existed in the '30s and '40s was proletarian power and led the society "along the socialist path." While not regarding the regime of personal power as "an inevitable aspect of a dictatorship of the proletariat," V.S. Lipitskiy attributes it primarily to the Soviet Union, noting that it is inevitable for our nation. In V.S. Lipitskiy's opinion, the comparison of the various positions of those forces engaged in a political struggle at that time shows that practically every position "would promote a regime of personal power. It was only a matter of whose personal power would be established as a regime. The results of the political struggle under those circumstances of society's development could most likely not have been otherwise." (Footnote 10) (Ibid.) And so, the regime of personal power is depicted as a political way of implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat which is inevitable for the Soviet Union. But is socialism possible then?

I have already written about the fact that for some time fatalistic concepts of the development of the Soviet State and our society from the '30s to the '50s have begun to spring up like mushrooms after a rain and multiply in our social science. Various authors express it in different ways. Some of them maintain that the implementation of Lenin's suggestion that Stalin be removed from the post of general secretary of the party Central Committee would have changed nothing, because the laws of history function independently of the will and wishes of the people. Others maintain that a personality cult is natural: The "meat-grinder," they say, could not have been avoided, and the forms of social and economic reforms

implemented by means of force, illegal acts and repression were inevitable. Now we learn that the regime of personal power in the Soviet Union "was inevitable," that the results of the political struggle under those conditions could most likely not have been otherwise.

In my opinion, all of these interpretations of the subject are based on a fatalistic concept of the course of history, in which, accordingly, there was no possible developmental variability or alternative. There is something else in the latter, however: recognition both of the inevitability of a regime of personal power in our nation (and therefore, the inevitability of the absence of socialist legality, democracy and glasnost) and of the realistic possibility of building socialism in this situation.

And what about Lenin's tenet that "socialism which does not exercise complete democracy cannot be victorious"? (Footnote 11) (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 27, p. 253) And what about another basic truth of Marxism-Leninism, which states: "Socialism is not created by ukases from above. Official-bureaucratic automatism is alien to its spirit, and vital, creative socialism is a product of the popular masses themselves"? (Footnote 12) (Ibid., Vol. 35, p. 57) The historians do not have the right to forget this.

If we are not to forget it, we face a dilemma—not historical but logical: either Lenin was wrong in maintaining that socialism is impossible without democracy or the fatalists were wrong in believing that socialism was being built in the Soviet society in a situation of a regime of personal power, which degenerated into usurpation of power and Stalinist despotism. There is no third way!

This, in my opinion, is the erroneousness of the positions taken by my opponents.

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11499

After Two Decades Church Is Reopened, Religious Community Registered

18120100 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 31
7-14 Aug 88 p 11

[Article by Alexander Mineyev entitled: "In Search of Justice"]

[Text] The story of how Orthodox believers from the village of Stromyn outside Moscow struggled to have their church opened.

Stromynka is a well-known street in Moscow. However, very few people are aware that the street is but a tiny portion of a road linking Moscow with Vladimir—through Kirzhach, Yurvey-Polskoi and Suzdal—from time immemorial. Before reaching these cities, the traveller from Moscow will pass Stromynsky Monastery of the Assumption and a large village nearby. It is the village of Stromyn in the Noginsk District, Moscow Region, and it exists to this day.

Andrei Uskov, the abbot of the Monastery of the Assumption in Stromyn, was removed from his post on May 15, 1960, "for violating financial discipline." The hundreds of believers in Stromyn and the ten villages around it, who constituted the parish of Assumption Church waited for the appointment of a new priest. But by a decision of the Council for Religious Affairs attached to the USSR Council of Ministers of May 17, 1962, this church community was "taken off the registers as dissolved". At the time, churches were again being closed throughout the country and the church in Stromyn was one of the 38 in the Moscow Region where services simply ended.

Letters started pouring out of the Stromyn to all imaginable places. One letter addressed to the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the 60s was signed by 560 people. I'll just note that, legally, no less than 20 signatures are needed in order to register a religious community. They're needed, but, apparently, they are not always enough.

In July, 1971, the chairman of the Noginsk City Soviet signed decision No 547 "On housing a branch of the Noginsk Museum of Local Lore in the former building of the Stromyn church."

Here I should add that the keys from Assumption Church were kept by the believers, and that no one suspected of ill intentions was allowed inside the church for the first 11 years after it was closed. It will be clearer if I mention that Assumption Church contained the Miracle-Working Icon of the Cyprus-Stromyn Mother of God, which had been entrusted to the first abbot of the Stromyn Monastery of the Assumption in 1379 by Sergius Radonezhsky "as a token of love and blessing."

And on July 22, the day when the Russian Orthodox Church celebrates, according to the new calendar the holiday of this icon, the authorities arrived in the village accompanied by militiamen and members of voluntary public order squads. The squad members, young workers from Noginsk enterprises, sawed off the locks, the militiamen held back the indignant women and old men, and the "authorities" wrote up the "Act of withdrawal": 19 chandeliers, 39 holy books, and 44 icons were donated to the museum by its newest "branch." Today, the only thing left of the icons are their dimensions and names. The Museum of Local Lore has neither the icons, nor any documents which could throw light on their further fate. Fortunately, the believers managed to preserve their main holy item—the Cyprus Mother of God.

As for the museum, it was not opened in Stromyn. There was a decision, there was a withdrawal and then a complete disappearance of the withdrawn items, but the museum itself failed to appear.

"That was the line back then," says Klavdiya Moiseyeva, a Stromyn resident. "It's only now that people are being taken into account but back then..." Klavdiya reared ten children; she has 20 grandchildren and 11 great-grandchildren. She was awarded the title of Mother-Heroine. But did G. Romanov, agent on religious affairs from the Moscow Region, and N. Lyakhov, his deputy, think about this when they were shouting loud enough for everyone to hear: "If we open this church, it will only be to keep cattle there!" And did the people who built a shop next to the church, the only church for tens of kilometers, which sells alcohol, did they think about the people, about their dignity, their convictions? Empty bottles are piling up near the church. "What do you think—that a shop isn't needed in the village?" the people at the City Soviet replied, answering my question with their own. But let's go back to the 70s. The church didn't exist, and this was legally established. It seemed that it was possible to celebrate an ultimate and complete victory over the religious opiate. Then, suddenly, in October 1975, the Moscow Region Soviet issued decision No 1343—making Assumption Church an architectural monument. And once this happened, it had to be protected. If the building is not in use then the organs of power are responsible for it. The Noginsk City Soviet had a certain amount of "experience" with this—not long before, two wooden churches in Ivanovskoye and Yamkino had burned to the ground, and a good ten or so stone churches had been reduced to ruins. It seemed that Assumption Church in Stromyn would meet the same fate. But the authorities proved their mettle. On September 6, 1974, the Cultural Administration of the City Soviet entrusted, by special appointment, "the protection of Assumption Church and all property belonging to it to village elder Ye. Martynova." The religious community is dissolved, the property plundered, and then the village elder is appointed to guard it.

The idea was a sly one. When the believers finally got the official papers, they got down to work. Money was raised, and by the summer of 1980, the roof over the

refectory was fixed. Later, the Noginsk City Soviet was to rule that the church had been repaired by the "non-existent" religious community. In the summer of 1983, work was completed. But then 1985 came, and news reached Stromyn's believers, at first unconvincing, but then ever more insistent, about the opening of churches all over the country. It was then that the "banners" realized that by permitting the repairs and registering it officially they had made an error—the money spent had been raised by the people and could become an argument for opening the church. It was decided to declare the repairs of poor quality, or, at least, incomplete. In February 1986, a district commission went to Stromyn and declared that the building was on the verge of collapse. In answer to this, a stream of indignant letters flowed out of Stromyn. The City Soviet sent a new commission, which, quite contradictory to the first one, concluded that everything now was in "satisfactory condition."

Nevertheless, when early this February I came to see the deputy agent on religious affairs of the Moscow Region,

N. Lyakhov (G. Romanov had been relieved of his post and his successor hadn't yet started his new job), he told me: "As long as I sit here the church in Stromyn will not be opened." "But from a legal point of view there is no reason for not opening the church," I argued. "Of course," he said, "but apart from the law there is one's Party conscience!"

However, the times were resolutely changing. On March 5 the Noginsk City Soviet sent a letter "to the Region" in which "the expediency of registering the religious community in the village of Stromyn" was recognized. When I asked what happened to their former objections, I was told: "We spent a lot of time looking into the matter and, besides, what are you surprised at? In the past there was one line, and now—there's another."

The Orthodox community in Stromyn has been registered, and at Assumption Church services are being held.

07310

Critic Calls for Return of Solzhenitsyn's Citizenship
18000642 Moscow *KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE* in Russian 5 Aug 88 p 15

[Article by Yelena Chukovskaya: "Return Solzhenitsyn's USSR Citizenship to Him: A Literary Critic's Opinion"; first paragraph is excerpt from a reader's letter; last paragraph is editorial comment]

[Text] I personally know about A. Solzhenitsyn's books only by hearsay. To be sure, I once held "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" in my hands, but was not allowed to read it.... I have heard that "GULAG" means Main Administration for Concentration Camps, and also that the writer either left the USSR on his own or was exiled. How could it be that the winner of such a prestigious award as the Nobel Prize left the USSR? Wherein did he fail to find a common language in our country and with whom? Wherein lies the essence of this paradox? (V. Karnaushenko, City of Odessa)

In February 1974, by an Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the writer A. Solzhenitsyn, winner of the Nobel Prize, was deprived of USSR citizenship by Article 64 of the Criminal Code "for betrayal of the Motherland." A.I. Solzhenitsyn was arrested at his apartment and sent to Lefortovo Prison. It was there that the article mentioned above and his sentence were read out to him. He was placed on board a special airplane and flown out of his own country. At that time he had just become 56 years old.

Solzhenitsyn's life in Russia had included study at two institutes, the war (more about that later), eight years of concentration camps, internal exile, work as a school-teacher of mathematics at a rural school and then at a school in Ryazan, literary recognition and daily devoted, inspired work without any concessions to the threatening conditions of life, persecution, slander, and disease.

Despite all that befell his lot, Solzhenitsyn traveled his path in our land as a happy person, profoundly convinced of the necessity and the irreversibility of the times for which he struggled with all the might of his gift as a writer and his civic-minded temperament.

By the way, he was striving for our present-day *glasnost* as far back as 1969. Here is what he wrote in a letter dated 12 November 1969 to the Secretariat of the USSR Writers' Union: "Glasnost—honest and complete *glasnost*—that is the primary condition for the health of any society, ours included. And whoever does not wish *glasnost* for our country is indifferent to the Fatherland."

The cup of patience held by the leaders during those years overflowed when the first volume of "The GULAG Archipelago" was published in the West in December 1973. It must be said that Solzhenitsyn was not completely willing to publish this work abroad—this intimate work, hidden

up to this point in time, and about which only a few of his closest friends knew. Circumstances compelled him to take this step. The fact is that one of the initial drafts of the book was confiscated in August 1973. This was followed by the death, under unexplained circumstances, of Yelizaveta Denisovna Voronyanskaya, an elderly, unmarried Lenin-grad woman who had assisted Solzhenitsyn as a typist for many years.

The publication of "Archipelago" in the West was Solzhenitsyn's reply to the confiscation of his manuscript and the death of his assistant.

The publication of "Archipelago" stirred up our press. For two months special articles excoriating the author, threatening editorials, indignant letters from citizens who had not read the book, and Bor. Yefimov's professional caricatures were not absent from the newspaper columns. Then followed the Ukase regarding the deprivation of citizenship and the enforced exile of this author of a seditious book. About two weeks after A.I. Solzhenitsyn's exile all his books published in our country, as well as the journal publications of his short stories, were removed from all libraries and burned.

And by that time quite a few of his things had been published in our country. Readers remembered "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," "Matryona's House (A Village Cannot Stand without One Honest and Just Person)," "Incident at Kchetovka Station," "For the Sake of the Cause," and, finally, "Zakhar-Kalita." All these pieces had been published in NOVYY MIR when A.T. Tvardovskiy was the editor ("Ivan Denisovich" was also published in the "Novel-Newspaper" and by the "Sovetskiy pisatel" Publishing House). Most of them, especially "Ivan Denisovich," were enthusiastically received by the press. However....

The story of the confiscation of the "Archipelago" manuscript was not the first in the chain of outrages against this author's archives.

On 11 September 1965, at the apartment of the persons to whom A.I. Solzhenitsyn had entrusted the safekeeping of his manuscripts, his novel "In the First Circle," as well as his poems ("Heart under a Pea-Jacket"), and plays written while he was still in a concentration camp, were confiscated. This first confiscation of his archive served as the beginning of Solzhenitsyn's persecution. It led to his expulsion from the USSR Writers' Union (in October 1969) and exposed him to a squall of unremitting slander, threats, and insults. And the main thing was that it erected a barrier to the publication of his works in his native land. Not one of his books which he wrote in Russia after 1965—"Cancer Ward," "The Calf Butted against the Oak," "August, 1914" (not to mention scenarios and short stories) was allowed to appear on the pages of the Soviet press.

The following question might be raised: Why recall all this now, when the name of Solzhenitsyn has begun to appear without abusive epithets in our press, when, as I have been told, NOVYY MIR wishes to publish "Cancer Ward"?

And so we have acknowledged that Solzhenitsyn wrote something of value; we have even agreed to take these valuable cultural items unto ourselves. So be it: we enjoy the results of his labor, the fruits of his crushed life. And let him be grateful to us for this, let him be happy that the Motherland has remembered her son.

"Art belongs to the people"—this is a slogan which we have seen since our childhood, and it has been imprinted on our retinas. The fates of our best writers, performing artists, and scholars insistently demands that we introduce into the consciousness of the coming generations yet another slogan: "The creators of genuine art (and science) comprise a great value for any civilized people."

But we have trampled upon our own great and valuable treasures, heaped abuse upon them, and even destroyed them. And then we are amazed at where goodness, mercy, a sense of our own dignity, morality, respect for work, and hence, even the ability to work have all disappeared.

Therefore, instead of a request to publish "Cancer Ward," Solzhenitsyn should, first of all, be informed that the unjust sentence condemning him for betraying the Motherland has been set aside. His USSR citizenship should be returned to him. Only after that would it be appropriate to publish his books and critically discuss them in the pages of our newspapers and journals.

As confirmation of A.I. Solzhenitsyn's inalienable right to USSR citizenship (if, indeed, such confirmations are needed at all for a person who was born in this country and who has traveled the difficult paths of his own generation together with the people), let me cite some lines from his rehabilitation case (Decision No. 4 n:083/57 of the USSR Supreme Court, dated 6 February 1957):

"...Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isayevich, born 1918, native of Kislovodsk, possessing a higher education, prior to his arrest was a battery commander, took part in battles against German-Fascist troops and was awarded Orders of the Patriotic War, Second Class and the Red Star....

It is evident from the materials of the case that, in his diary and in his letters to his friend, Solzhenitsyn expressed his opposition to Stalin's Cult of Personality....

From Solzhenitsyn's military dossier...it is evident that Solzhenitsyn from 1942 to the day of his arrest, i.e., to February 1945, was at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, bravely fought for the Motherland, on several occasions manifested personal heroism, and set a personal example for the staff of the unit which he commanded.

Solzhenitsyn's unit was the best in the section with regard to discipline and combat actions.... The decree of the Special Conference of the USSR NKVD, dated 7 July 1945, with regard to Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isayevich is hereby abrogated and the case against him for committing a crime shall be dropped."

And so, Solzhenitsyn bravely defended his country when it was attacked by Hitler; during the 1930's he thought of writing a novel to be entitled "Love the Revolution"; during the 1940's he condemned Stalinism, and during the 1960's he demanded glasnost. Over the span of his life his views changed, he accumulated some bitter experiences, and his talent as a writer grew stronger.

It is high time that we put an end to this drawn-out strife with a remarkable son of Russia, an officer of the Soviet Army who won military awards, a prisoner in Stalin's concentration camps, a schoolteacher in Ryazan, and world-renowned Russian writer, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. And it is time that we gave thought to the example shown by his instructive life and to his books.

From the Editors

The letter from our reader in Odessa concerning the books and personal fate of A. Solzhenitsyn is not the only one of its kind. For a long time we have been answering such letters in accordance with the established bureaucratic practice—with polite formality, mentioning only that which is commonly known. And now material from the literary critic and scholar Yelena Chukovskaya has appeared in our editorial offices. Like a small knot, it has tied together some drawn-out strings from long ago and far away.

String No. 1: Readers are becoming more and more interested in Solzhenitsyn's creative work.

String No. 2: From what has been published in our country we know that Solzhenitsyn is an important writer.

String No. 3: We do not know what he has written in exile, so people cannot talk about him in the Motherland.

And the final string: The constructive point of view with which you have just become acquainted.

We have no other arguments, only questions. And the questions must be answered. Who would like the floor?

Literary Achievements of Brezhnev, Rashidov Assailed by Uzbek Writer
18300398 Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 29.
16-23 Jul 88 pp 26-29

[Interview with Timur Pulatov by Natalya Zagalskaya: "Under the Protection of the 'Father of the Nation'"]

[Text] L. Brezhnev's "writing" is well known. Preparations were even underway for an exchange of membership cards in the USSR Writers' Union so that he could be issued writer's certificate number one. They did not succeed. Sh. Rashidov beat his highly placed benefactor to it. His name was listed in the directory of the USSR Writers' Union for many years, and his "works" were published in the best magazines and as separate books. The logic behind any cult is that if the "top man" in the republic is a "writer," then he must be the best writer. And how did the other Uzbek writers—not "better" writers but real ones—get along next to him? Today we give you an interview with one of them, Timur Pulatov.

Timur Pulatov is known as one of Uzbekistan's most popular writers today. Not one of the books which brought him fame and recognition—"Vtoroye puteshestviye Kaipa" [Kaip's Second Journey], "Vladieniya" [Possessions], "Zavsegdatay" [The Habitue], "Strasti bukharskogo doma" [Passions of a House in Bukhara] and "Cherekakha Tarazi" [The Turtle of Taraz]—could the author get published in his native Tashkent at one time, however. They were all published in Moscow. In the republic in which Timur Pulatov lived and worked, he was simply suppressed. And this went on for 2 decades....

Timur Pulatov's fate is not a troubling exception. Unfortunately, it proved to be typical for those Uzbek literary figures who did not want to compose odes in honor of Rashidov and his circle or to extol the flowering of Uzbekistan and its "wise leader" in their essays, poems and novels. Such writers did not suit the authorities and were subjected to repression, and their works were not published in the republic. This was all brought out at a recent plenum of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union.

I asked Timur Pulatov, now a holder of the State Prize of the Uzbek SSR and member of the Presidium of the Board of the republic Writers' Union, to tell in detail about literary life in Uzbekistan during the Rashidov era. The subject is of interest also because Rashidov was considered a leading writer of the republic, and there was mandatory study of his books in the schools and VUZ's.

When I began the interview, I did not imagine that it would be so long or so painful for the interviewee. We spent several evenings talking in Tashkent and then in Moscow, when Pulatov went there for a writers' plenum. It seemed that there was no end to the story, which kept bringing out new facts, events, names....

[Answer] It is difficult to speak of those times, but it is necessary. And not in order to settle personal accounts, but for purposes of repentance and purification—not just verbally, not just "with the tongue," but in the secret places of one's soul and conscience.... For some reason we in Uzbekistan were certain that Rashidov could tolerate it if he were called a poor leader, but God forbid that he should be described as a poor writer. I do not know who would have had the courage to call him a poor leader, since L.I. Brezhnev himself called him "the perennial and tested leader of the republic" twice, in 1974 and 1977, when he attached the star of the Hero of Socialist Labor to Rashidov's chest. And this was during the very height of the figure-padding and other abuses in Uzbekistan....

It is an ancient tradition in the East for those in power to try to "ennoble" themselves in the eyes of the people with the aid of poetry. One could name many poets-and-leaders. Their laurels apparently gave Rashidov no peace of mind....

[Question] But there was always also poetry opposing despotism. The Epicurian Omar Khayam and Khafiz, who swore "to give up Samarkand and Bukhara for a smile from his beloved," and Firdausi, who gave his royalties from the poem "Shah Namah" to the poor....

[Answer] But do you know what the rulers called those poets in order to cast doubt upon them? "Devonians," people in a different world. To Rashidov those who attempted to cast doubt upon the value of his literary works were also Devonians.

Our well-known prose writer A. Kakhkhar, holder of the State Prize of the USSR, was persecuted for opposing the nomination of Rashidov's novel "Silneye buri" [More Powerful Than the Storm] for a Lenin Prize by obsequious literary officials. At writers' meetings and in the press those who had just yesterday been Kakhkhar's friends or students unanimously called him a "slanderer of prospering Uzbekistan," "casting suspicions upon his own people," as though the vindictive Rashidov was synonymous with Uzbekistan and its people. Even K. Simonov and V. Ovechkin, who lived at that time in Tashkent, were unable to defend Kakhkhar, and the persecuted writer departed this life too soon, without having incorporated his ideas into books. It was now dangerous even in a small group to refer to the writer Rashidov unflatteringly. He had informants everywhere. Rashidov was informed that literary critic E. Rustamov had said in a conversation with one of his graduate students: "Rashidov is not at all the writer our critics would like to make of him." The student of prominent Russian scholar Ye.E. Vertels and author of the remarkable book "Uzabekskaya poeziya pervoy poloviny XV veka" [Uzbek Poetry of the First Half of the 15th Century], well known in Turkey and Italy, was accused by critics loyal to Rashidov and at his orders, of "ideological omnivorousness" and "mysticism." Professor E. Rustamov, who had just turned 50, literally "rotted" in

a psychiatric hospital. Composer M. Burkhanov, author of the UzSSR Anthem, was an outcast all those years because he had dared to oppose Rashidov's nomination for chairman of the Composers' Union. Rashidov took attacks on members of his clan as attacks on himself. Gifted film director A. Khamrayev was forced to seek work outside the republic. He had dared to touch upon the complexities of life in the film "The White, White Storks," and it was believed that in "Rashidov's" Uzbekistan the complexities and tensions had long since receded into history.

I would also mention Shukhrat, S. Zunnunova, Shukrullo and P. Kadyrov, who refused to regard Rashidov's works as a model for emulation and protested the profanation of the very concept of literature, the deliberate destruction of the people's culture, their ethics and morality. Everything lofty and inspired, which was beyond Rashidov's intellectual grasp, was ostracized. I would not be stretching the truth if I said that during the years of Rashidov's rule, which lasted almost a quarter of a century, Stalinism, his methods and objectives reigned once again in art. Only a few of our illegally repressed national writers were returned to the readers during the brief period of the "Khrushchev thaw." Rashidov reinstated the ban on the rest, those who, like Chulpan and Fitrat, had been rehabilitated posthumously....

[Question] We know that Rashidov's literary works were analyzed—more correctly, brazenly extolled—in many scholarly monographs and dissertations. Some of these "scholarly" works were defended in Moscow. Today one can evaluate Rashidov's works calmly and objectively. How would you describe them?

[Answer] May the candidates and doctors of science who defended their dissertations on Rashidov's creative works forgive me if I say that everything written by him, beginning with his first collection of poetry, "Moy gnev" [My Rage] and ending with his works of prose, the novels "Silneye buri" and "Moguchaya volna" [The Mighty Wave], is second-rate and timeserving. There is nothing original in either the subject matter or the style. He took subjects for his novels from the "Main Directions of the Five-Year Plan for Development of the Uzbek SSR." This is not an exaggeration. He took the "global" subjects for himself and graciously distributed the others among writers close to him, because these subjects were considered to be prestigious bonuses. Rashidov was convinced—and this is obvious from his works of literary criticism—that literature must depict life only at a high level of glorification, completely repudiating its conflicts and tensions. Writer V. Kozhevnikov, one of the "perceptive" students of the creative works of Rashidov, that "master at polishing reality," wrote the following in the foreword to Rashidov's book published in 1977: "Sharaf Rashidov's novels have a precise place of action. In 'Moguchaya volna' it is the construction site of the Farkhadges (Galabages in the book); in 'Pobediteli' and 'Silneye buri,' the Golodnaya Steppe. The events depicted by the author should actually be viewed on the

scale of all Uzbekistan, however, in the light of those achievements, developments and processes which are typical of the entire republic...."

The crude, no-conflict sociological theory returned to our literature following the talented books of A. Kadyri, S. Ayni, Chulpan, Aybek and A. Kakhkhar. And it reigned thanks to the authority of the "republic's leading writer." This was at a time when F. Abramov, V. Bykov, I. Drusse, G. Matevosyan... were active in multinational Soviet literature. But why did we need other literatures, when we had our own "living classic"! On Rashidov's 50th birthday, then UzSSR Minister of Culture V. Zakhidov wrote in the magazine GULISTAN: "How good it is that our reality and our life, our homeland and our work have turned 50.... As the folk saying goes: 'Be alive as long as the world stands!' May we have the good fortune to gather beautiful flowers from the flowerbed of Your creativity and make wonderful bouquets of them"! One must truly have a euphoric imagination to identify Rashidov with "our life," with "our homeland"! Just where will the imagination not fly to gather beautiful flowers from the republic's first flowerbed?! And Zakhidov picked a rare flower. He soon became an academician....

[Question] The trouble is more than just that Rashidov suffered from megalomania. Ingratiating writers and critics assiduously supported the title of "outstanding writer of the republic." And it was certainly not Uzbek writers alone who created the cult of Rashidov the writer. You just mentioned V. Kozhevnikov. Is he not the former chief editor of the magazine ZNAMYA?

[Answer] Yes, he is. Rashidov apparently needed more than just the Uzbek critics' opinion of his work to convince the sceptics. He wanted very much to gain a reputation of All-Union and even world greatness. And, thanks to articles in ZNAMYA and OGONEK and many other magazines, even in the respectable VOPROSY LITERATURY, and through the efforts of PRAVDA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and other central newspapers, Rashidov gained a reputation not just as a political and public figure, but also as a writer in the front ranks of multinational Soviet literature.

We always linked the development of our post-revolutionary literature with Russian writers. Gorkiy, Mayakovskiy, Fadeyev and Tikhonov supported all that was talented in Uzbek literature. Yesenin, Lugovskiy and Akhmatova were in our midst at various times, leaving their mark on our creative culture. Platonov's story "Dzhan" forced us to take a new look at ourselves. V. Dudintsov, A. Tarkovskiy and S. Lipkin translated both our ancient and our contemporary authors, noting the merits of a literature created by the spirit of the people over many centuries.... Unfortunately, during Rashidov's time the evaluative criteria changed, as did the group of Moscow writers whose opinion of our literature was unquestioned.

[Question] It is clear what Rashidov's compatriots who sang his praises were hoping for: titles, honors, awards.... But what could the capital's writers have wanted? They were in no way dependent upon Rashidov! He was extolled by A. Safronov and N. Gribachev, after all—and not by them alone.

[Answer] Rashidov was supported by those who shared his view on the role of literature. But Rashidov was not praised by Fedor Abramov, who planned to come to Uzbekistan because he was very interested in our ancient culture. I still have his letters on the subject. It is inconceivable that such a conscientious, painfully honest writer would be capable of supporting a person without talent! Nor did K. Simonov translate Rashidov, although this held the promise of various benefits. Despite Rashidov, however, they translated A. Kakhkhar, persecuted by Rashidov. Nor did V. Ovechkin extol the "deeds" of Rashidov and his circle, even though he was taken to "model" farms and insinuatingly instilled with the idea: "Everything which you praised in your 'Rayonnye budni' [Rayon Workday Life] is embodied here in the millionaire-kolkhoz"! Following these tours Ovechkin would withdraw even more deeply into himself, become morose and not leave his home for weeks on end. He sensed that deception and crime were concealed behind all that show.... On the other hand, Yu. Karasev, who secluded himself from the sounds of the outside world at a Central Committee dacha surrounded by a "heavenly" garden, translated Rashidov. This was the Karasev who was famous for the scandalous article "False Importance," in which he attempted "to debunk" Boris Pasternak. A move very necessary for [his] literature, but it was not enough for him to become a member of the Writers' Union, which had expelled Pasternak from its ranks. He had to prove his worth some other way. If Karasev was not accepted into the Union in Moscow, that was no problem. At Rashidov's instructions the translator was accepted as a member of the USSR Writers' Union in Tashkent, ignoring the clear violation of the Charter. The Secretariat of the USSR Writers' Union, as though unaware of the violation, approved the republic Union's decision. This is what he was counting on! The "boss" was generous. The books of all those who praised Rashidov and his circle, those who translated them and promoted them to the entire nation, were published in Uzbekistan. They were awarded titles and were translated into Uzbek, and V. Kozhevnikov was given the honor of being a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet from our republic.

We learned of the visit to our republic by "important guests"—secretaries of the USSR Writers' Union and editors of central newspapers and magazines—only after they had departed, from lavish television and newspaper interviews. They all praised in unison the republic's achievements in all areas of life under Rashidov's "wise" leadership, particularly noting successes in literature and art, and listing the muster roll of those especially close to Rashidov. It is possible that they could see only achievements from those "deputies' itineraries" by which they

were taken, because they did not go near the real roads of life—the routes flown by agricultural aircraft spraying with health-threatening toxic chemicals the fields in which peasants stooped, the villages where poverty coexisted with deliberately cultivated ignorance and where one could hear the moans and curses directed at the "newly created bair," who mercilessly exploited their long-suffering people for the sake of orders, titles and positions, for gold and luxury.

Andrey Bitov only had to turn off the tourist routes onto the road of life and describe his Khiva impressions in "Azari" [Fervor], and he was the object of a flood of reproaches for his "disrespect for Eastern hospitality." And what about Bella Akhmadulina? She had just acutely exposed Rashidov's hospitality "to the core" and openly discussed it in one of her talks, when she was placed into circumstances forcing her to leave the republic ahead of schedule.

[Question] Then the visiting literary figures, those who wrote articles of unbridled praise, deliberately ignored the outrages being perpetrated?

[Answer] Not always. It is doubtful that visiting writer D. Kalinovskaya, who published an essay on Adylov, general director of the Pap Agroindustrial Association, in LITGAZETA in 1982, suspect that she was praising the head of a thieving mafia and a sadist. It is doubtful that the authors of "positive" essays published in ZNAMYA and OGONEK knew that those whom they were "eulogizing" were frequently contemptuous criminals and embezzlers of public funds. The method whereby they gathered their material for their essays was a simple one, because they traveled to a "zone outside of criticism" and were primed for optimism in advance. They were taken directly from the airport to the republic Central Committee, where they were provided with an itinerary and a "positive hero." They were received even more cordially locally, at the obkom, which had been informed "from above" as to the purpose of the respected writers' visit. The visitors were housed in a dacha of the obkom, of course, and from that minute on their every step was scheduled. Splendid entertainment and gifts were also used as grease for the wheels of that machine in which, as in a colorful theater act, the main roles were played by fine workers from the top- and mid-level party and soviet apparatus, ministers....

[Question] Yes, the journalists who visited Uzbekistan experienced a full sense of the meaning of "Eastern hospitality." They also felt the force of Eastern despotism!

[Answer] The panegyrics published in the central press were immediately printed in all of the republic newspapers, and fables about their remarkable leaders in the rayons and oblasts, in the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were instilled over and over in the people, already tormented with lies. Lord, one wanted to scream at times, is a world in which "in the beginning there was the word" actually going to perish from the

false word?!! In order to escape the vicious circle of lies one only had to take a close look around—and not from the window of the Volga! One only had to walk among the salt-whitened fields to see that the irrigation method introduced in Bukhara Oblast, for example, by the "great meliorator" had ruined thousands upon thousands of hectares of highly fertile land and left the cities without drinking water. The land was perishing, while the "Rashidov crowd" continued year after year to accept increased socialist commitments, promising "to increase" the cotton harvest to 1 million tons by 1986, exactly half of which would be "procured" by means of padding and machinations. I repeat: those who created the unquestioned authority for Rashidov as the republic's leader and a leading writer, those who sang the praises of his circle probably did not know about their criminal activities, but some of them simply did not want to know. It is too bad that as soon as the rumor spread through Uzbekistan that Adylov's schemes had been exposed, the magazine SOVETSKIY SOYUZ (No. 8, 1981) edited by N. Gribachev, "good friend of Uzbekistan," and published, as we know, in many of the world's languages, came out with a large photographic report on the economy he headed. And Adylov was not an exception. Just how did it all come about?

The last "holdouts" were being removed with victorious fanfare in the republic itself, in order to close the circle around the "zone outside of criticism." IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Melikyants was forced to leave because the republic leadership did not like his critical articles. "Contentious" V. Karpov, currently First Secretary of the USSR Writers' Union, was also forced out of Uzbekistan.

[Question] It is simply amazing how Rashidov got around to everything: running the republic, writing novels, interfering in the affairs of the Writers' Union, naming those who should be given a title, who should be placed onto a board or sent as a delegate to the congress in Moscow!

[Answer] And it was not just in literature. He advised architects about the best way to build showy palaces at the expense of housing for the workers; artists on how to paint pictures; composers on how to compose music. The grateful artists responded to this concern by composing ballets on the subjects of his books, filmmakers made films of them, and artists were inspired by his image to paint pictures like "L.I. Brezhnev Awarding the Order of Friendship of Peoples to Uzbekistan," in which the second most important figure was Rashidov. Many students of writer A. Kakhkhar and composer M. Burkhanov came to pay homage to Rashidov and acknowledged him as their "teacher." He showed them affection and rewarded them. The talents were rooted out, the spirit was amputated. Everything in literature had to be slightly below Rashidov's level, slightly worse than what he had written. With callous calculation Rashidov established an age qualification for those close to him, whereby upon achieving the age of 60 they were awarded the title People's Writer, with mandatory publication of

a collection of their writings, so as to elevate them above everyone else not just psychologically but materially as well. One of these "people's [writers]" told with delight how he had asked Rashidov to "present" him with a subject for his next novel. Rashidov made him the gift of a subject and specified a date for the novel's completion—the list of new winners of the State Prize came out every year just at that time. The image of Rashidov himself was developed in novels, but for the sake of modesty he shared his fame with those close to him: we encounter the prototypes of K. Karimov, Adylov and others in prose. Those who "immortalized" him in documentary films were also given honorary titles and award.

Rashidov's 60th birthday was commemorated not just with an abundance of articles, but also with the publication of a monograph of his creative works. He was provided in good time with a list of Moscow scholars who could write it. He circled in red the name of the one he wanted. In the East one who has reached the age of 60, the "age of a prophet," is highly honored as one filled with wisdom and dignity. From that age the "master" began to be called "otakhon," or "father of the nation," in the republic. The favorite reading of the "father of the nation" were the novels of Yan and Kalashnikov's novel "Zhestokiy vek" [The Cruel Century] about Genghis Khan. He probably fantasized about himself as the lord of the universe. Of the modern authors he read Ch. Aytmatov—albeit only until the writer began to intervene in the dispute about water resources between Kirghizia and Uzbekistan. I can just imagine how indignant the "father of the nation" was when he heard about R. Gamzatov's statement! On one of his trips to Tashkent the poet, upon hearing Rashidov praised, exclaimed angrily: "No, you will never have a Kaysyn or Rasul of your own!"

[Question] "Priznaniye vse narodnoy lyubvi" [Acknowledgement of Universal Love] was the title of the well-known, five-volume collection of Rashidov's works published at the Khudozhestvennaya Literatura publishing house in 1980. Publication of the collection was a perfectly natural thing. P.N. Fedoseyev, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, underscored in the postscript to Rashidov's five-volume collection, in everything which we have had the good fortune to read "the artist, the theoretician and the publicist function in inseparable unity."

[Answer] Yes, Rashidov was presented to the public as an outstanding publicist with his main subject, internationalism, prominent in his books "Znamya druzhby" [The Banner of Friendship] and "Tashkent—gorod bratstva" [Tashkent, a City of Brotherhood]. From time to time, on important dates, he had articles on friendship of peoples printed in PRAVDA. And although these articles consisted of a mechanical collection of general statements and cloned expressions, they apparently provided the author with additional "political capital." We

now know the real cost of "internationalism a la Rashidov," which served as a screen for deceiving the "state of 15 fraternal republics." Rashidov's creative career completed its circle the year he finally received the coveted Lenin Prize. Not in the "field of literature," to be sure, but in geology—along with a group of comrades at that. No one asked back then what Rashidov had to do with the working of a gold field, known from time immemorial, in the southern part of the republic. And it is not clear why he did not want to receive a prize for literature at that time. With so many admirers in the persons of secretaries of the USSR Writers' Union and chief editors of central newspapers and magazines, Rashidov could perfectly well have achieved this.... Particularly since we referred to Chairman G. Makarov as a long-standing and tested friend of Uzbek literature. He translated and thereby promoted its "best specimens"—the works of literary figures especially close to Rashidov.

[Question] You yourself suffered a great deal during those years, of course. At a recent plenum of the USSR Writers' Union Adyl Yakubov said that each new work of yours received a hostile reception in the republic. Tell us more about how your career as a writer developed in that situation.

[Answer] Everything went well at first. I had a story published in Tashkent, and I was preparing a second. There were good reviews in the press. Everything would have continued to go smoothly if I had not suddenly stopped and asked myself where I was headed. I only had to turn to serious matters, to attempt to depict life with all its complexity, and it all started! I refer to the story "Other Communities" published in the magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV in 1968. One of the secretaries of our Writers' Union detected sedition in it and wrote to Rashidov. The latter ordered him to get to the bottom of it. An order was issued to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, which printed an abridged and edited denunciation by the same Union secretary with the unequivocal title "There Is No Such Point, Gadzhivan"! This was the signal. Soon thereafter, at a combined plenum of creative unions, in Rashidov's presence, I was accused of "slander." Publication of the story also coincided with a new campaign of "tightening the screws," in which the authorities had decided once more to divert the dissatisfaction of the people away from their own blunders and errors and skilfully direct it against the creative intelligentsia, making them the scapegoat and generating a perverse attitude in the public toward writers. The latter were ostensibly "slandering" and censuring everything, preventing the people from mobilizing for new victories. Organizational conclusions immediately followed the criticism. Publication of my book was halted in the Tashkent publishing house, and I was forced to leave the film studio where I had been working as an editor. Naturally, they halted production also of the film, which was based on "Other Communities," and demanded a totally different interpretation of events from the director. Despite the material hardships, I understood what a blessing it was not to depend upon an official position or

someone's bureaucratic will. Many of those who had started out with me had already advanced in their careers, but one could see more and more frequently in their eyes anguish and fear evoked by the fact that "they had throttled their own song." I decided that I had to persevere, no matter how difficult it was. "Well-wishers" advised me to write an article praising Rashidov, and everything would return to normal. I could not understand why Rashidov needed the praise of an unknown young writer, what this could add to the chorus of enthusiastic eulogies to him. I finally understood that to him, a person with sadistic inclinations, it was not my praise which was so important as the very fact that yet another young author desiring rapidly to find his path in literature would have come to him with his confession, with bowed head, as though laughing at his own romantic inspirations. "A naive young man," the "master" would have admonished me and then ordered the publishing house to publish my book. The threats began sometime later, when it became clear to Rashidov that I would not do this. And the threats were not just against me, but also against family and friends.... During that period I came across Ghandi's book "My Life." From it I understood that even if one does not actively attack evil, does not castigate it in public, one can still achieve a great deal, can hold out and ultimately win, by adopting a position of noncooperation with evil. After all, evil does not grow and overcome good because it is self-replenishing, but because we waste so much of our spiritual vigor on it. We only have to recoil from evil, and the magma of its nucleus begins to cool.... My position was socially more vulnerable than that of A. Kakhkhar and others who openly opposed Rashidov's evil, but this was due to public sentiment.

A vacuum gradually formed around me. Yesterday's friends avoided me, afraid of the all-seeing eye of Rashidov's informants. They would not publish me in Tashkent, and I was ignored in the Writers' Union, which also turned out to be a blessing. I had an opportunity to write without being distracted by the fussing and fighting. I learned how to benefit from adversities, and this, you will agree, is also the art of living....

[Question] Today we use Rashidov's name, "Rashidovshchina," to refer to any criminal practice such as bribe-taking and the brazen pressuring of farm leaders to achieve good performance figures at any cost, even to the point of open machinations and figure-padding, an entire disgusting phenomenon of our life which we are attempting to eliminate. Just how then was it possible for such a person as Rashidov—to all appearances, a perfectly ordinary, lusterless individual—to ascend to the pinnacles of power and cause so much trouble? Was it actually just because of his connections, his flattery, his ability to be silent at the right time in the presence of the powerful and to shove aside the weak at the right time? What was the mechanism by which "Rashidovshchina" emerged?

[Answer] The absence of democracy and glasnost created "a zone outside of criticism" and "leaders outside of criticism." Secondary factors and luck frequently played

a role in the process of advancing to "the higher positions." Luck played a role even in the fact that it was Rashidov and not some other, more worthy person who occupied the post of first secretary of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee. R.G. Gulamov, an active participant in those events and an old Bolshevik, told me that when the matter of who was to be first secretary was being determined in the Central Committee Bureau, the votes were equally divided for and against Rashidov. The date for the Central Committee plenum had already been announced, but the Bureau members continued to debate. Then, according to the legend, representatives of the CPSU Central Committee visiting Tashkent made a call to N.S. Khrushchev: "The Uzbek comrades simply cannot reach agreement." "And who is on the list of candidates?" N.S. Khrushchev asked. The list was read to him. "I only know Rashidov. He and I were in India together," N.S. Khrushchev said, and his statement, conferred to members of the Central Committee Bureau, decided the outcome of the voting in Rashidov's favor.... One also has to consider the period of Rashidov's climb to the pinnacles of power. It was the middle of 1959, a time of difficulties and conflicts, when frosts were again replacing the "thaw" and the icebergs of stagnation were already looming on the horizon. That is, Rashidov suited "the court" of Brezhnev, who restored the authoritarian, bureaucratic methods of governing by decree, "Stalinism without Stalin." Writer M. Ismaili, who worked with Rashidov at the end of the '40s in the editorial office of the newspaper KIZIL UZBEKISTON, told how the future leader of the republic was enchanted by Stalin, by his exposure of the "enemies of the people." Rashidov at one time occupied the position of chairman of Uzbekistan's Writers' Union, where he took an active part in the successive campaigns "against cosmopolitanism" and "against nationalism" among the writers....

[Question] I have been told more than once in Uzbekistan that, strange as it seems, many of the people respect Rashidov's memory. Can that be true?

[Answer] It is a pity that our sociologists have not yet studied the social "phenomenon of how people perceive the leader," have not studied all of the stages of this perception, its rises and falls. This is particularly important in a society in which there is no constitutional limitation on the period a leader can serve in that position. We know that the public regards every new leader in the beginning with a fair amount of criticism, that the critical spirit then cools, disappearing entirely when public opinion crosses over the "critical threshold." The leader becomes a symbol to which the society magnanimously ascribes its own achievements. The absence of the "critical threshold" turns the leader's shortcomings into merits. We accepted our deteriorating life under Brezhnev as something inevitable, which did not evoke criticism. This is what happened also in the case of Rashidov. Life in the enormous field of a single crop, cotton, which is what Uzbekistan was, became more and more intolerable by the year, and positive

feelings for Rashidov grew, transforming his "cult of the personality" into an image of the "father of the nation"—wise, kind and with the people's welfare at heart. His personal qualities—a rare self-control and the ability "to appear to be what he was not"—also promoted that image. I look at his portrait—a gentle, fine-looking face—and I think to myself that under different social conditions he could have been the imam of a large mosque and enjoyed the respect of its members. He could very well have coined the expression "Policy is made with dirty hands." Such leaders betray friends and like-minded people to benefit policy, as Rashidov did with his comrades in the Central Committee Bureau, R. Gulamov and M. Mukhamedzhanov, pass off lies for the truth and lawlessness for the greatest good. When the "critical threshold" of perception of Rashidov's personality disappeared, everything good which had been accomplished in Uzbekistan—restoration of Tashkent after it was destroyed by the earthquake, the development of the Golodnaya Steppe, the building of the new city of Navoi—was all attributed to the "father of the nation."

[Question] Exactly the same as those who would attribute to Stalin our successes during the first five-year periods, our victory in the Great Patriotic War and the nation's postwar recovery.

[Answer] And Rashidov, "our local Stalin," has his defenders, who are certain that he knew nothing about the evil deeds of the "local Beriy," former Minister of Internal Affairs Yekhyayev, who, incidentally, was regarded as a poet and was a member of the Writers' Union. A great deal had indeed been accomplished in the republic during the past five-year periods, but it was all accomplished with the selfless labor of the people. And when one mentions the negative effects of the foolish management—hundreds of thousands of hectares of land turned into swamps in the development of the Golodnaya Steppe and the destruction of Aral—today, that notorious "threshold of critical insensitivity" emerges for many people: "Rashidov is not to blame; those who surrounded him were to blame." It is as though a refined manipulation of public awareness was underway during the years of Rashidov's rule. The traditional duality of Eastern thinking, whereby authority and force were "ennobled" by intelligence and talent, was cloven in two. Intelligence and talent, education and the unique view of the world were ostracized, and authority and crude force evoked reverence. Almost to a person the republic's peasantry has not yet rid itself of the perception of supreme authority as "the authority of the master," and Rashidov took skillful advantage of this for the hierarchical relations between the elite, who are served, and the lower classes, who serve. This also accounts for the respect for despotism, the desire for a "strong arm." Just as there are people in the nation who sleep and dream of Stalin's "return," we have many who yearn for the Rashidov times.

[Question] Particularly since, despite the constant praise of Rashidov's literary talent in the press, it was said that even these mediocre works were not written by him....

[Answer] In 1982 it was publicly announced that our "leading writer" had decided to bless the public with a new work, the story "At the Heart's Command." A trusted circle of writers close to Rashidov were invited to the Central Committee for a "discussion," where the birth of a new masterpiece was unanimously acknowledged. Following publication of "At the Heart's Command" in an Uzbek magazine, the name of Rashidov's "literary double" was named, from whose works subjects, images, phrases and expressions migrated to the story by the "father of the nation." A careful textual study would help to determine the author of the works attributed to Rashidov. The same is true for the real author of "Malaya zemlya." As war veteran F. Snegirev correctly stated in issue No. 4 of OGONEK for that year, "... Brezhnev never was its author, and consequently he was never an outstanding literary figure. I cannot understand how he could be awarded the Lenin Prize for that book. How could he become a member of the Writers' Union, when he could not even greet his comrades on the job in everyday life without notes." Rashidov too could not get along without notes. He was afraid to take his eyes off the lackluster text, written in officialese, to glance at the dozing audience.

[Question] How has the situation in literature developed since Rashidov?

[Answer] To our great regret, after Rashidov we witnessed not a struggle between the truth and lies, not between talent and mediocrity, not between the robust and independent and passivity, fear and obeisance to the "cult of force," but a struggle among clans.

Those figures who implemented Rashidov's policy for many years were sent to "reinforce" the cultural area—to various state committees, creative unions, magazines—since all of them, like the "father of the nation," are the authors of novels and poems. Our people believe that the republic's creative potential makes it possible for everyone to write for all, and the Writers' Union therefore willingly accepted ministers and workers in the MVD and the Procurator's Office. A clan struggle in the East has some peculiarities. It does not have a mortal outcome. A powerful clan lifts up a weakened one and accepts it into its own ranks. This is how those who established prestige for the "republic's leading writer" still operate. How they thirst for revenge! The first, mild scare passed, they moved back slightly into the trenches and regrouped, and they are once again on the offensive. Some of them have returned to their previous positions. These are the people who destroyed for us an entire generation of creative youth by giving it false reference points....

The top leadership in the republic was replaced in January of this year. How one wants the purifying wind of change to pass through as soon as possible, so that glasnost, democracy and honorable service to literature do not continue to be just intentions but become the norm of creative life. I have high hopes that those who are now 25 or 30 years old will bring a renewal to our literature. People mature early in the East, but they do not always get an early start in public and literary life. I can name dozens of young people who will amount to something. The prize of the republic's Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade] and Writers' Union was recently awarded to one of them. He refused it, however, declaring "I am not writing for prizes. Give it to someone who dreams that it has been awarded to him." The literary officials were offended: "We respect him, but he does not respect us." I understand the young poet in purely human terms. He expressed his regard for an award which was for many years synonymous with cunning, flattery and all of the other qualities which have nothing to do with real talent.

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Filmmaker Romm Recalls Encounters with Khrushchev

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[Article by Mikhail Romm, prepared for publication by Natalya Kuzmina, with introductory notes by Dzhemma Firsova, film director: "Four Encounters with N. S. Khrushchev"; first four paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] The need to study democracy is timely and important as never before. Its lessons are difficult, but their vital essence has been confirmed many times, by all Soviet history. Let us recall one of the most difficult and important periods of the struggle for renewal—the early 1960's. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev did a great deal to return Leninist democratic norms to our life and had an enormous role in dethroning the criminal cult of personality, developing the Soviet Union's contacts with the world outside, and normalizing the life of Soviet society. Many honest names shone anew in those years, and many were born in this favorable creative atmosphere. It is very important that Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev himself was trying to change, trying to overcome the many stereotypes that were harming not just the country and society, but him personally. This was a difficult process, but the lessons of democracy are never easy.

By promoting the release of persons who were innocently convicted during the years of the cult and by restoring justice the party freed human souls from fear, and in this

its role after the 20th CPSU Congress was especially noble. We heeded the lessons of democracy and everyone learned, from the leaders of the country to ordinary citizens.

From this standpoint the memoirs of Peoples Artist of the USSR Mikhail Romm, a complex man and talented film director who won several Stalin Prizes, are very interesting. Romm was a man of his times. The memoirs are also important because they give a picture of both the subject being recalled and of the author. The story about how Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, who had just done so much good in the fight for justice, was not always able to hold himself back from ignoble behavior in many historical situations forces us to think and teaches us. The lessons of N. S. Khrushchev's level of party principle are painfully interwoven with recollections of his voluntarism. But the character and actions of this major political leaders will receive growing attention; they will unquestionably be illuminated in many facets.

We are mastering democracy; without it Soviet society cannot progress. Today, when meetings of the leaders of the party and country with cultural figures have become common events and their usefulness is apparent, it is worth recalling the first attempts at such meetings in that time of renewal marked by the great 20th CPSU Congress. We have come a long way since then; it is that much more important to study democracy constantly, remembering and recalling. Restructuring teaches us not only to defend our own views, but to listen to those of others. All this is in the name of the present and the future, so that the good is not forgotten and the bad is not repeated. [Comments of Dzhemma Firsova]

If it had not been for the phenomenon called Romm we today would not, in my opinion, have the type of Soviet cinematographer personified by his students (whether from VGIK, the Higher Directors and Screenwriters School, or the creative association that he headed at Mosfilm). It is difficult even to name them: Grigoriy Chukhray and Vasiliy Shukshin, Andrey Tarkovskiy and Marlen Khutsiyev, Tengiz Abuladze and Georgiy Danieliya, Denara Asanova and Razo Chkheidze, Andrey Smirnov and Larisa Shepitko, Igor Talankin and Elem Klimov, Gleb Panfilov and Savva Kulish, Rolan Bykov and Sergey Solovyev, Vadim Adrashitov and Aleksandr Mitta...

It is 17 years since he left us, and a generation has grown up who do not know Romm. They do not know his films "Lenin in October," "Ten Days of a Year," "Everyday Fascism," and "All the Same I Believe."

In addition to an enormous number of manuscripts—screenplays, articles, memoirs, and lectures at VGIK—the archive of Mikhail Ilich contains 40 hours of tape recordings of him telling stories; and he was an excellent story-teller. Even the profoundly analytical quality of his thinking came not from cold reason and theorizing, but from the living, paradoxical, ironical clash of events, the

vivid and striking details that he captured exactly and sharply. Even "Everyday Fascism," a frightening and tragic film, is "told" by Romm with irony and sarcasm. "I became a cinematographer with the conviction that art should look at people in critical moments of their lives, the conviction that the most powerful characteristic of art is the clash of the tragic and the funny, or the almost funny, that every person is uniquely strange, and it is possible to find in his life that segment of time when he opens himself up completely, in all his amazing qualities." The ability to see these "amazing qualities" in everything, in people, events, and time, distinguishes everything about which Romm wrote and, especially, talked. "Some people write memoirs out of malice, while others, by contrast, write them in a pure and conscientious way. I personally decided to write as the result of a heart attack. Believe me, that is a powerful stimulus! And I certainly had interesting and unique meetings. Then I got a portable tape recorder and began telling my stories. I decided to make something like an oral storybook."

When you listen to the tape recordings of Mikhail Ilich where the narrator is cheerful and ironic you recall this inimitable intonation of Romm's in "Everyday Fascism," and you understand that it is not an easy manner, but a courageous one instilled by frightening times and a difficult personal fate.

In picking out material for publication Mikhail Ilich's daughter Natasha and I chose the period of our history which, starting with the spring of the 20th congress, failed to become a summer of true renewal. The 1950's and 1960's were so complex!

For Mikhail Ilich they were the years when he broke himself as a director and an artist. It was just at this time that he "fell silent" for 6 years. "I understood that I had really ceased to be an artist, that a great drama had overtaken me. I had ceased to be an artist." At that time he, as it were, signed the verdict on a whole segment of his life, almost a decade of his work—"It is lies." And after 6 years of silence the film "Ten Days of a Year" came out. But even after this film Romm's creative path was strewn not with flowers, but rather with doubts and searching.

At that time there were 20 of us, his students. We had not experienced the revolution, the civil war, the postwar ruin and famine, collectivization, the terrible year 1937 (which had really begun almost 10 years earlier), the "quiet" 1940's, or the last war. We were not, like Romm and his generation, the "characters on stage," but only enthusiastic spectators in the student section.

The "Khrushchev decade." My generation remembers these years sharply and vividly, because those were the years of our youth.

It was a complex and ambivalent time that began with the 20th party congress, with Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's report on the personality cult and overcoming its consequences. The return to Leninist norms, the return to life of thousands of persons who had been innocently convicted and the rehabilitation of thousands who died as innocent victims of the cult, the fresh wind of renewal which revitalized all aspects of our life, large-scale opening of new housing, (even though they were in ugly, standardized developments, "Khrushchev blocks" we called them then, still people on a large scale were moving out of cellars, shacks, and communal apartments), the voice of the first satellite, our headlong rush into space, Yuriy Gagarin's smile. And it was a time of voluntaristic incompetence: insistent efforts to introduce corn and forage beets in places where they had never grown, insistent attempts to govern art and literature "by force," a time of naive promises that the era of communism would arrive in 20 years and ultimately the curtailing and discrediting of the complex, difficult, and slow process of renewal of the country and the society.

We were not only participants in the events of those days; we were also witnesses to the profound personal drama of an exceptional man, but one who over-estimated his capabilities, who could not resist the "copper bugles" of glory and power, who did not find in himself the strength to break out of the vicious circle of conventional methods and patterns of leadership—the one-man rule and voluntarism whose condemnation marked his promising beginning as head of the party and state.

At that time I was preparing for work on my diploma picture at Mosfilm, and my director was Mikhail Ilich. I would go to his dacha to see him, sometimes for advice on the diploma project but more often out of a pressing need to figure out what was happening. And what was happening was hard for us, the young ones, who believed in the fresh wind of changes which suddenly turned into the shouting at the Manezh, the discord at the October, and the "arrest" of Marlen Khutsiyev's painting.

"Do you know who is most to blame for this," Mikhail Ilich said to me then. "Our friends and colleagues. The contemporary Salieri does not need poison. And there is no need to kill anyone. You just have to 'advise' the ones who need it in time, what is 'for the good' of the state and what harms it.

"But you know, not much time will pass before people will forget the Manezh and the corn. But people will be living in his buildings for many years. People he freed. And nobody will hold a grudge against him, not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. And it will be many years before we realize his real significance for us all. We have enough vivid and powerful villains in our history. Khrushchev is that rare and also contradictory figure who embodies not only the good, but also a desperate personal courage which it would not hurt all of us to learn.

"And what is happening now is also a lesson. To us all."

Yes, the country shook off the terrible dream of Stalinism. The awakening was not easy. But still, it was an awakening.

So here is Mikhail Ilich Romm's story about the man whose grave is still honored today by those to whom he gave a second life when he opened the gates of the camps. About a man who did much good, and also... But here we will let Romm himself speak.

[Romm's Memoirs]

I had never personally seen or heard N. S. Khrushchev until December 1962. Of course we live in the age of newspapers, radio, and television, and this made it possible to be familiar with Khrushchev's outward appearance and way of speaking. You felt that you knew everything about him. But still, this was no substitute for personal impressions, and when I first simply heard and saw him at three meetings with the intelligentsia and then at one more, more important gathering, the impression was completely unexpected. The man proved much more varied in colors, hues I would say, and much more complex and unusual. And some of his traits were simply amazing.

I have to say that before this time I was one of Khrushchev's supporters. I was even called a "Khrushchevite." I was inspired by his speech at the 20th congress, and I liked his human quality. I tried to forgive him for everything. It is true that sometimes he did things that were so unusual they were mind-boggling. At a meeting he suddenly stated: "Marx's ideas are good, of course, but if we grease them with pork lard they will be even better." I simply could not picture how Marx's ideas could be greased with pork lard.

Everything about him kept changing, but still it seemed to me: after all, he is a human being all the same.

Our countrymen have an inclination to be delighted with their leaders at every opportunity. Long ago Saltykov-Shchedrin noted in his "History of a City" that every new mayor of the city was a darling or a beauty.

You could not say that Khrushchev was a beauty, but people did call him a darling. Everybody said it, me included. Not a beauty, but a darling.

In the cultural domain things were going well. We breathed freely, art was moving ahead, and we kept on saying to each other every so often, "He certainly is no beauty, but he is a darling, a darling."

It went that way until December 1962. The freedom was becoming more and more palpable somehow, and I believed in it firmly somehow and even spoke at a conference of the Institute of History of the Arts at the VTO [possibly All-Russian Theater Society]. My speech

started being passed around as an "underground tract," and complaints against me were made to the Presidium of the Central Committee. My affairs were very shaky at that moment. But then it turned out that I had given the speech at a very opportune time, for literally one week later the famous visit to the Manezh took place, where Khrushchev, as I was told, kicked over paintings and raged against leftist art and at the whole culture, the young poets.

I knew the abstractionists who aroused this fury and had visited their studios. There were interesting guys, unselfish, hungry, and absolutely devoted to their work. A tiny little room, eight square meters, a worn-out couch without a back, and there he lived with his wife and 18-month-old daughter. And there, on the edge of a table, he painted his canvases. And there was nothing in the house except bread, hot water, and milk for the baby.

I had seen them, and my heart groaned. Someone began gathering signatures to a letter asking that they not be treated too harshly. I signed, and Favorskiy, Erenburg, and many others had already done so.

But it was such an anxious time. Clouds had already started gathering over Khrushchev, and over Erenburg. Then the storm broke over the young poets, and in this situation, when no one knew how the scales would tip, this is when the first meeting took place.

In December 1962 I received an invitation to a reception in the Reception House in the Lenin Hills, the place where the famous mansions are.

I arrived. Lots of cars, and a long line of people. The government coatroom. On the second floor were suites of rooms hung with canvases both proper and improper. And there was a crowd of people, maybe 300, maybe more. Everyone was there, cinematographers, poets, writers, painters, sculptors, and journalists. They came from outlying areas. The whole artistic intelligentsia was there. And everybody was buzzing, waiting to see what would happen.

Through the doors to the main room, the reception room, we could see tables set with white tablecloths, dishes, and sumptuous food. What the hell! It appeared that it would be a banquet! What was this, maybe for softening us up? Why were the tables set?

Then amidst all this noise, every kind of mutual greeting, all kinds of questioning looks, the leaders appeared; the crowd streamed toward Khrushchev, cameras clicked.

Khrushchev carried on a kind of conversation as he walked, heading into the main room, and everyone flowed along behind him. Everyone tried to get close to him as quickly as they could. Everyone moved that way, toward him. And like a vacuum cleaner this main room sucked in the people with amazing speed.

I decided not to get mixed up in this pushing crowd, but in less than a minute I realized that they were all already in the room. I went in and all the seats were taken. Someone waved to me from the far end; they had saved me a place. It turned out to be those very same young artists. So I sat in the middle with them. And Khrushchev was at the other end.

Of course the artists were hungry. And in front of them was sturgeon, salmon, trout, sliced turkey, various delicious-looking salads, grape juice, and more.

So everyone sat down. Maybe a bell was rung at the other end of the room.

Khrushchev stood up and said that they had invited us for a talk, but to make the talk friendlier, better, and more frank we should eat first. We would eat, and then talk.

Khrushchev even apologized that there was no wine and vodka and explained that we should not drink because it was going to be what he would call a completely frank discussion.

We ate and drank for about an hour. Finally coffee and ice cream were served. Khrushchev stood up. Everyone stood up. Talking began, chairs creaked, and the people poured out into the suites of rooms.

It was an intermission.

The intermission ended and everyone rushed back into the room. The tables had already been cleared, and I ended up in a different place. It began with a report. I recall a few speeches. One of them called me a provocateur, political ignoramus, and slanderer and at the same time also lambasted Shchipachev. The gist of another speech was that the camp commanders were fine communists.

Khrushchev's comments were sharp, especially when Erenburg, Yevtushenko, and Shchipachev, who spoke very well, were talking.

This is when I saw a Khrushchev who was entirely new to me.

At first he behaved like a kind, soft-spoken manager of a large enterprise: you are our guests, eat and drink. We are all here to have a good, sincere talk.

And he was so rotund and well-shaven, and spoke so sweetly. His movements were rotund. And his first comments were so agreeable.

But then he gradually became wound up, he somehow became wound up and fell first on Ernst Neizvestnyy. It was unusually difficult for him. I was struck by the earnestness with which he talked about art while understanding nothing of it, absolutely nothing. He tried so

hard to explain what is beautiful and what is not, what is understandable to the people and what is not. And what the difference is between an artist who is striving toward communism (which he mispronounced) and one who is not helping communism. And how bad Ernst Neizvestny was. He spent some time trying to find the words to show a little more clearly and stingingly what Ernst Neizvestny was. Finally he found the words, he found them and, overjoyed, said: "Here is what your art is like. If a man dashed into the bathroom, crawled into the toilet bowl and from there, out of the bowl, looked up at someone else sitting on the toilet. Looking at that part of the body from inside a toilet bowl. That is what your art is like. And that is your position, Comrade Neizvestny, you are sitting inside the toilet bowl."

As he said this some of the older creative intelligentsia, artists, sculptors and a few writers, were laughing in approval.

And onward: "Now what kind of surname is this, Neizvestny [literal meaning—'unknown']? How come you picked out such a pseudonym for yourself, Neizvestny of all things? What we would like is for things about you to become known."

Neizvestny said, "That is my surname, Neizvestny."

"But what kind of surname is Neizvestny?"

Two or 3 hours passed in such exchanges, sometimes malicious and sometimes trying to be educational. Everyone was tired. We could see that no statements, not by Erenburg, Yestushenko, or Shchipachev, which were very good, would make any impression; they all bounced back like peas off a wall and had no impact at all. The line had been drawn, and he was trying to hold it.

Finally he took the floor for the closing word. I remembered a few segments from this closing speech.

Again he began softly. Well, he said, we have listened to you here, talked with you, but who is going to make the decisions? In our country the people must decide. And who are the people? The party. And who is the party? It is us. We are the party. That means that we will decide, that I will make the decisions. Is that understood?

"It is understood."

"And now I'll tell you something else. It sometimes happens that a colonel will argue with the general and the colonel will present everything convincingly, very convincingly. The general listens, listens some more, and there seems nothing to object to. He gets tired of the colonel, stands up and says, 'Well, here is how it is. You are the colonel and I am the general. Right face, march!' And the colonel turns right and off he goes, to carry out the order! So you are the colonels and I, excuse me, am the general. Right face, and march! Please."

That was the conclusion.

And here is another excerpt.

"People signed a letter here. Among other things this letter intercedes on behalf of the young leftist poets, says let them work along with the rest, let there be peaceful co-existence in our expressive art. Comrades, this is a flagrant political mistake. Peaceful co-existence is possible, but not in ideological issues."

From his seat Erenburg said to him: "But that was a witticism, Nikita Sergeyevich. In the letter that is a humorous means of expression. It was a peaceful letter."

"No, Comrade Erenburg, that is no witticism. There will be no peaceful co-existence in ideological issues. Comrades, it will not happen! And I am warning everyone who signed that letter. So there!"

This talk lasted a long time, some 2 hours, but I just cannot remember what he said. He even read poetry by some miner. He kept trying to explain what kind of art is good and, among other things, he quoted some poetry, amazingly poor poetry. It was apparent that he had memorized it in his childhood; since then he had not read poetry. Here was poetry he had read, poetry the miner had written. Of course, the miner was not particularly literate, but the poetry was good in terms of content.

And what pretty pictures some artists paint. Here was a self-portrait by comrade So-and-so, just look how handsome he is. And look what these other ones have painted. It is frightening to look.

That is how this meeting in the Lenin Hills ended. Everyone went away well-fed, but upset, with troubled spirits, not knowing what what was coming. Things went badly after this; the screws began to be tightened, and letters and expose articles started to appear. In general the devastation began. Everyone who was accused caught it during this time. I caught quite a bit myself, mainly for my speech at VTO.

It was suggested that I leave VGIK, but leave quietly, after the spring session, just finish up and disappear. And of course, from the Union too.

My case was being prepared for hearing. I decided to use a proven method: come down sick. I went to my dacha and became sick for a month and a half, for 2 months even. I stayed at my dacha, to sit it out. I was ordered to write an explanation of my "slanderous" speech. But I did not write the explanation, I delayed. Then I wrote it. I did not admit mistakes. I admitted that it was put in sharp terms, but offered a lot of evidence that in terms of content I was correct.

So I just sat there, sat there and waited for things to soften up. But it did not happen. On the contrary, they tightened the screws more and more. I got sick of it. I decided to go to Moscow: let happen whatever would happen. If there was going to be a hearing, so be it.

I arrived and waited for my case to be heard. But no hearing was held. Then I was surprised to receive another agenda-letter: I was again invited to some kind of meeting of the creative intelligentsia with the leadership. But this time the meeting was not in the Lenin Hills; it was in Sverdlovsk Hall in the Kremlin.

So there was a second meeting.

It lasted two days, could not finish in one. It began in the morning.

I arrived at the Kremlin and Sverdlovsk Hall. It was the same people, the same creative intelligentsia, only twice as many of them. In the Lenin Hills there were some 300 people, but here there were 600, possibly 650. And among the familiar faces I noticed unfamiliar young people in modest black suits and neat collars. It was a very official occasion. The hall is laid out like an amphitheater, with benches. Opposite the seats on a special raised place for the presidium was the speaker's podium. It was a neat, attractive, cold hall.

Everyone sat down. It was clear that this was a continuation. No one expected anything very good. Everyone sat down, and the young people spread themselves around, all over the hall. Wherever you looked one of these neat, attentive little guys would be nearby.

Everyone stood up. They clapped for one another. They sat down. It was quiet. A guarded silence. We were waiting.

Khrushchev stood up and began: "Well, we have decided to meet with you once again, but forgive me, this time we do not have the tables set. We decided that this time we would talk carefully so that more people will hear us. But during the intermissions there will be a buffet, and please help yourselves."

Once again he was beginning like a generous, well-meaning master.

"The weather," he said, "is, unfortunately, poor right now. It is winter, so biting cold that it does not help create an atmosphere of sincerity. Well, that is all right, we will talk that much more seriously. But we plan to hold the next meeting in May or June, when there will be sun, the trees will be out, and there will be grass. Then we will have a really sincere meeting, and the talk will be more cheerful. But today we have to do it this way, winter-style."

He was silent. He loved to use the weather as a prop when he spoke. It always helped him. The sun or lack of the sun.

He was silent. Then suddenly, without any transition: "Will all voluntary informants of foreign agencies please leave the room."

Silence. Everybody looked around, at one another, understanding nothing: what informants?

"I repeat: voluntary informants of foreign agencies, leave."

We were silent.

"I will explain," Khrushchev said. "The last time, after our conference, our meeting in Lenin Hills, the very next day the foreign press was running very detailed reports. That means that there were informants, lackeys of the bourgeois press. We do not need lackeys. So I warn you for the third time: voluntary informants of foreign agencies, leave. I understand that it is uncomfortable for you to stand up right now and declare yourselves. So during the intermission when we are all going to the buffet, you say that you have to go to the bathroom, slip out and disappear. We do not want you here. Is that understood?"

That is how he began.

Well, then things got underway, the same as in Lenin Hills, but maybe worse. No one dared to contradict him this time. They simply did not let Shchipachev speak. Maltsev tried to say some nonsense about the party committee of the Writers Union, which was being attacked in particular, but they started interrupting him and simply chased him off, preventing him from speaking. And those who did speak expressed gratitude that order was finally being imposed in art, that all these bandits (they no longer called them anything else—not abstractionists or young poets), that all these bandits would be taken care of.

To be honest, I have forgotten which speeches were on the first day and which on the second. There were two key speeches, I would say. One was a denunciation in very elegant form to the effect that Voznesenskiy and a group of young poets gave an interview in Poland, that during this interview he was asked about his attitude toward the older generation, and so on, the matter of generations in literature. And he supposedly answered that he does not divide literature on the horizontal, by generations, but on the vertical, that for him Pushkin, Lermontov, and Mayakovskiy are contemporaries and belong to the younger generation. But he added the names Pasternak and Akhmadulina to these names, to Pushkin, Lermontov, and Mayakovskiy. And this set off a huge scandal. I think this was already during the second day.

But if I am correct, Plastov's speech came on the first day. Out stepped a modest little man with his hair parted down the middle, neither young nor old, hoarse-voiced or pretending to be so, and with a very colloquial manner of speech. He began, coughing constantly, thanking the party, the government, and Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev personally, telling the most amazing stories.

Here is how he began: "You know, Nikita Sergeyevich, that after the meeting in the Lenin Hills I was inspired, excited, and tried to remember everything. That was certainly a historical event. So I made notes on it and returned to where I live (I live far away, in the provinces, we have a sovkhoz there, and once there was a kolkhoz), and as I rode along on the train I repeated over and over, in order not to forget them, your words and the words of Comrade Illichev, what was said and how it was said.

"I arrived, and at the station Semen met me in a sleigh (maybe Semen, maybe Grigoriy, I don't remember for sure). He is a fat old man now. At one time I painted him as a shepherd. He's my friend.

"I took a seat and waited for him to start talking with me about the great event in the Lenin Hills. But he simply did not raise the subject. He talked about who was sick and who was healthy, who died and who was alive, so on and so forth."

"I asked him, 'Why don't you ask me about the event?' 'What event?' 'Why, the one in Lenin Hills, the meeting of the intelligentsia with the government, artists.' He said, 'So, did you catch it maybe?' 'Oh no, just the opposite. I'm riding high, and it was others, the abstractionists, who caught it. They have become divorced from the people.' He said, 'What do you mean, divorced from the people. What are they, foreigners or noblemen?' I said, 'Oh no, they are Russians, but they have become divorced. What's wrong with you, don't you read the newspapers?' And he answered, 'Some we read, some we smoke.'

"I arrived home, and no one knew anything, Nikita Sergeyevich. The people there do not understand what abstractionism or surrealism is, or even what realism is. The teacher came up to me and asked, 'Can't you give me a Repin reproduction to show the children. I just don't know how to explain to them.' And the men assembled, I spoke to them, and they answered, 'You should talk to Udinov, who works at the post office. He reads everything and knows it all. We don't understand these things.' And they asked me, 'About these artists, are they paid?' I said yes. 'Are they paid well?' I said, 'They are paid.' And they said, 'This is amazing. For months in a row now we've done our work as planned and we are not being paid while these ones, who are divorced from the people, are getting paid!'''

He went on and on like this. Khrushchev tried to interrupt him, interject comments. He would turn and say, "Eh? Yes, yes, that is just what I was saying!"

For example, there was this episode.

"I was ordered to paint a certain milkmaid. I looked her over from the front and in profile. There was nothing heroic, romantic, or realistic about her. So how should she be painted?"

Khrushchev interrupted him: "Well, here is how I would have painted her if I had been in your place. So that this milkmaid looked heroic and romantic—that is what art is."

Plastov put his hand to his ear: "How's that? Well, sure, that is what I am saying, Nikita Sergeyevich. There was nothing heroic or romantic in her that could be painted."

Khrushchev repeated, "What I said is that she could be painted that way."

Plastov: "That is what I am saying, there was nothing in her, Nikita Sergeyevich. Now I remember painting our neighbor, she herded goats for me, this was still during the war, and the tragic expression of her face struck me. I painted for one day, two, three, but there wasn't enough time. During the day she would herd the goats, then drive them in, and it would already be near dark. The portrait was dragging out a bit. Then one day she asked me, 'Tell me, are you going to be working on this portrait much longer?' I told her, 'Just four days.' And she said, 'Just so I don't die before Sunday.' And she did die."

Someone in the hall shouted, "What from?"

He said, "Hunger."

And, continually agreeing with Khrushchev and saying, "Thank you, Nikita Sergeyevich," he began to draw this kind of picture of the countryside—no club, homebrew produced by the barrelful, everyone illiterate, and no one knowing anything about art. No one needed all these meetings. He gradually drew such a picture that it was terrifying...terrifying. Compared with his story "Vologda Wedding" and "Matrena's House" seemed almost idyllic somehow.

He told how he did illustrations for Uspenskiy. He went to the hayfield to draw the peasants, to make sketches of the hay-cutters. So he did all these rough drafts, then at midday they gathered and looked at his pictures. They said to him, "Tell us, how much do they pay you for these pictures?"

"I found it uncomfortable to say, this was in Stalin's time. Of course, it was a hard time, but I answered straightforwardly: they pay me well. I won't conceal it, Nikita Sergeyevich. It was a hard time, but they paid me, they did pay! And, just between us, they paid a lot."

"So then one asked me, 'Well, do they pay you five rubles?' Another put in, 'Come on, would he do all that for five? I'd say ten.' And I was being paid 500 apiece. I

told them, 'Go higher!' 'Could it be 25?' And I was ashamed, so I said it was 25. 'Well, good for you! We really have to hustle to earn 25 rubles. Maybe 2 months of work.'

He went on and on like that, and ended this way: "You have to drop Moscow, fellows; all artists should go to the outlying areas, to the sticks. There are no urban comforts there, of course, no bathrooms or showers, but you can live."

And in conclusion: "There is no truth in Moscow!"

He waved his hand. And he was speaking in front of the Presidium of the Central Committee! "There is no truth in Moscow." And although people were laughing during his speech, when he finished it somehow became frightening.

All the time Khrushchev was raging and boiling with shouts and comments, Ilichev was backing him up, and the rest sat motionless.

I also had to speak that first day. And during this speech an astonishing side of Khrushchev appeared again.

I was expected to give a repentant speech. Therefore as soon as I signed in I was given the floor. I did not expect it, instantly.

I came forward and my first words were: "You probably expect that I am going to talk about myself. I am not going to talk about myself. It seems to me that this is not a significant enough subject for this meeting. I am going to talk about two things.

"First I want to talk about Khutsiyev's painting."

I began to speak in favor of Khutsiyev's painting, in particular to clarify the meaning of the episode where the father meets the son, the son envisions his father dead, and the conversation ends with him asking his father, "But how am I to live?" and the father answers, "How old are you?" "Twenty-two." "I am twenty," the father answers, and disappears.

So I tell Khrushchev that the meaning of this is, you are older than me, you should understand, at your age I understood and died for Soviet power! What about you?

Suddenly Khrushchev said to me, interrupting, "No, no, no! You are not interpreting it right, Comrade Romm. That is wrong. It means something different. The father says to him 'How old are you?' 'Twenty-two,' and he disappears. Even a cat doesn't abandon its kitten, but at a difficult moment he drops his son. That is what it means."

I said, "No, no, Nikita Sergeyevich, here is what it means."

He repeated, "No!"

We began to argue. I would get in one word, then he would have two. Finally I said to him, "Nikita Sergeyevich, please do not interrupt me. It is hard enough for me to speak. Let me finish; I need to make my statement!"

He said, "What am I, not a person," in a hurt-child voice. "What am I, not a person, that I can't have my own opinion?"

I told him, "You are a person, and moreover the first secretary of the Central Committee. You will have the last word, you can talk as much as you want after me, but right now I want to talk. It is hard enough for me anyway."

He said, "Well all right. You won't be interrupted." He began to simper as if offended.

I went on talking. I finished the matter of Khutsiyev's picture and went on to the Union. Our union was about to be closed down. A decree to disband the Union of Cinematographers had been written and the liquidation commission was already formed. That was it! Our union was really already finished. But I pretended that I did not know about this decree. And I said that there were rumors about disbanding the union, but for various reasons it was needed.

He interrupted me, "No, all the same permit me to interrupt you, Comrade Romm. The Ministry of Culture can do all these things."

I told him, "The Ministry of Culture cannot do these things. It does not have the capabilities. For example, to send a creative commission to Azerbaijan or somewhere. And in addition it will cost money. After all, our union doesn't cost the state anything, it is self-sufficient."

I finished my speech. After me Chukhray talked and ended the same way: the union must be preserved.

Suddenly Khrushchev announced an intermission, and after the intermission started off like this: "You know, comrades, the cinematographers have split our ranks. Here we had practically closed down their union, but we have listened to them and given it some thought, and maybe it should be preserved!"

Well, we jumped up and said, "Preserve it!"

"Let's preserve it. But you be careful!"

Now just imagine that! The Secretariat of the Central Committee had just banned it, I said a few words, Chukhray added a few words, and he decided to preserve it!

But you know, I did not even feel happy.

I thought to myself, that is how things are decided! And at this meeting they were basically ready to disband the Writers Union too, merge it with the Union of Artists, Composers, and so on, and disband the party organization of the Writers Union (incidentally, it was disbanded, while for some reason our case went the other way and a party organization was formed).

That is how it all was. That is how the first day went. At the buffets during the intermissions people ate marvelous snack foods and exchanged puzzled, troubled glances. During one intermission a major Kazakh cinematographer came up to me and said, "Please forgive me, Mikhail Ilich, but in the Lenin Prize Committee we voted down your picture 'Ten Days of a Year.' This doesn't mean that we didn't like it. We thought very highly of it. But you understand, it was necessary, we were told what to do, so please, don't be angry with me."

So, I told him I would not be angry, and I won't.

Zavadskiy said the same thing to me. He came up, shrugged his shoulders, stretched out his hand, muttered something without saying a word, raised his eyebrows, and walked off.

Still, overall the first day did not seem so frightening. It was murky, in a way, but nothing horrible happened.

We went home, to continue the next day.

The second day arrived, my third meeting with Khrushchev, so to speak.

We arrived at the same hall, the same people, and sat in our former places. I looked around, and behind me was a neatly-dressed young man. Well, I thought, I will have to restrain myself in expressing my feelings. And at the same time Yu. Ya. Rayzman, who was sitting next to me, said, "Misha, restrain yourself." I quietly said the same thing to Tarkovskiy.

Then the presidium entered. Kind, cheerful N. S. Khrushchev, full of vigor, came first, followed by the rest. They stood and applauded, then sat down. Kozlov stared at the audience with his icy eyes. The immobility of his face was striking, exceptionally well-trained. It did not express anything.

Khrushchev began very cheerfully, as follows: "Well, comrades, I have to say that my warning yesterday worked. It worked! Nothing leaked out. I can even say that there were receptions at several embassies last night, and apparently out of simple caution, nobody went to them. So in general, that is fine, just fine. Well, let's continue."

And we began to continue.

The day started a little dully. The same pap, kinship of the generations, thanks to Nikita Serveyevich, art feeds on the juices of the people—it got underway, and on it went.

Well, then Voznesenskiy came forward. This was where the meat of the program began. I have trouble even telling what happened here. Voznesenskiy could feel immediately that it was going to go badly and so he started off timidly, somehow unsure of himself. Khrushchev interrupted him almost immediately, sharply, even crudely, and working himself up to a shout, began roaring at him. He said all kinds of things: "slanderer," "What are you doing here?" "If you don't like it here, go back to your mother," "We're not keeping you," "If you like it there, abroad, you have protectors there—go there! You can get a passport, we'll make it out for you in two minutes. We'll fix up the passport and you get out!"

Voznesenskiy said, "I want to live here!"

"Well if you want to live here, then why do you write that slander? What kind of attitude do you have toward Soviet power?"

Somehow it is hard even to recall that shouting because I did not expect this explosion. No one expected it; it was so sudden. It even seemed to me that it was not really serious, that Khrushchev was pumping or winding himself up. Until suddenly, in the middle of another outburst while Voznesenskiy was trying to answer something, Khrushchev suddenly did not interrupt him. He turned to the hall, to the very last row, and yelled:

"What are you smiling about! You, in the glasses, way back in the last row, in the red shirt! Why are you smiling? Just wait a minute, and we'll hear you too. Your turn is coming too!"

Voznesenskiy did not know how to go on, and said, "I am an honest man. I am for Soviet power. I do not want to go away anywhere."

Khrushchev waved his hand, "That's all just words, garbage."

Voznesenskiy said, "Please, let me recite my poem 'Lenin.'"

"We don't need your poem."

"Please, I will recite it."

"Okay, recite it."

He began to recite his poem "Lenin," but his heart was not in it. Behind him sat Khrushchev, moving his fists around the table. Next to him was the icy Kozlov.

He recited the poem. Khrushchev waved his hand. "That's good for nothing, useless. You can't do anything and don't know anything. Here is what I have to say to you. How many people do we have born in the Soviet Union every year?"

Someone answered: 3.5 million.

"All right. All right, as long as you. Comrade Voznesenskiy cannot understand that you are nothing, that you are just one of these three and a half million, you won't amount to anything. Just remember this: you are nothing."

Voznesenskiy was silent. What else he may have mumbled I do not know, I do not remember. And Khrushchev ended this way: "Here is my advice for you. You know how they do it in the army, when they receive a new recruit, useless, no skills, no talents? They assign him to an 'uncle,' which used to be one of the NCO's, and now would be an extended serviceman. So I advise you to get yourself one of those 'uncles.'"

And then, almost without a transition, he went on: "Okay you, the one who smiled? You there, in the glasses, come down here."

Somebody in the back rows stood up, "Me?"

"No, the one next to you."

"Me?"

"Yes, you, you're the one!"

Down the aisle came a man who really was wearing glasses and a red shirt, under a jacket and without a tie. A very thin man who no one knew.

At this point Khrushchev's shouting at Voznesenskiy had put the whole crowd of intelligentsia in some kind of strange, cruel, and excited mood. Tolstoy described this phenomenon well in "War and Peace," where Rastopchin gave the order to kill the merchant's son and the whole crowd, infecting one another with cruelty, hesitated at first and then began to kill him.

This man came down the aisle and people shouted at him. Someone shouted, "He has a red shirt on!"

The man said, "It's my only shirt."

"Come on, come on, answer for your actions!"

He came up, and Khrushchev said to him, "Who are you?"

"I...I am Golitsyn."

"What, Prince Golitsyn?"

"No, no, I am not a prince. I...I am the artist Golitsyn. I am...a graphic artist. I am a realist. Nikita Sergeyevich, if you like, I have some of my work here with me. I can show you."

Khrushchev stopped short, and said: "That isn't necessary. Well, start talking."

"What should I say?"

"What do you mean? You came up here, now talk!"

The man said, "I don't know what to say. I did not intend to speak."

"But since you have come up here, talk."

The man was silent.

Khrushchev said, "But do you understand why you were summoned?"

Golitsyn said, "Uhh...I don't understand."

"What! How can you not understand. Think about it!"

The man said, "Maybe because I applauded for Comrade Rozhdestvenskiy's or Voznesenskiy's poetry?"

"No."

"I don't know."

"Think about it and you'll understand."

Golitsyn was silent.

"Well, start talking."

Golitsyn: "Perhaps I should recite some poetry?"

"What poetry?"

"Mayakovskiy."

At this point hysterical laughter broke out in the hall; the nervous tension had become unbearable. The scene had become something surrealistic, something unbelievable.

Finally when he said Mayakovskiy, Khrushchev said, "That's not necessary, you can go."

Golitsyn started to leave, then suddenly turned and said, "Can I work?"

Khrushchev: "You can work."

Golitsyn left.

Finally Nalbadyan was given the floor. He presented another outline, said his thanks to Nikita Sergeyevich, and sat down. Then came Khrushchev's concluding statement. The main event!

He began, as I remember, by apologizing for getting upset and shouting, and asked not to be judged for it, because it was an important issue and one does get upset about it.

Then he began to explain to us what good art was, using images as examples.

"Say you are walking through the woods in winter, at night, a moonlit night. The snow is so blue in the moonlight, the pines and spruces, you look—how beautiful it is! And you think, somebody should paint this. But they won't paint it, and if they did people wouldn't believe it. They would say it isn't real! But such beauty does occur in life! Why go into the crapper for inspiration? Now I had a miner friend..."

And once again he recited some verse by some miner. Then after this a very strange game began. Khrushchev began saying things that I think even the presidium with all their restraint did not expect.

"Now Comrade Erenburg writes that he already understood after 1937, or after the war, what Stalin was like. He understood, but had to remain silent. So we see that he understood, but we did not understand. And if he understood, why did he remain silent? Does it mean that everyone remained silent? No, Comrade Erenburg, everyone did not remain silent. Many did not remain silent. But you, Comrade Erenburg, you say that everyone remained silent. Not everyone remained silent. Is Comrade Erenburg here?"

But Comrade Erenburg had already left. They had already ridden roughshod over him and mentioned him so many times that the old man could not take it and left this second session, apparently just at the moment when the roaring started and they were beating on Voznesenskiy.

"Erenburg isn't here? Okay. That is what he says. Do you think it was easy for us? But speaking just between us," Khrushchev said, lowering his voice and forgetting that there were some 650 people in the hall, "between us, he was a madman in those last years, a madman. On the throne, see. No, not everyone remained silent, Comrade Erenburg. And here Comrade Erenburg thinks that it was easy."

This surrealistic session with these stories by Khrushchev, it was probably the crowning incident. I don't remember anything more striking.

I left for home, thinking: what would come of all this? Even Khrushchev's last words were in some way elevated; he was declaring something, making an appeal. But what kind of appeals were they? Everyone was rebelling. What to do? What would happen?

And the next day the writers' party organization really was disbanded and the writers who were party members hitched on wherever they could, some at Mosfilm, some at a publishing house, and a few joined the party organization at the zoo because it was next door. The zoo was next to the Writers Union. How do you like that! And the party organization of the Writers Union ceased to exist. The only union without a party organization. Just in case, there was also no party committee. There was a party organizer, but that is something entirely different.

And how things went after that everyone knows.

My fourth meeting with N. S. Khrushchev took place at the June Plenum of the Central Committee. It was distinguished by unusual pomposity, good food, and an enormous number of people present. More than 2,000 guests were invited to the Plenum.

June. Therefore I had waited from March till June to know my fate. I waited and waited, and kept hearing that material was being collected. Material was being collected at VGIK, at the union, at the committee, and at Mosfilm. They were collecting material in various organizations. And I was waiting and waiting to see what would happen. Finally I was told: obviously your case will be reviewed after the June Plenum, or possibly at the Plenum itself. That was bad.

So finally the Plenum came.

The first thing that struck me was the behavior of our exalted intelligentsia, our finest people so to speak.

The members of the Writers, Artists and Composers unions were puzzled and unhappy, because these three unions were supposed to be merged. And outside the hall everyone was asking: what are we going to do, for example, at plenums of the union? Will artists really discuss questions of music, and will musicians review novels, novellas, and short stories? That certainly cannot be, so what will we be doing?

But despite this bewilderment the leadership of our unions welcomed this merger with elation; they welcomed it with sadness and bewilderment in their faces, but they welcomed it.

Well, this was the end. The meeting got underway again.

The meeting was underway, again a regular speaker had the floor. And again this regular speaker was interrupted by Khrushchev.

"Just a minute," he said. And turning to two members of the Central Committee, he said, "Why are you grinning over there? You, Comrade So-and-So. And So-and-So (a Kazakh surname, one of the secretaries of Kazakhstan). What do you find funny here? You are at a meeting of the Central Committee, and you have to know how to behave. What is it, don't you want to work? You can be released! How can you allow yourselves to act that way in the presence of members of the Central Committee? A disgrace!"

My heart just dropped. I must admit that I never thought it was possible to yell at members of the Central Committee like that, as if they were little boys. Of course I had heard how he yelled at Voznesenskiy and Golitsyn, but at members of the Central Committee!

After the intermission I went downstairs, with a pain in my stomach. I went to the dispensary and said, "Give me something for my liver."

"Why your liver?"

"I have a pain in my stomach."

"And why do you think that it's your liver?"

"I have a bad liver."

The doctor listened to me, and examined the place where it hurt.

"Oh no," he said, "that's not your liver. You have stenocardia. It's your heart."

I said, "I have never in my life had stenocardia. My heart is strong as steel."

"Well, you didn't have it, but now you do. We see that here."

I looked and saw a man lying on another cot, breathing in something. He set me down, gave me validol and nitroglycerin. I lay down, and off I went.

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Council On Historic Place Names Makes Proposals

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4 Aug 88 p 3

[Letter by the Chairman of the Board of the Soviet Culture Foundation, Academician D. Likhachev; Lenin Prize Laureate, Academician T. Gamkrelidze; and the chairman of the council for toponymy at the Soviet Culture Foundation, Doctor of Philological Sciences, V. Neroznak: "Historical Names Are Also Culture Monuments"]

[Text] Historical and cultural heritage requires social and legal protection. The necessary basis for such protection is to recognize it as a monument of art and culture. Historical geographical names must belong to their number. However, today they do not have an official status of monuments.

An historical geographic name is always motivated, that is, since its beginning, it is connected with a definite historical event in the life of the peoples, namely, with exploration of a territory and beginnings of a settlement, and various aspects of social, economic, and cultural life. This represents their fundamental historical importance. At the same time, names are monuments of the language by preserving a concrete evidence of its condition during one or another epoch.

Scientists and students of local lore did a lot for studies of the historical and cultural heritage represented by names of towns and townships, streets and square, mountains and rivers, etc. In some cases it is possible to reconstruct geographic names, which were lost earlier, important for their historical and linguistic values. We also have an organizational experience, namely, through the work of the permanent commission on geographic names of the Main Authority for geodesy and cartography at the USSR Council of Ministers and the toponymic commission of the Moscow branch of the Geographical society at the USSR Academy of Sciences. Awarding geographic names is regulated by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme on putting in order cases of awarding names of Statesmen and public figures to krays, oblasts, rayons, as well as to towns and other settlements, enterprises, kolkhozes, and institutions and organizations and by some other official documents. The importance of this element in the historical and cultural heritage was mentioned at the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party conference.

In spite of all this, the way how we award and replace geographic names, and how they are protected and studied, causes a concern. This concern is expressed in public circles, in the press, and the letters of working people sent to us, that is, to the Soviet Culture Foundation, the USSR and the republican Academies of Sciences, and to the Party and State authorities. One of the

urgent themes of these letters is the possibility of reconstruction of geographic names lost during unjustified renaming sometimes made for political reasons only.

We feel that it is appropriate to have a reminder of the thought of Konstantin Paustovskiy that "Names are popular, poetic beautification of the country. They speak for the peoples' character, its preferences and peculiarities of everyday life. One must respect the names. When they are changed due to an extreme necessity, this should be done first of all competently, with knowledge of the country, and with love to it. Otherwise, names are turned into verbal garbage, a breeding ground of poor taste, and demonstrate ignorance of those who invent them."

In our country, a "cult model" for names was more and more established. Two Kaliningrad, three Kuybyshev, Zhdanov, Zhdanovsk, and Zhdanovka appeared. In addition to other problems, this creates all kinds of confusion, especially for mail delivery, telegraph, and transportation. Some names simply do not make sense. For example, the railroad station Astapovo is now called Lev Tolstoy, and the town Spassk in Penza oblast is called Bednodedmyanovsk... Undoubtedly, we should in the future reject the practice of renaming the old towns and settlements in honor of some public figures and to give their names, at best, to new streets, square, and towns only. In each particular case, such names should be historically and linguistically justified.

We should also renounce the practice of naming educational institutions, palaces of culture, theaters, and other institutions in honor of public figures who did not have any direct connection with them. It would be more natural to leave them without any "dedications" or, in special cases, to connect them with the names of their founders or outstanding representatives. For example, the name of brilliant D.I. Mendeleyev, who worked and created there, would fit much better the Leningrad University compared with that of A. Zhdanov. Four of our universities carry the name of A.M. Gorkiy, and none of them has a name of A.S. Pushkin, V.I. Vernadskiy, or N.I. Vavilov.

Taking into consideration the scientific, historical and cultural, and social significance of the complex of problems connected with the geographic names on the map of our country, we feel it necessary to introduce on behalf of the council of toponymy at the Soviet Culture Foundation the following concrete proposals for consideration of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

—to add the list of types of historical and cultural monuments presented in the "Statute for protection and use of the monuments of history and culture" of 16 Sep 82, No 865, with the notion of "historical geographic names (names of towns, townships, streets, squares, localities, mountains, rivers, etc.)". Thus, the geographical names will receive the legal protection of the State;

—to develop on a strict scientific basis and to introduce for approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet the "Ukase for naming and renaming geographical objects". This document must conform to the new attitude toward geographical names;

—as the first step in this direction, to return on the map of our country the following historical names: Tver (until 1931) instead of Kalinin, Nizhniy Novgorod (until 1932) instead of Gorkiy, Samara (until 1935) instead of Kuybyshev, Mariupol (until 1948) instead of Zhdanov, Vyatka (until 1934) instead of Kirov, Lugansk (until 1935 and since 1958 to 1970) instead of Voroshilovgrad, Peterhof instead of Petrodvorets, and Gyandzha instead of Kirovabad.

In general, the problem of returning the historical names in the whole territory of our Union must be discussed with the wide participation of public in the spirit of glasnost and democratization. The result of this will be as if peoples would obtain the forgotten historical monuments anew.

13355

Authors' Self-financing Rights Defended
18000612b Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in
Russian 23 Jul 88 p 7

[Article by the acting deputy editor-in-chief of the Main editing board for fiction at the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and Book Trade, L. Khanbekov: "Right to a Book"]

[Text] In his letter "New the Old Way" (4 Jun 88) the newspaper's reader Genrikh Gunts subjected to sharp criticism the "Statute for publishing books self-financed by author" approved by the USSR Goskomizdat on 4 Apr 88 and published in the newspaper KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE (15 Apr 88).

He did not recognize in the Statute "anything new, in the spirit of perestroika, and anything conforming with simple common sense." Because the newspaper did not provide next to this statement another, more objective reader's opinion, I am afraid that the general reader may develop an incorrect impression.

Thousands of people would like to publish their books and cannot do it. There are many reasons for that, namely, few publishing houses operated during recent years, publishing was subdued by administrative and do-it-in-accordance-with-an-order methods of management, gross output and commercial indicators, by the tendency to reduce the number of publications, that is, by the reduction of choice, and alas, by the fact that corruption, publishing activities...

The Statute for publishing books self-financed by the author cannot be taken out of the context of measures implemented by the USSR Goskomizdat and directed

toward democratizing the publishing business in the country. And such a measure as the publishing of a manuscript in the author's wording without further editing is a step forward, an acceleration, on this road. And, by the way, people, who are not used yet to take cold cash for the "blood of the heart", enthusiastically support the opportunity to self-finance their meeting with readers. The Statute provides an equal chance for everybody. Books published in small number of copies and paid by authors may be considered pilot editions. After receiving public recognition, they could be published again on general conditions.

When publishers must refuse the authors, they use "shortage of paper" as a shield. A self-financed by an author publication covered by the Statute has a small volume of up to 3,000 copies. In order to realize such a publication one needs a very small amount of paper. For example, a collection of poems of quire size (700 poetry lines) requires only from 24 to 30 kg of paper.

At the present time, the Moscow publishing houses which I managed to contact have up to 200 authors' applications. The publishing houses Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, Sovetskiy Khudozhnik, Detskaya Literatura, Malysh, Iskusstvo, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, and Sovetskiy Pisatel are beginning to publish books self-financed by the authors. Only the Molodaya Gvardiya publishing house categorically refused to publish self-financed books. Its editor-in-chief N. Mashovets using the same pretexts as described above, namely, no paper and capacity, wrote on the pages of SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA (Article "I Do Not Hear Applause", 26 Jun 88), and the general director of the publishing house in his memorandum to the Komsomol Central Committee justified his point of view using the same arguments. At the same time, Molodaya Gvardiya put into production a collection of works by Mikhail Alekseyev in 8 volumes without even waiting for a decision of the USSR Goskomizdat board on the subject. Here, the paper consumption per one volume is 59-60 tons! And very recently the publishing house made readers happy by publishing two collections of poems by Yuriy Chekhonadskiy at once. The first one, "Interlocutor" was signed into print on 10 Oct 87... Where under such conditions can one get "free capacities" and "paper assets"?

As we see, the realization of the new Statute is hindered by the unwillingness of publishers to change anything in their life.

The novelty of the document which, in my opinion, Genrikh Gunts has not understood and appreciated, is in its approach to the practice of book publishing in the country and in its rejection of the stereotypes we are accustomed to. To reduce this novelty to the Goskomizdat's hunger for additional profits is a profound mistake.

NEVA Chief Editor Describes Publishing Plans
18000621a Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Jul 88 p 3

[Interview with B.N.Nikolskiy, NEVA Chief Editor, by S.Yagmurova, special correspondent, Leningrad and Alma-Ata: "One Cannot Choose One's Times: Our Correspondent Talks to the NEVA Journal's Chief Editor"; under the heading: "Days of Leningrad Culture and Art in Kazakhstan"; first paragraph is boldface introduction]

[Text] Behind the closed office door of the chief editor of a journal I imagined a hectic atmosphere: members of the editorial board, flushed in the heat of a discussion, sat around a table heaped high with manuscripts, tobacco smoke filled the air, voices were hoarse from debating. This picture has been suggested to me by the spirit of competition that now permeates journal publishing: journals compete for sharp, thought-provoking articles, for high-quality prose imbued with profound meaning and for criticism that puts everything in its place without regard for names, honors or positions. NEVA, the organ of the RSFSR Writers' Union and the Leningrad writers' organization, has been successful in this competition. The circulation has doubled, and in Kazakhstan the number of subscribers has surpassed 15,000. Let us list some of the works published there which have been responsible for such returns: Akhmatova's "Requiem," Dudintsev's: "White Robes," L.Chukovskaya's "Sofya Petrovna," Zhitinskiy's "Lost House" and Zhuravleva's "Novel with a Hero; Comparably, Novel with Myself," as well as the polemical "Apocryphal Dialogue" by L.Gumilev, Ph.D. in history, and "Justice and Two Crosses" by Samoylov.

[Question] One's times one cannot choose, one lives and dies in them, said the poet. People and their art can not fall out of their times, no matter what kind of period it is, stagnant or revolutionary. Time, however, sifts away all that is accidental, leaving only what is spiritually valuable. Things that were only recently praised to the heavens now seem pitiful. New processes in music, visual arts, theater, etc. engendered by perestroika are already informed with the new esthetics, discernible to the eye and the ear. "And what about literature?" some people begin to ask (there are too many of them to avoid answering the question) and by this question they mean works which have flooded our periodicals (which is wonderful, most think) but which address yesterday's (as some think) concerns. What is your opinion, Boris Nikolaevich?

That was the first question we asked NEVA's chief editor B.N.Nikolskiy.

[Answer] Today, our literature has got a second wind, it seems, and has begun to speak with a full voice. It is not so important that many of the works that are being published now were written long ago. Literature, if it is true literature, knows no statutes of limitations. It is important that those works naturally enter the present,

awaken our conscience and teach us lofty lessons of truth and civic courage. Recently, however, voices of caution have also been heard: is not there a danger that addressing acute, difficult and dramatic pages of our life and history would become something of a fad and turn into the new official literature. I want to counter these doubts decisively. The need for cleansing, for truth, can not become a fad. The price for being able to address these issues has been far too high. Most importantly, the works that have appeared in journals and attracted broad readership not only enrich us, our knowledge and our souls, but create a new climate in literature. I judge it by the change in our mail. In the past, comments on our publications were mostly concerned with questions of taste; now, readers follow writers' lead in debating the nature of power, the honor of the scientist or other truly spiritual issues. Their ideas are based on the history of their country and on their own lives. This is why we started printing readers' thoughts on NEVA's pages.

[Question] Some people think that perestroika in literature means a decisive renewal of creative forces and a break with the bureaucratic management style in the Writers' Union, an organization that has become a sort of a ministry. They think that this process should be accomplished by writers "whose creative thinking has not yet been encumbered by 'experience,' whose vision has not been blocked by a wall of unshakable truths and whose fear of making a mistake has not yet made them chronically enamored of infallible decisions."

[Answer] A similar question was once asked at a readers' meeting. I received the following note: "How can we speak of perestroika in the literary business if practically the entire leadership of the Writers' Union remains unchanged?"

I replied that in my opinion the author of the question was looking for signs of perestroika in literature in a wrong place. Replacing the leadership is probably a valuable and important task, but the state of literature does not depend on it. Open our journals, I said, and you will find there such works as A.Bek's "New Posting," Ch.Aytmatov's "Scaffold," A.Tvardovskiy's "The Right of Memory," A.Akhmatova's "Requiem," Yu.Trifonov's "Disappearance," V.Dudintsev's "White Robes," D.Granin's "Bison" and A.Rybakov's "Children of Arbat." Two or three years ago, could you have read in a journal an honest and stirring novel such as A.Pristavkin's "A Golden Cloud Has Spent the Night?" Is not this alone proof enough that we have found our voice?

[Question] Boris Nikolaevich, people express a legitimate, in my opinion, concern that the flood of so-called sensational materials will be exhausted and journals, including your NEVA, will be left without clothes. Today's reader has developed a certain standard and publications below this level will no longer satisfy him. He will not accept them, and will be absolutely right.

[Answer] I am optimistic about the future. The editor's desk has enough materials brimming with great human force. We have memoirs, letters and autobiographical works; tales of our own times and contemporaries not only by professional writers but by people who were pushed into literature by their country's and their own fate. Some of these works are quite successful. As an example, I will cite N.M.Ivanova-Romanova's "The Book of Life." The author's name is not familiar to the reader, not yet, as it was not familiar to our editorial staff until we read her manuscript and were amazed. It is an autobiographical novel which takes place against the backdrop of historical cataclysms; she, a teacher, spent most of her life writing it, apparently without a thought for publication. The novel is undoubtedly interesting.

Ye.Gnedin is a former a diplomat, a "high-society" man who at one time published in Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR, a man of complex destiny who felt Beriya's heavy hand. He suffered much, and reassessed much in prison. The result was "Disaster and Rebirth," which was offered to NEVA.

The reader will see on our pages "Epilogue" by A.Kaverin and "Memories of A.Akhmatova" by L.Chukovskaya and A.Efron, M.Tsvetaeva's daughter. "Paris without Joy" is the title of V.Konetskiy's short novel about meetings with Viktor Nekrasov. A.Zlovin's novel "Demontage" is done in the style of satirical grotesque. It is a story of how a monument to Stalin was demolished in the course of one night. Yet, it is not a documentary novel. It assesses a period of transition using artistic means, telling a story of people who wanted to adapt superficially to changes while deep inside they continued to live by old ideas and precepts. This subject has not lost its timeliness. Finally, there are I.Metlov's "Fifth Corner" and G.Gorbovskiy's "Procession." This is a partial list of manuscripts that give me hope that NEVA's flow will not abate.

[Question] How about difficulties of publishing some manuscripts? Take "Epilogue" for instance. Doubts about publishing it were expressed by Kaverin himself in the press. Who decides or what becomes the decisive factor? Do you consult higher authorities or...?

[Answer] We decide ourselves. This is a great achievement of ours. In the climate of restructuring of all aspects of the life of Soviet society, the character of the editorial board has changed: it has become more active and, I would say, more decisive and imbued with the sense of civic duty when it decides the fate of acute and polemical manuscripts. The editors assume the right and the responsibility for publishing it, be it a work of prose or poetry, a polemical piece on urban development in the historic district of Leningrad or a debate on the new exposition in the museum in Pushkin's last apartment.

'Sovetskiy Pisatel' Chief Editor Describes Publishing Plans
18000621b Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 2 Aug 88 p 3

[Article describing an interview with writer/critic V.I.Mussalitin, "Sovetskiy Pisatel" chief editor, by Galina Fadeeva, APN correspondent: "Erasing Blank Spots" under the "Culture and Life" rubric: first paragraph is boldface introduction]

[Text] Cultural life of the past 2 or 3 years is inconceivable without works that have come as though from the next world. Glasnost has restored to life films that for many years languished on the shelf and gave stage life to plays whose authors' names were no longer even mentioned. There are many such examples in publishing as well. This is what writer and critic V.I.Mussalitin, Chief Editor of the "Sovetskiy Pisatel" publishing house, told an APN correspondent.

This year, the publishing house has inaugurated a Silver Series; it will publish works written by our writers in the 1910s and 1920s which practically have not been published in this country. Bans first appeared during Stalin's time, when dissent was stomped out and emigration meant alienation from the motherland. As a result, due to political dogmas the readers' perception of that period has become lopsided. "The goal of the series is to re-establish it and to present it as fully as possible," said Mussalitin. "The period in question was not a transitory one in Russian literature: it was rightly called the 'silver age' of our nation's culture. Hence the title of the new series, echoing that name."

The series began with a volume by Sergey Klychkov "Devil's Chatter Box." In 1989, the Silver Series will published works by Aleksey Remizov, Ivan Shmelev and plays by Leonid Andreev which have not been re-issued in many decades. It is noteworthy that all these books will have 200,000 copies printed, the maximum allowed for "Sovetskiy Pisatel."

"In the history of our literature there should be not blank spots," went on Mussalitin. "These books form a small part of our output (we publish some 500 titles a year), but it is a rather important part. We think that it is better to forgo yet another edition of some work in favor of one of these books, which are in need of gaining readers in their native land."

For the sake of fairness, it must be mentioned that "Sovetskiy Pisatel" has been publishing writers whose lives were viewed negatively in certain circles. For instance, as long ago as in 1984, it published "Selected Works" by Boris Pasternak, "A Chess Move" by Yuriy Slezkin and historical novels of V.Ladinskiy. One of its most popular series, Poet's Library, published collections of works by Igor Severyanin, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Maksimiliyan Voloshin, which had never been published before. There were, however, serious difficulties. Five years ago, "Sovetskiy Pisatel" prepared for publication a collection of works by Evgeniy Zamyatin which included his novel "Us," which has long been known in many countries but not here. Yet, at the time the book could not be published. This year, "Us" was published by literary journal ZNAMYA, so that in that case "Sovetskiy Pisatel" missed the honor of being the first, since Zamyatin's volume will come out only next year.

"These are not one-shot deals or accidental publications, but a complete program," explained Mussalitin. "It includes literary studies and memoirs. We have already published a collection of critical essays by Osip Mandelstam titled 'Word and Culture' and a volume of Velemir Khlebnikov's works titled 'Creations.' The list of such works also includes a very interesting document which for many years has been kept on the so-called special reserve list and which is now being prepared for publication: the records of the 1st Soviet Writers' Congress in 1934, which featured speeches not only by writers but by prominent political figures of the day, such as N.Bukharin and K.Radek.

"One publication prepared on a priority basis in just one and a half months and already sent to the printer is a volume of memoirs by Vera Muromtseva-Bunina, Ivan Bunin's wife. It is interesting not only for the factual material it provides but also for the insight into the psychology of creative work.

"The publishing house plans to publish memoirs of Nadezhda Mandelstam and Evgeniya Ginsburg. Near-term plans include early prose of Mikhail Bulgakov, a book by Boris Pilnyak and works by Gayto Gazdanov, a writer whose work was highly praised by Ivan Bunin. The Poet's Library series will publish collections of poetry by Nikolay Gumilev, Vladislav Khodasevich, Dmitriy Merezhkovskiy and Zinaida Gippius, as well as a two-volume set of Boris Pasternak."

**Lack of Knowledge, Mistaken Perceptions Impede
Antialcohol Efforts**
18300393 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in
Russian No 16, 19 Jul 88

[Article by L.Ovrutskiy under the rubric "Social Policy: A Look at the Problem": Dead-Ends on the Path to Sobriety"]

[16 Jul 88, p 5]

[Text]

1. Dilemmas of Home-Brewing, or "The Jourdain Effect"

The future historian will note that the first decisive step after April 1985 was the dismantling of the old alcohol policy. It was the universal sentiment that things could not go on the way they were. Something had to be done, had to be done immediately. The nation had to be taken out of its alcoholic stupor before initiating the most important dialog with it. Three years have gone by, and it is apparent that part of the plan has been achieved, part of it has not. This is what the debate is about. The greatest irritants to public opinion today are the "liquor" and "sugar" lines and the shortage of lotions, tomato paste and toothpaste.

"In the Serpent's Embrace," "The Green Snake in Slippers," "Stop the Home-Distiller!".... The tone of the newspaper headlines is reminiscent of reports from the front. It is the front, and the changes occurring there are alarming. Sugar sales are increasing: 7.85 million tons in 1985, 8.635 in 1986 and 9.28 in 1987. The number of home-distillers exposed is rising menacingly: five times as many last year as in 1985. The General Procurator of the USSR has stated that "sales of alcoholic beverages have been cut in half, but home-distillation has just about 'compensated' for the decrease."

Who could have imagined it, some people say in distress.

We warned them, others say, glowing with the triumphant truth.

It is going to get worse, yet others gloomily predict.

They say that doubt is the investigator's bread, and we would like the reader to partake of this meager repast.

We know that the amount of sugar sold to the people and the number of self-brewers caught are regarded as the most important indicators of the extent of home-brewing. When one takes a closer look at the statistics, however, one has the impression that the phenomenon of home-brewing is made up of paradoxes. It appears that there are two situations indicating an increase in the number of home-brewers: a. when sugar sales increase; b. when sugar sales drop. So just which "holds up": sugar

sales or "rate of detection"? The pattern of sugar sales would seem to be more reliable. This indicator has the advantage that it is more objective and therefore more reliable.

In that case, just what does the "detection rate" detect? At least two things. In the first place, it shows the degree of activity of law-enforcement agencies. While in the past the police called upon the public not to ignore the home-brewer but would not come within a country mile of him themselves in order not to encumber the crime statistics or hamper the planned reduction in crime, the producer of rotgut is apprehended far more regularly today. It would be difficult for me to say exactly how much more, although I do have certain information to think about. On 22 October 1985 IZVESTIYA carried an extremely curious article about a 2-month period established for the voluntary surrender of stills in Chuvashia's Yantikovskiy Rayon. We shall skip over the creative part and report the official results: 5,115 stills were surrendered in a rayon with 6,000 homes. Another 400 were found on the outskirts of settlements. This means that home-brewing was universal (or almost universal) there. A total of exactly seven were discovered in 1984, however.

I am assuming (strictly for the purity of a mental experiment) that everything had fallen back into the same old pattern in 1987, that everyone had once again become owners and operators of stills. Home-brewing was going on the same as before, and there was nothing new under the Yantikovskiy sun. How did the "detection rate" behave in this apparently unchanged situation? Did it also remain unchanged? Did it drop, since the seven home-brewers, grown wiser from bitter experience, had gone underground, as they say, making it more difficult for the law-enforcement agencies? But let us not intrigue the reader: the "detection rate" increased almost 20(twenty)-fold. And naturally the rayon authorities are sounding the alarm that home-brewing is on the rise! But how could it increase? Think about it. It could not rise above universal.

In the second place, the "sour face" of the police statistics almost mirrors the change in the laws against home-distillation. They had only to change the liability for the production of substitute beverages with the intent to sell from criminal to administrative in July 1987, and there was an unprecedented jump in the "detection rate" during the second half of the year (it increased 4-fold compared with the first half). The new laws considerably simplified the detection procedure and the establishment of "a basis of proof," as the legal experts say, of a violation of the law. According to the USSR General Procurator, this "drastically stimulated efforts to stop home-distillation." For reasons difficult to understand the increased activity of the law-enforcement agencies was interpreted as an increase in home-brewing activities. This is the same as saying that there is more oil in the ground because a more powerful pump has been instilled at the well.

I have already stated that sugar sales are a more objective and reliable indicator, but it too requires "delicate" handling. In the article "Pitfalls on the Path to Sobriety" published in the 19 October 1987 issue of PRAVDA, A. Martynov states: "It is not difficult to calculate that the 'extra' million tons of sugar discovered by the press, which is now also being 'consumed' by the population during the year (referring to 1986—L.O.), this is a billion 1-kilogram sacks of sugar. If they have gone into the production of 'elixir,' it would amount to 2 billion bottles."

This opinion is typical. It accurately reflects both the extent to which the publicists are informed and the depth of the analysis. A. Martynov proceeds on the assumption that "they went for the production of 'elixir'.... But what if they were used for something else? For making jams and things like that, for example? This hypothesis can easily be checked out. One only has to take a look at the quarterly, and not the annual, sugar sales dynamic. The first and second quarters of 1986, for example, "showed" a decline compared with the corresponding periods of 1985. And the entire growth in sugar consumption occurred during the third quarter. If we reject the belief that home-distillers are capable of committing themselves to asceticism during the first half of the year in order to make up lavishly for their restraint during the scorching summer heat, we have to admit that it was the fruit and berry harvest which has amplified annual fluctuations in the demand for sugar. In fact, there was a record harvest in '86, a million tons above the average for the five-year period. The processing of this additional million tons required an extra 843,000—not at all "extra"—tons of sugar. "A kilogram to a kilogram" is apparently what our homemakers intone as they work their magic over the jams and "concoctions."

One of the unwritten laws of contemporary social and political journalism states: "You cannot go wrong by knocking statistics!" It has become a sign of good style to describe statistics from the era of stagnation as the big lie or simply the lie. The reproaches are justified in great part, but I would point out that there are not just "tricky" statistics, but crafty statisticians as well. Completely reliable data can be arranged so that they would not be recognizable even to the State Committee for Statistics, which compiles them.

It appears that the third, "nonindicative" quarter should be discounted when considering the annual figures. It then becomes clear that the average per capita acquisition of sugar was less in '85 than in '84 and less in '86 than in '85. There will possibly be people who would try to contend on the basis of these data that home-brewing has increased continuously since the ukase, but I am not one of them.

In order to determine the extent of rotgut production today, one needs to know what it was in the past. However, this is one of those useful questions which are difficult to answer (given the lack of information).

The level of rotgut production in the '70s and '80s can be assessed only on the basis of certain disconnected data. V. Perevedentsev conducted a survey of "clients" at medical detoxification facilities at the end of the '60s, for example. It revealed that every seventh one of them had become drunk by means of home-brewed liquor. And this was in Moscow where, the author points out, the store shelves sag under the weight of alcohol. A total of 16,000 stills were voluntarily surrendered in little Chuvashia (Yantikovskiy Rayon was previously mentioned. And how many such rayons are there in Rus?). A full 500,000 (!) were surrendered in the Ukraine, according to a report in the 20 September 1987 issue of PROZHEKTOR PERESTROYKI. Did every owner of a still surrender it, or only every tenth owner? One can only guess.

By providing exaggerated, sensational reports on the scale of contemporary home-distillation and remaining modestly silent on its scope in the past, we risk becoming like those purveyors of gloom about whom Chesterton commented in his time: "They report the death of Sir Jones to people who had no inkling that the aforesaid Sir existed."

I call the process of comprehending certain facts about our recent past the "Jourdain effect." Moliere's hero was taken aback to learn that he had been speaking prose for a long time. We had similar feelings when we learned that drug-abuse existed not just "there," "among them" and that prostitutes were not being parachuted down to the Natsional like the infamous Endurtses in Fazil Iskander's story. It appears that the more information there is about home-distillation in the '70s and '80s, the greater the disappointment in store for those people abiding in the certainty that nothing like it existed in the past, that the "most favored status" for the alcohol trade was a reliable guarantee against alternative production, that any restrictions on access to liquor would automatically cause a home-brewing "reaction."

There is one other overlooked witness in the matter of home-brewing—the consequences. I recall that 5 or 6 years ago, during the time of heated and sometimes, bitter, debate about the strategy of the antialcohol campaign, it was frequently predicted that a reduction in the sale of alcohol would inevitably be offset by its illegal production and distribution. Furthermore, all of the different kinds of damage would still be with us, but would become even more serious. Did these predictions come true? Unfortunately, those who made them do not burden themselves with this question.

Let us turn to the facts. During the past 3 years alcohol-related crimes have been reduced by 40 percent, and traffic accidents due to drunk driving have been cut by a third. Although the police have become far stricter in this area, the number of people brought to account for alcohol-related violations of the law was reduced from 14.4 to 9.6 million in 1986 and to 8.6 million in '87. The absenteeism rate has been cut by 40 percent, the number

of divorces has been reduced, and life expectancy has increased. Finally, the most important "end" result of the antialcohol policy: an average of 200,000 fewer people have died in the past 2 years than in 1984.

The rejection of alcohol is particularly evident among the youth. Novosibirsk Sociologist V.V. Morozov, who studied changes in the drinking habits of students during the period 1984-1986, discovered that the number of teetotalers among the girls grew from 2 percent to 8 percent; among the boys, from 1 percent to 13 percent.

The author of this article recently conducted a survey of experts on the rejection of alcohol among the youth. Secretaries of certain rayon and city Komsomol committees served as the "experts." Fifty-five percent of those surveyed agreed that "young workers are drinking less." According to a fourth of the "experts," the working youth drink just as frequently as before. The others declined to answer, but the fact is revealing that not a single person indicated an increase in the frequency of drinking. There was approximately the same spread of answers about the frequency of alcohol consumption among students at vocational and technical schools. The Komsomol workers feel that the greatest improvement has occurred among the upper-grade students. Only one in ten stated that the students are drinking as much as before, while the majority pointed to significant success in establishing temperance at the schools.

Would we have seen all of these signs of a rejection of alcohol if home-brewing had made up for the reduction in the production and sale of alcohol? Well-known publicist S. Sheverdin has formulated the ZNV, the "law of ineradicability of the damage" from alcohol consumption. This graphic phrase is based on the solid philosophical premise that the force of evil contained in alcohol does not dissolve without a trace. Whether it is distributed from a distillery or produced underground, all the same it explodes in crime, accidents, disease, the disintegration of the family.... And if the omniscient statistics show that there are fewer crimes, accidents, deaths and divorces, one has to take this into account.

"There are situations," Marc Bloch, who had come up against an insolvable problem, wrote, "when it is the researcher's first duty to say: 'I could not find the answer.'"

I could not find it, I repeat after the French historian, any evidence that home-distillation increased in 1985 and 1986. On the contrary, it appears to me that it dropped. The trend toward an increase did not become apparent until 1987. And this was due primarily to the drastic hike in liquor prices in August 1986. The State Committee for Prices long ago acquired an almost mystical gift for divining and going along with the secret desires of the workers, but we still have to learn how to add up the immediate effects. History, both Soviet and foreign, has unequivocally demonstrated that an increase in the price of alcohol (particularly a dramatic

one) provokes an explosion of home-distillation. One need only to recall the initial performance of the infamous Rykovka in the consumers' market. The sale of vodka was initiated in October 1925, costing only a ruble. Sales were so brisk at first that it was decided in December to increase the price by 50 percent. The reaction was instantaneous: village residents stopped buying it. In July of 1926 the price had to be reduced to a ruble and 10 kopecks.

Police statistics show that the social "outsider" is the main producer and consumer of home-brewed liquor, beer and so forth. These are primarily low-income people: pensioners (most frequently, women), semiskilled or unskilled workers, and so forth. I would add to this the fact that a study of around 500 court cases involving home-brewing conducted by V. Belyayev, chief of the OOP [Department for Public Order?] of the Tatar ASSR's Ministry of Internal Affairs, showed that every tenth home-distiller had been treated for alcoholism and every fifth one had appeared in court.

Judge for yourself how this social type would react to a price increase. The pensioner has been conditioned to pay for personal services with a "bottle," but the bottle suddenly costs twice as much. What is she to do? Willingly or not, she goes against the law, because the chauffeur, the tractor driver, the carpenter, the woodcutter and others are unyielding.

What is the person inflicted with alcoholism to do? Since he drinks up "all his wages," as they say, what will he do when he discovers that his wages cover only half of his "norm"? The other half will be "made up" with an alternative, of course.

Incidentally, it is a big mistake to think that the "booze" lines motivate people to turn to the still. The alcoholic consumer is prepared to put up with the lines, but he can ordinarily not afford the doubled price. The moderate, or "social," drinker, on the contrary, is put off by the line and not the price. He will give up alcohol altogether before resorting to producing or consuming home-brewed products.

Furthermore, with the latest, drastic restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages which took effect in the fall of 1987, we crossed over a line which left millions of alcohol-abusers and alcoholics with no choice (typically, the reduction affected the vodka and other "strong drinks" preferred by this group). These people distill their own for the simple reason that they can no longer get by without drinking.

It is doubtful that what I have said here covers all of the ideas on the run on sugar which struck the nation in the fall of '87 and has still not abated. There are others. In the first place, the sugar beets were harvested later than usual because of the weather. The entire processing chain was delayed accordingly, so that less than the planned

amount of sugar was received in certain areas in September. In the second place, rumors of a shortage are contributing to the stockpiling of sugar. The "snowballing" effect which results in shortage "fever" has been too thoroughly described to discuss it separately here. Incidentally, the 22 May issue of the Leningrad TELE-KURYER carried an article on a run on salt which is spreading over the city on the Neva. Is it the home-distillers again?

[19 Jul 88 p 6]

[Text]

1. Tilting at Windmills?

We know that the Biblical Jacob fought with strangers at a ford and emerged crippled from the skirmish. This amusing prehistoric incident eloquently attests to the fact that in general one can battle the unknown, but one cannot win. Unfortunately, the idea that the antialcohol policy is serious and long-term has still not been reinforced with a thorough, in-depth study of the problem. Hopes continue to be pinned on the mid-level party officials thrown into the sobriety campaign. On "their own Planons and quick-witted Newtons" at the oblast or rayon level. It is all right, they reason, God will not abandon them. One can only hope.

The period preceding May 1985 foreordained the weakness of antialcohol science. Weakness is not the word for it! Forgive me for the inadvertent pun, but the expression itself is too weak. The "Slovar prikladnoy sotsiologii" [Dictionary of Applied Sociology] issued in 1984 describes in detail dozens of branches of sociological theory, but there is not even a mention of the sociology of alcohol consumption. It is conspicuous by its absence, as they say. One scholar wrote that we have fewer specialists on the social aspects of alcohol abuse than... basketball experts. But just why would we need them? After all, "it was the opinion" that alcohol abuse was a relic which would be eliminated any day. The alcohol issue gradually began to be like Chekhov's frail young lady: nonsubstantive, reticent, with no prospects.

Three years have gone by. Just what has changed in the status of sobriety (from the Latin *sobrietas*, meaning sobriety), which is the science of ways to achieve sobriety? Nothing. As before, a few people are studying the problem at the Sociological Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a few at the Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and two or three at the Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Procuracy. And to these a few scholars in the Baltic area, in Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk and certain other cities. Is it any wonder that the national comprehensive program, whose development was discussed in party and state decrees in May of '85, has not only not yet been approved but has not even been submitted to the tribunal of the scientific community.

There are sizeable research groups studying the social aspects of alcohol-abuse and alcoholism in almost all of the European nations, the USA and Canada. There is something to be learned from the experience of Finland, where an institute for the social problems of alcohol was established in 1960. It is financed by the ALCO state company, which has a monopoly on the production and sale of alcohol and which has set up a special research fund in the amount of 2 percent of its profits. As a result of the institute's work, the Finns have succeeded in holding alcohol consumption at a stable level over a period of a decade without taking any drastic steps. A few years ago I met with Pekka Sulkonen, then institute director. I was envious when he told me about the institute's possibilities for enlisting highly trained specialists—socialists, psychologists and economists—for the research, and about the statistical information center which collects 21 items of information on alcohol consumption in the nation on a daily (?) basis. And I have to admit that the envy was not at all benign.

On our scale one tenth of a percent of alcohol's contribution to the budget would be enough to set up a large institute with an extensive network of regional branches. I mentioned the need to establish a sobriety institute at the round-table discussion held by the magazine KOMMUNIST in Ulyanovsk on 2 and 3 July 1987. No one supported the idea, however, except my perpetual opponent, Professor B. Levin. It was not that the attitude was sceptical; there was simply no attitude at all. This was perhaps a reflection of the typical attitude of "what is there to study? Everything is already clear."

Strictly speaking, just how much do we know about the alcohol problem? Do we know, for example, how much it "costs"—in other words, the economic damage (I shall not go into the political, moral and other kinds of damage) caused by alcohol abuse? Some estimates put it at 50 billion rubles, others at 100 billion. The economic loss from the Chernobyl tragedy, as we know, was 8 billion rubles. How many drunken Chernobyls explode in the nation every year? Five? Ten? Fifteen? Twenty?

I asked S. Maslov, deputy chief of the Social Statistics Administration of the State Committee for Statistics, about this. He shrugged his shoulders. I. Durnuov in an adjacent office was supposed to be dealing with this question on a volunteer (?) basis. Ivan Dmitrievich explained that he had still not worked on the methods for performing the work but that he planned to this as soon as he retired. So we should not wait long.

In recent years we have suffered perceptible financial losses as a result of the restrictions on alcohol sales. They might more accurately be called an investment in sobriety. What is the return? One does not invest billions in the economy and receive just moral satisfaction, after all. I agree that an investment in sobriety is recouped slowly, but one would still like to know when, how much, in what way. Does Gosplan have the answers to these questions? Will we ever be able to learn from the annual

plan how much is invested in sobriety, and how much is received as a result? In addition to everything else, sobriety is an economic category and should therefore involve accounting.

How many alcoholics are there in the nation? There are 4.6 million registered. According to USSR Minister of Health Ye. Chazov, the number registered accounts for 30 percent of all the alcoholics in the nation. Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I. Bestuzhev-Lada has summarized the opinions of other specialists and finds that we have four or five times as many as the records show. It can therefore be assumed that 15 million people are afflicted with alcoholism. Perhaps it is 20 million. The counting is done by estimation—plus or minus....

What is the point in discussing the causative factors in alcohol consumption? Read certain sociological books.... F. Engels himself wrote that exploitation, poverty and denial of rights would lead to alcoholism. And since socialism eliminates exploitation, poverty and denial of rights, we can therefore declare that alcohol abuse and alcoholism do not have any "social roots" [under socialism]. Nothing other than the spirit of God sweeping over the abyss....

By making this theoretical effort, one can ignore with a clear conscience the real contradictions of real development, which do not fit into the Procrustean bed of the prescribed design. One can speak of the stresses caused by the scientific and technological revolution as factors contributing to alcoholism, while forgetting about the accumulation of fear and other negative emotions during the Stalinist era. One can sigh about the complacency toward alcohol abuse without linking it to connivance in bribe-taking, speculation and corruption. One can point to the ineffectiveness of antialcohol propaganda and indoctrination without noticing the vacuum formed by the gap between words and deeds and filled in (in accordance with the laws of the class struggle) with nihilism, lack of faith, apathy. One can point to individual errors in the production and sale of alcohol but not place them alongside the infamous "cost-is-no-object" attitude and the use of the extensive methods in the economy. One can assess blunders in the antialcohol policy, while closing one's eyes to its organic unity with all the other areas of state functioning. One can be distressed by the "eccentricities" of conjugal love which lead the married partners to drink, while refusing to see the erosion of those substantial human qualities of decency, honor and integrity.

The list of examples of our terrible ignorance could be extended. How can we speak about a serious policy, when we have no idea of the scope of the alcohol problem, when the parameters of the subject which we are to affect are unclear (I hope I have already demonstrated how much we know about home-distillation).

The sobering-up policy is like the *Titanic*, proceeding in a dense fog. And when, from time to time, it encounters icebergs, the order goes out from the captain's bridge: "Step up the indoctrinal work!" "Combat the specific agents of the evil!" or "Put everything into it!" It would not be a bad thing to put everything into it, of course, but one needs to know what to put everything into, and how.

It is only natural that the vacuum of scientific conceptions would be filled in with emotional effluence. On the one hand, there are demands that alcohol abuse (read production and sale of alcohol) be ended within a five-year period. Or... by the year 2000. Why five and not three or seven? Why precisely by the year 2000, and not by the 90th anniversary of the October Revolution or the 60th anniversary of the Victory? These are honored dates totally deserving of vibrant commentary.

I recall how, 10 years ago, one prominent social scientist tried to show that kolkhoz proprietorship should be eliminated (it was called "merging with state ownership") in order to eliminate all of the theoretical barriers to the inclusion of the peasantry into the working class. Why do we need to do this? The prime motive was this: "To be able to tell the people that a classless society has been built in the USSR." It was apparently assumed that at this joyous news the people would sigh with relief and say: "At last!"

One more reminiscence. There were populists in our history. And they used the so-called "subjective method in sociology," whereby "critically thinking individuals with the very best motivation would advance some sort of noble goal. Then they would rack their brains figuring out what to do to achieve the goal. Lenin laughed a lot about this method, underscoring the fact that the goal grows out of the natural laws of development itself, out of the natural course of things, and not out of noble intentions.

More than once I have asked those who are striving for immediate passage of a "dry law" what is to be done in the absence of alcohol with the millions of people afflicted with alcoholism, if we cannot offer them medical help. And how are we to accomplish the "drying up" legally, if the majority are against it. These fundamental questions wrenched the same, unvarying answer from the depths of hundreds of souls: Leave Academician F. Uglov be, Mister (Citizen) Ovrutskiy!

Fear of the painstaking, hard work lies behind the demand for immediate sobriety. It is a desire to avoid a struggle, the outcome of which is not clear, because crises, defeats and retreats are inevitable in this, what can be called paramount, matter. This slice of the public mentality issues calls for sterilizing or shooting alcoholics and home-brewers as enemies of the revolution. Rid the country of the filth! Let's shoot and bury them, and we can then live sober and happy lives.

On the other hand, those who fear the struggle insist on returning to the "Egyptian cauldrons." Don't feed our intelligentsia bread; let them ponder the matter of whether universal harmony is worth the tears of a child. They most frequently agree that it is not. Then we descend from the lofty ethical heights to inebriated earth. Are the 200,000 lives of our fellow citizens saved each year worth the difficulties which we are experiencing with sugar, lotions, pastes and so forth? Here the opinions diverge. "This is the 71st year of Soviet power. It is 40-some years after the war!" Ye. Yevtushenko, whom I have admired since his "Bratsk GES" was published, exclaims in LITGAZETA.

And how do you perceive the campaign against this enormous social evil? Did you regard it as a monstrosity with ourselves as its pawn? Only a charlatan could promise any kind of success without a whole range of costs: rationings, regulations, inconvenience, lines.

There has been no end of appeals to begin the restructuring with oneself, but I have yet to meet a cultural figure who has begun the restructuring in the area of drinking, with himself. Everyone tries to begin with the extreme case, that is with the alcoholic. We do not see the forest, the real process which is saving real lives, for the trees (investigations of bureaucratic simplicity, which are worse than thievery).

Yevtushenko's arguments are as old as time. He invokes Parisian steeplejacks who imbibe their light red wine on the struts of the Eiffel Tower: "And you know, they do not fall and are not yanked down by any trade union or party organization...."

Paris, the Eiffel Tower.... That's the trouble with these poets. They do not read the popular pamphlets, or else they would know that France has one of the highest rates of alcoholism in the world. Countless French alcoholics die, most of them from cirrhosis of the liver and delirium tremens, to be sure, which is not as conspicuous as posters with steeplejacks.

The poet sounds the alarm about conception "under the influence of antifreeze." I would point out, however, that prominent and foreign scientists have been sounding the alarm for 2 decades that alcohol disturbs man's genetic stock. This includes light red wine and fine Armenian brandy. Perhaps hundreds of conceptions under the influence of antifreeze seem more dangerous—from the genetic standpoint, of course—than the hundreds of thousands of conceptions occurring under the influence of vodka? Think of it, vodka! Nothing wrong with that, as Belov's Afrikanych would say. We have become accustomed to millions of alcohol abusers and alcoholics. We have become accustomed to the birth of hundreds of thousands of handicapped babies every year. We have grown accustomed to hundreds of thousands of drunken deaths: people freezing, drowning, getting into accidents, choking on their own vomit. The title of Ye. Yevtushenko's article is "Inured." That is truly the case.

Nikolay Shmelev is puzzling. He writes in issue No. 4 of the (novomirskaya) publication: "It is increasingly apparent that the state is being drawn step by step into a war on home-distillation with the population. It can hardly win this debilitating war. The ease of home-production, the profit from it and the extent of the demand for alcohol in the final analysis render hopeless any conceivable counteraction by MVD agencies. We cannot station a policeman at every village house, and now even every urban apartment."

N. Shmelev is so popular that he does not burden himself to provide a single argument or fact, assuming that he will be believed without them. There is no question that by being drawn into a war on alcohol abuse, the state has committed itself to a war on home-distillation. This is tautologically the same as saying: "The battle started in the center, but the flanks will be drawn into it." Will we win the war on home-brewing? No, N. Shmelev believes, because we cannot post a policeman at every apartment. But perhaps it is not necessary to have a policeman at every apartment. Only those people who have an extremely acute and frequently pathological need for alcohol are distilling and will continue to distill their own. Let us look at what will happen with the potential home-distillers—that is, with the army of alcohol abusers and alcoholics. Will it be replenished?

Whoever would risk answering in the affirmative assumes an obligation to indicate the sources of the replenishments. Alcohol abuse and alcoholism are the toxic fumes given off by the swamp of so-called moderate (social) drinking (according to World Health Organization statistics, 6-7 percent of those who regularly drink become addicted). The restrictive measures "struck" primarily at the moderate drinkers, greatly reducing the likelihood of their becoming alcoholics. This went a long way toward undermining the foundation for the reproduction of alcoholism and cut off the channel for growth in the "ranks of the drunks." It is just a matter of not being in a hurry and not getting nervous, of being able to bide our time, of strictly correlating the rate of alcohol production to the reduction in the number of alcohol abusers and alcoholics and with the growing masses of the sober formed by the generations entering life.

"By lowering the price of alcohol and providing it in adequate quantities through state channels we shall achieve at least one thing. We shall stifle the home-distiller, close up every underground source of bootleg and stop the poisoning of people with chemicals," the author writes. We might achieve the one thing (although it is doubtful). But what about the other? Will the people stop being poisoned with chemicals? With vodka?

I have published articles on problems of sobering up more than once, and I pay close attention to the letters from the readers. I have to say that in the past 2 or 3 years I have not once encountered the opinion that "positive results can be... anticipated... from a significant reduction in the price of vodka, elimination of the

shortage in the stores or the large-scale establishment of well-furnished taverns and cafes. Even extreme opponents of the antialcohol policy arrive at conclusions other than those of N. Shmelev. This is because they are familiar with the sad experience of France.

The idea that the problem cannot be resolved with bans alone is too global to be right. To date, the entire "active experience" of the antialcohol policy has been derived exclusively from the application of bans and restrictions. Let us not forget, however, that the matter of eliminating the chronic social evil was represented extensively and comprehensively in the decisions of May 1985. It is another matter that it is easier to restructure in the administrative area than it is to perform without a hitch the maneuver the navy calls "turn altogether" in the propaganda area. We know how to ban and restrict things. We even like it. We do it almost with a passion. The fact is also indisputable that the production of goods and services is not totally keeping up with the available money which would have been spent on alcohol, nor the leisure industry with the increase in "sober" time.

There are at least two ways out of every disaccord, and this one is no exception. We can either beat a retreat and return to the times when we "shook" in our privacy, "banqueted" in our offices, "deliberated" and "calculated" out by the gate; or we can try to hold the heights taken with the ban and bring up propaganda forces and resources from the rear, while not renouncing temporary withdrawals (appearing as "zigzags" to the sideline observer), finishing up or redoing on the second, third or even tenth attempt that which we did not accomplish on the first. The choice of a position depends greatly, if not mainly, upon the attitude toward sobriety as one of the strategic objectives of social policy. The assertion that most Soviet people not only oppose abuse but are actually against the consumption of alcohol indicates an overly optimistic view of things. This approach distorts the assessment of the motivating forces behind the antialcohol policy and blocks our view of the real conflicts.

There is no disputing the fact that the antialcohol policy is in need of major adjustments. The center of gravity must be shifted from the administrative to other areas. The only (frontal and "crushing") tactic is to make way for a calculated and differentiated approach which takes into account the demographic, social and ethnic differences of people. "Selective," precision action must replace world onslaught." The "Sturm and Drang" era must be transformed into ordinary days of concentrated, quiet work—"organic" work, as they used to say in the old days.

Lenin underscored the fact that policy is a science, an art, "which does not fall from the sky and which does not come free." The antialcohol policy has yet to become a science and an art.

'Videofilm' Association Will Fight Black Market in Videos

18000622 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 10 Aug 83 p 6

[Interview with A. Gotlib, "Videofilm" senior editor, by E. Valentinova: "'Black Market' in Video" under the "Analyzing a Problem" rubric; first two paragraphs are introduction; first paragraph in boldface]

[Text] Only a few years ago the word video was associated in the minds of many exclusively with illegal business. Today some 2 million households in our country own "home movie theaters," movie rental outlets have opened in large cities and film production is starting. Nevertheless, experts claim that most video cassettes get to consumers through the black market. Despite several trials involving cases of illegal video cassette production and speculation, the flow continues uninterrupted.

Nothing can be changed in this area by slapping on prohibitions, according to employees of the All-Union Production Association "Videofilm." The association's marketing department has done a general sociological survey of the market. Its results were in many ways surprising. A. Gotlib, senior editor of "Videofilm," told us the following:

[Answer] Such illegal markets exist in every country. With the spread of video cassette recorders in this country, demand for videos has far outstripped supply; naturally, eager suppliers of this good have emerged, those who copy films from one cassette to another. The market has been flooded with films that are diverse in content and uneven in quality. Let us give entrepreneurs their due: they were quick to react to the audience's demands. Even now, while state outfits carry about 1,000 titles, the unofficial market has some 10,000. Both new and old films, such as "The Sound of Music," "Romeo and Juliet," "West Side Story" and Chaplin's works, are available in that market.

[Question] It seems, then, that video entrepreneurs help satisfy pent-up demand for quality art, right? Why should they be punished?

[Answer] They do not help at all, but live off unsatisfied demand, profiting by it. Note that we have not yet mentioned commercial aspects of their business. This is a separate subject. Those who did the study were concerned with its social aspects. In the minds of many, the black market still implies only exchange or sale of pornographic or antisoviet materials. Yet, criminal charges for producing such materials may be brought on several counts. The first one is speculation. It is difficult to prove it in the case of the video market. The seller buys an clean tape and sells it with a film copied to it; in other words, it implies a certain investment of labor. The second issue is dissemination of pornography, violence and antisoviet films. Here, too, special problems arise. What was considered antisoviet yesterday is published

openly today. Violence? If there is desire to find it, its elements can be found practically in any action drama. Nor are there any generally accepted criteria, either legal or aesthetic, that provide a clear definition of pornography.

In these circumstances practically any tape could be considered criminal. Locally, special commissions used to be set up in which professional experts were rarely included. In some cases they were comprised of a representative of the police, a gynecologist and a librarian. Their decisions were enough to bring criminal charges against individuals. To avoid such situations, we need to develop strict legal criteria and at last define precisely the above-mentioned terms. This can be done only by experts: art and movie critics, film directors and sociologists. An index of banned films should be published. If this is done, it may be possible to protect other films, ones that are true works of art, from being manhandled by incompetents invested with authority. This is the only rational policy with respect to the unofficial market.

[Question] But let us not view consumers of videos as a passive element. It is their demand that explains the availability of such assorted products on the market.

[Answer] The survey showed that among viewers watching videos for less than a year, there are indeed many of those who express a heightened interest in films that are, to put it mildly, atypical for our state video industry. By this I mean unbridled eroticism, action dramas and bloody horrors. Naturally, they would not think of going to video stores for tapes of this sort. Yet, in their second or third year, owners of video cassette recorders usually become more selective and begin to look for true masterpieces of cinema. They watch movie classics and music videos; jazz, opera and chamber music are also quite popular. Incidentally, Western experts have noted that thanks to video, movie classics are enjoying a revival. The same process is under way here: at state stores, people rent best Soviet feature films and documentaries, as well as educational programs made in this country. As to most popular films, they are the true masterpieces of world cinema: M. Forman's "One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest" and "Amadeus," B. Fosse's "All That Jazz" and others."

[Question] But you must move quickly to satisfy this demand; otherwise, black market entrepreneurs will once again best you.

[Answer] The survey revealed the mechanism whereby the interest for this or that film is generated. Knowing this, we are seeking ways to influence viewers. Take for instance the film "Gone with the Wind," made in 1939. Demand for it increased in this country when the new edition of the book by American writer Margaret Mitchell was published. The black market lost out, since it did not have this information. The conclusion is that we should use information more aggressively. Now, people buy cassettes judging them by their titles. Occasionally,

the name of the star or the director is familiar to the viewer. Any description of the subject or a review could serve as a promotion. Our goal is to make the audience more cultured and better educated in cinema. We plan to publish information on films that may be worth seeing.

[Question] Some think that with the introduction of a special device that prevents films from being copied off the tape, the problem of the black market will disappear.

[Answer] Unfortunately, this is not so. In the West, attempts have been made to introduce this device. Tapes equipped with it went on sale for \$50, compared to \$80 for regular ones. The result was that people were buying the more expensive ones. In America, they explain this by people's desire to have freedom of information. They claim that nothing good would come out of bans.

[Question] And yet, they slap enormous fines for copying cassettes. And in some countries, those who do this can even go to jail.

[Answer] This is a different story. Commercial use of video tapes is defined as video piracy. A spot check of 350 video stores in Tokyo showed that 250 of them used pirated tapes, ones which had been copied illegally and from the production of which no royalties had been paid to original producers. In this country, too, entertainment organizations sometimes rent or buy video tapes retail and show them commercially, pocketing all the revenues without paying the requisite royalties to "Videofilm." Yet, producing a video tapes requires a large investment. For now, the stumbling block is the lack of legal regulations. Currently, we are trying to resolve this question in VAAP, which maintains that the films we produce or buy are our property and therefore we are entitled to proper compensation.

[Question] You do not have to be a psychologist to understand the attraction of video piracy.

[Answer] Yes, it is true. Our goal is to create a competitive state enterprise able to offer a respectable selection of videos to the consumer. "Videofilm" was established 2 years ago. Before that one entity produced films while another handled distribution. Now everything will be brought together under one roof. "Videofilm" is setting up a dozen studios to produce feature, documentary and children's films, as well as cartoons, educational programs, music videos, etc. Currently, domestic as well as foreign movies are first filmed and then taped on cassettes; now they will be made directly in video. We have set up a purchasing board that will formulate an independent policy and will be able to buy whatever films it thinks fit. Most likely those films will not be distributed to movie theaters or shown in public.

[Question] And what about financing?

[Answer] Our organization will soon switch to self-financing. The state has funded "Videofilm" only for the initial phase. We will have a strong interest in purchasing films that will bring us profits. In this case, buying a film simply because it is cheap would no longer make sense.

In addition, a growing number of amateurs have emerged making independent videos. Some works are extremely interesting. We intend to support such people by all possible means. We are planning to sponsor an independent film festival and will try to develop ties with the most talented directors. In short, we will do everything to help video lead a normal life, without criminal overtones.

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Media's Right of Access to Law Enforcement Proceedings Discussed

18000617 Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
20 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Ya. Nagnoyny, deputy UkSSR procurator: "What Is the Press Permitted"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The broadening of glasnost is lifting the veil from more and more areas of our life. The courts, procuracy, and internal affairs organs are no longer a zone that cannot be criticized. But there are still many complexities in the mutual relations of the press and law enforcement agencies, and there are also restrictions. E. Logvin, head of the department of propaganda and communist indoctrination of RABOCHAYA GAZETA, asked Ya. Nagnoyny, deputy UkSSR procurator, to respond to a series of questions that interest not just journalists but also, as the editorial mail testifies, a broad range of readers.

Here are the questions.

1. It is customary to think that the press cannot write about any crime or criminal case before the court has delivered its verdict. Is there in our laws a statute that prohibits treatment in the press of cases that have not been concluded with a court verdict? What are the legal norms here?

2. Court sessions are normally open for "outside" visitors. Each person who attends such a session is free to "take away" all the information he has heard there. Why have there been numerous incidents with journalists who were forbidden to make notes in court? What legal grounds are there for this? And finally, if information from the courtroom can be freely disseminated by spoken word, and often in the form of rumors and fabrications, then why can't it be disseminated through the press? After all, publication, and especially in the atmosphere of glasnost, does not mean, as it did in unhappy times, delivery of a verdict. So why not publish an objective story of the case in the press?

3. The press recently has had broad discussions of cases where lawful procedures were violated during the investigation. One measure proposed to prevent this is to allow the lawyer access to the file in the investigative stage. In such a situation it is possible that employees of the information media could also have access to the materials from the investigation?

4. Finally, concerning the system of "secrecy." Looking at the way things are, law enforcement organs and other institutions that have nothing at all to do with national defense and state secrets construct a fence of "secrecy" and inaccessibility to the press around themselves, and are not averse to shielding themselves from these "pesky" journalists with a departmental barrier and creating a zone free of criticism. So shouldn't law enforcement organs themselves set an example of openness before society?

The fresh wind of restructuring and the broadening of glasnost have opened up a stream of vital thinking in the mass information media. Indeed, under current conditions there are no zones in the party, state, or society that are closed to criticism, and the law enforcement organs, in particular the procuracy, are not an exception. There have been many critical publications. As a rule they are objective, well-founded, and are permeated with a desire to eliminate violations of the laws and the citizens' rights and interests they protect. The law enforcement organs of the Belorussian SSR, Odessa and Voroshilovgrad Oblasts in the Ukraine, and a number of other regions of the country have been seriously criticized in the central press. From these publications we procuracy employees draw lessons and do everything possible to see that there are no violations of legality in the organs that supervise compliance with the law by all persons, regardless of position and status in society. Why conceal it—the relaxation of discipline in our society in the 1970's and early 1980's also touched the employees of law enforcement organs. Restructuring in our ranks means, above all, restructuring our minds and way of thinking and instilling personnel with a protective and respectful attitude toward the law and people's fates.

As the resolution of the 19th party conference observes, a broad legal reform is to be carried out in the country in the near future. Among its paramount tasks are a fundamental increase in the role of the activity of court agencies in indoctrinating people, rigorous compliance with democratic principles in legal proceedings, and in particular enlarging the capabilities of the defense in criminal cases. In this connection some journalists feel that, along with expanding the rights of lawyers, employees of the press should also be given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the materials of the investigation before it is complete. Otherwise, in their opinion, the information loses its timeliness and the possibility of preventing judicial mistakes can be unrealized. But it should be observed that the lawyer is one thing, and the journalist is something else. They cannot be equated.

The lawyer is a participant in the proceeding, a professional who has devoted his activity to giving legal help to citizens and to defending against the declared accusation. The group of persons given the right of access to a criminal file is strictly delineated by law and will hardly be expanded.

A representative of the press can have access to the materials of a criminal file before it is heard in court on an individual case basis with the permission of the investigator, procurator, and judge. There are cases where newspapers report on the facts of crimes that have been committed and criminal cases that are under investigation. Such reports should be purely informational, without predetermining the guilt or innocence of particular person in advance. For example, a number of newspapers and journals (PRAVDA of 29 April 1988) recently published materials about the USSR Procuracy's display of valuables confiscated during investigation of the cases of bribery by a number of officials in the Uzbek SSR. In February of this year the Union and republic press published a report by the Kiev Oblast procuracy on a certain V. P. Andreychenko. Andreychenko is accused of gaining the trust of elderly people in 17 oblasts of the UkSSR, 5 oblasts of the RSFSR, and Krasnodar Kray; she would then give them sleeping pills and steal their property. More than 150 cases were established, and 19 persons died.

The resolution of the 19th party congress entitled "Legal Reform" especially stresses the need to observe the presumption of innocence unconditionally, and notes that "it is necessary to raise the authority of the court, ensure the absolute independence of judges and their subordination only to the law, and define specific measures of responsibility for interfering in their activity and for disrespect to the court," and to preclude any pressure on procurators or interference in their work. No manifestation of localism or protectionism will be tolerated. But certainly, press statements before the verdict is delivered are nothing else but interference in the professional activity of the court and the investigative organs. Analysis shows that it is in precisely such cases that journalists make the most mistakes, and sometimes they try to exert direct pressure on the investigation and court. There are plenty of examples of this. Let us refer to one of them. The newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 5 January of this year published a plainly biased report, entitled "Without Witnesses," supposedly about flagrant violations of legality by certain internal affairs workers in Denpropetrovsk Oblast in relation to Barvinskiy, a college student and Komsomol member. The author reported to readers that the Barvinskiy case had "again come to a dead end. There is no evidence." By this time the investigation had established that the "hero" of the newspaper story had stolen a tape recorder from his commanding officer while serving in the Soviet Army, and that he was convicted by a military tribunal and expelled from the Komsomol. Upon admission to the institute he concealed his criminal record and the real reason for his exclusion from the Komsomol, and

later with an accomplice committed a series of thefts from private cars in Dnepropetrovsk. This article was published a day before the court trial began.

A study of the case at the UkSSR Procuracy found no grounds to appeal the verdict of the rayon peoples court. There was no confirmation of the statement by the reporter and by Barvinskiy that the latter had been beaten by militia workers. The editors were compelled to print a retraction, although it was written with qualifications and incomplete statements. The editors themselves admit that they received more than 1,500 reader responses to the article "Without Witnesses." After all, people are used to believing the printed word, but here it proved to be unreliable.

Under the Constitution of our state no one can be found guilty of committing a crime or sentenced to punishment except by a court verdict and in accordance with the law. This is the cornerstone of the justice system, the presumption of innocence. This principle precludes publicly recognizing someone as guilty of committing a crime before the verdict is delivered.

Despite this, some journalists act in conflict with the requirements of the law. In 1986-1987 the newspaper RADYANSKA OSVITA published the articles "Crimes without a Perpetrator," "Perpetrator without a Crime," and "An Unfinished Story" by non-staff reporter A. Sugak, telling about the supposedly unlawful conviction of I. V. and Ye. I. Fedchenko. In addition the author stated that the peoples judge of the Zhmerinka City Peoples Court regularly takes bribes and that the Zhmerinka transportation procurator abuses alcohol. The facts were served up to the reader as genuine and accompanied with unceremonious and insulting comments about employees of the procuracy and court. After a thorough and comprehensive inspection the UkSSR Procuracy and the UkSSR Ministry of Justice reported to the Ministry of Education that the newspaper's report was mistaken. Ultimately the editor of the newspaper was released from his position in connection with this, and the written retraction states that the editorial offices have renounced working with A. Sugak. But how much time and energy was spent to check on A. Sugak's scribblings! And what a loss there was to the newspaper's reputation!

In this way some journalists try to decide on their own questions which are within the jurisdiction of the preliminary investigation and then are decided by the judge and peoples assessors as a body according to the rules of judicial procedure.

Glasnost is a very important constitutional principle of our legal system. The doors of the courtroom are always open to those who wish to attend a criminal or civil trial. There are no exclusions here, just as there are no prohibitions on taking notes for a person who is attending the trial. The law does not contain such provisions. Even in those cases where a closed session is being

conducted for reasons of protecting state secrets or information about intimate aspects of the lives of participants in the case, the verdict is announced publicly. In civil procedure the only exception is made for paternity suits. Thus, no one has the right to prohibit a journalist from writing an article or essay about any court trial or from access to the materials in the file itself after the decision or verdict of the court has gone into effect.

I would not want, however, for the reader to form the opinion that we procuracy employees have a hostile attitude toward materials in the press. We are for glasnost too. Many publications appear as the result of cooperation between journalists and employees of law enforcement organs. Often the employees of these organs themselves write them. It should be noted that under the law (Article 94 of the USSR Code of Criminal Procedure) a report published in the press that contains a reference to the existence of a crime may be the occasion and grounds for starting a criminal case, after appropriate checking, of course. In recent times there have been frequent published reports of violations during the investigative process. We are sorry to say that violations still have not been completely eliminated. It must be kept in mind here that we ourselves are correcting and eliminating them. No one will release an improperly arrested person except the procurator; no one can reverse an unjust verdict except a higher-ranking court.

We are not trying to cover up violations and shortcomings in the activity of law enforcement organs. The essential point is not to cover up, but to eliminate the violations and take steps to see that they are not repeated.

Some people think that the work of procuracy organs is surrounded by a fence of "secrecy," and protected against journalists by departmental barriers. It should be noted that in our state a procedure has been established for every department to preserve official secrets and this procedure can hardly be rejected completely, although a great deal of information that was not divulged before is now open to the press and the public. For example, court statistics have been published; formerly they were a closely guarded secret. As for giving journalists access to documents of the procuracy at different levels—rayon, city, oblast, and republic—no one simple answer can be given. In some cases citizens sending letters and petitions to the procurator entrust him with aspects of their personal life that they have a right to expect will not be available to glasnost. After all, in our country the privacy of correspondence is protected by law. At the same time the results of inspections, for example of compliance with labor law at a particular enterprise or organization, compliance with environmental protection law, production of defective goods by a particular enterprise, or other matters, plus violations that are discovered together with the procurator's response, are subject to glasnost and are reported in labor collectives. Employees of the press too may have access to such materials.

If I were asked how journalists should write under contemporary conditions I would answer—honestly and truthfully, relying on accurate and indisputable facts. In my opinion those employees of the press are wrong who think that it is their job to write and let others whose job it is figure things out. We, the press and the law enforcement organs, should have a common position on this matter: accuse a person of violating the law only on the basis of proven objective and undisputed evidence.

I do not think anyone will disagree that court sketches have become a very common form of publication. All the newspapers and journals are running them, regardless of their specializations and orientations. Isn't this happening because everyone knows about the work of the law enforcement organs just like they do, for example, about soccer? Such material is comparatively easy to write and reads well, especially if it is written in a catchy style. This means that it helps enlarge the newspaper's circulation. But this is ultimately the concern of editorial offices, of journalists. That is not the point here. We cannot help but be alarmed that the newspapers and journals are running more and more unreliable articles, including ones about the work of the procuracy, courts, and internal affairs organs. PRAVDA (17 June 1988) in an editorial warns that this is intolerable, as do readers in their letters. Indeed, there have been cases where after unreliable information was published a court decision was reached that refuted it, but the editorial office did not publish a retraction. This is not only disrespect for the court, but also disrespect for the requirements of the law and for the people who are hurt by the unreliable publication.

A USSR Law on the Press is in preparation at the present time. We need it very much. We hope that all aspects of the activity of the mass information media will be regulated; this is especially important today, in the period of restructuring. One can hardly agree with the opinion of some comrades who think that no measures of disciplinary accountability should be applied to journalists for mistakes in their work. There is no sector of socially useful activity in our life where a person does not answer for his actions. The Law on the Press should clearly define the rights and duties of those who write and those who print their writings and it should establish the degree of accountability for incorrect professional actions. All this would increase the accountability of editorial boards, promote better work by the editorial offices of newspapers and journals, and enhance the value of the printed word.

Of course, procuracy organs will defend journalists equally and according to the law against insult and persecution for criticism and will do everything possible to help them perform their official and public duty.

Restructuring of Pioneer Organization Advocated
18000602 Moscow PRIVDA in Russian 2 Aug 88 p 3

[Article by I. Zarakhovich and T. Trukhacheva, journalists, and Ye. Sokolova, member, Central Council Buro, All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni Lenin: "Heirs... Without Rights. The Pioneer Organization: Seeking Its Own Path"]

[Text] One of the "Artek" groups held a meeting of pioneers and leaders with Viktor Ivanovich Mironenko, 19th Party Conference delegate, Komsomol Central Committee first secretary. The delegate's story of events at the Palace of Congresses was listened to attentively. Although he was very thorough, he did not satisfy the children's interest in the conference. Questions, both oral and written, were asked about the times, about the changes taking place in society, and about the most important thing for those gathered at this meeting—the future of their own organization. Several times the meeting leaders asked the children: "Perhaps, it is about time to sleep? It is night. Shall we break it up?..." "Nooooo..."—rolled out the response.

"What do you think, Viktor Ivanovich, will the Komsomol become a true leader?" "Tell us what was said about us at the 19th Party Conference! And about our gathering in Artek?"

Then suddenly: "What do we need this pioneer organization for in general? It is really not necessary."

Where did this come from? Why is there such a disturbance in the minutes? Why the dissatisfaction?

Because, as the teenagers explained, for them the organization had ceased being that which they had heard about from veterans, that about which the songs, poems and tales were made. It had ceased being a friendly and strict family, where it was good to dream, work and travel together. The children feel alienated from the organization. Many of them are not interested in it. Being in an organization where there is no real work corrupts them morally. After all, very often the organization's activities are contrived. The parading and pomposness, foisted upon them by adults and not inherent in children, have become a constant part of pioneer life. Personality is being lost in high-flown praises and the beating of battle drums. What is the solution?

Upon reading the 19th Party Conference resolution closely, we find lines reflecting the relationship of the party and society to social organizations.

"The reform of the political system presumes the restructuring of its most important units, such as social organizations. Trade unions, the Komsomol, cooperatives, women's, veterans' and other organizations, which reflect the interests and aspirations of various strata of

Soviet society, contribute to the formation of party and state internal and foreign policy, in which the interests of all our people are organically united."

The Young Pioneer organization is not specifically named. Most likely, this is because the Komsomol was named and that is sufficient in itself. After all, the party has entrusted the leadership of children's and teen-agers' organizations precisely to the Komsomol. Moreover, in the program adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress, among the first-priority tasks of the Union of Youth, it was noted that henceforth the party will increase the Komsomol's role in the upbringing of our teen-age successors and in improving the work of the Pioneer organization.

Traditionally, the Pioneer organization is represented in the social consciousness as a children's (in the last resort, a children's and teen-agers') organization. It is thought that since children have no citizen's rights, then, even united, they cannot lay claim to full rights in society.

Perhaps, this is because its role began to be viewed only in combination with the school and teaching, starting in the 1930s when it was "transplanted" from the plants and factories to the schools.

Perhaps...

There are many possible explanations. Meanwhile, however, the Pioneer organization has dropped out of the overall concept of restructuring.

This is because, in the 1930s, the pre- and postwar decades so consistently and firmly promoted within society the process of splicing the children's independent communist organization together with a state institution—the school. This is because the unification of children within circles conformed more to the period of the cult, since society needed an obedient personality that agrees with everything, devoid of truly democratic views and spirit and of bold revolutionary aspirations.

This is because the institution of the children's communist movement, created by N.K. Krupskaya, was in fact destroyed, since the development of a theory of a children's communist organization as an aspect of the theory of scientific communism was unnecessary or, more accurately, harmful to Stalinism.

This is because virtually all schools for Pioneer leaders were closed, since skilled cadres of political leaders were able to a significant extent to ensure the independence and revolutionary spirit of the children's organization.

Finally, this is because, beginning in the 1930s, a sharp decline occurred in the party's attention to the Pioneer organization. The study and development of long-term prospects for its activity were halted, since absolute formulas for upbringing had been found in the form of mottoes: "Be prepared to struggle for the work of

Lenin—Stalin!" Among the traditional, colorful symbols, a portrait was printed of the leader with a girl in his arms, subsequently orphaned because of the arbitrariness of power in the years of the cult. Less and less space was left for Lenin's idea that an organization for children is the best way to bring up communards.

Right now, we are not concerned with all the subsequent stages of the history of the organization for young Leninists, in each of which the dialectical processes of societal development were refracted in its fate. No matter how much the organization itself, the children and the Young Pioneer leaders strived for renovation, for a rebirth of their age-old revolutionary and political essence, no matter how much truly significant work they accomplished, they have not managed to fix the irreparable damage inflicted on the Pioneer organization.

The Pioneer organization is going through a difficult time now, if not to say a crisis. The tempestuous processes of renovation in the country have deeply touched the hearts of children and have troubled the souls of their adult friends. The Young Pioneers want to live in a new way. They want to independently choose what they will do and where they will help out. Like adults, they want to see the results of their own work and manage their own funds, earned through honest collective labor, themselves. They are fed up with depending on casual, at times incompetent and uninterested leaders, and would happily pursue subjects which they themselves choose. The obviously obsolete structural framework, which still forces children from the same class to be combined in a detachment, is cramped for them. They are bursting beyond the limits of the school. In short, they want a great deal. These aspirations of theirs were heard at "Artek" and were reflected in the suggestions expressed at the Pioneer conference there. However, unfortunately, here life confirms that internal forces are insufficient. We must change society's attitude toward the organization for young Leninists. Where do these conclusions come from? Let us give our arguments.

Today, there are 20 million Young Pioneers and 13 million Octobrists in the organization, led by almost 100,000 full-time Pioneer leaders and tens of thousands of workers in Pioneer palaces, houses and camps.

In our country and throughout the world the All-Union Pioneer Organization is known as a fellowship of young internationalists, who are always ready (and have proven this readiness several times) to respond to any misfortune and suffering of their foreign coevals and their fathers, and to fight alongside adults for the preservation of peace on earth. There are many examples of this in history and in the present day.

An original political program is expressed in the rules of the young Leninists.

All of this exists without any strained interpretations at all. However...

On the basis of what principles can the council chairman of a Pioneer organization at any level, beginning with the rayon and city and ending with the Central Council, enter into business contacts with agencies of Soviet power, trade unions, organizations and departments, financial institutions, etc.? Whom does he represent? In the legal sense—no one. Only the Komsomol has the right to represent the interests of the pioneer organization. This complicates life and in no way promotes the growth of Pioneer authority.

On the basis of what principles are relations between the detachment and the school structured? What can the Pioneer organization lay claim to in the school, when nothing there belongs to it? Neither the time, the place, nor the right, so to speak. The detachment needs to meet at assemblies, but there is a room system in the school and the children have nowhere to go. A group was holding an agitation team contest, but the assembly hall was busy. A hiking trip was planned, but the gym instructor would not let them use the tents, for which he was personally responsible. The detachment intended to send its own suggestions for restructuring the organization, but the classroom teacher did not agree with them. Little things? Not at all. This constant dependency is, more precisely, a lack of rights, or even more precisely, a formal existence.

The Young Pioneer leaders and extracurricular institution worker cadres are under the auspices of the State Committee on National Education. Young Pioneer camp cadres (yes, even the camps themselves) are under the auspices of trade unions. The television and radio programs are directed by the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. The Young Pioneer organization councils and its press cadres are under the Komsomol Central Committee. The budget? It does not exist as such. The point is not only that all of these different social organizations and state establishments cannot or do not want to join forces toward a common goal—the upbringing of fighters for the party's work, the heirs to our communist ideals. The point is that there is essentially nothing to unite for. Currently, the Central Council of the All-Union Pioneer Organization, unfortunately, is not recognized as an agency enjoying full authority on a legal level, because it itself is not recognized as an organization. In many respects this is predetermined by the fact that the same process of governmentalization, which the party had essentially cautioned against, has occurred with the Young Pioneer organization. The 19th Party Conference resolution, which noted the need to democratize the life of social organizations, to increase their independence and responsibility and to decisively overcome shortcomings, such as over-organization, formalism and the weakening of independent principles, offers much hope in this plan.

The fact that the many new shoots of morality, which have sprung up in society or, the whole since April '85, have arisen at various times in the Young Pioneer organization and testify to its healthy moral base, offers

hope as well. Really, is not the Timur Movement, the aid and sympathy for families of the deceased and orphaned children, imbued with a genuine spirit of charity? It is another matter, why and into what this movement was later transformed, and in which form it now exists. Really, during the most difficult times of the "cold war," did they not find a common language with the children of other social worlds at the cross-roads of the Artek Pioneer Camp? It is another matter, that today these Pioneer roads ought to be joined with the most diverse children's and youth movements for peace, that they ought to become a rightful part of national diplomacy. Really, did not the Young Pioneer organization start the "Beautify Our Homeland With Gardens!" movement for the destroyed postwar land? Did it not send out its green and blue patrols? It is another matter, that today it must once again seek out and at times insist upon its rights in the common struggle to preserve the surrounding environment. Really, was not this organization of children

and teen-agers the first to experience such a new phenomena, as collective relaxation in Young Pioneer camps, where both happiness of contact, useful labor, campfire romanticism and sports were combined together? It is another matter what life in these camps has now become.

"The future belongs to the children—this is a 'law of nature.' Let me remind you that the Young Pioneers are our successors, a reserve, the legitimate heirs to all that has been done and is being done," wrote A.M. Gorkiy in his day. "A socialist state cannot be brought into being if the children are not socialists. I hope that this does not require proof."

Back then, almost 60 years ago in 1929, in the opinion of the great proletarian writer, this truth was indisputable. Does it require proof today?

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Biologist on Costs of Pollution Control Measures
18300381a Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 23, Jun 88 p 21

[Interview with A. Yablokov, biologist, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA correspondent A. Valeney: "Sunday Will Be Too Late..."]

[Text] **No one can name the day on which our environment—land, water and air—became sick. Immediate treatment is needed, though, and not just the doctoring of existing sores. We need to prevent future illnesses. This is the subject of an interview by our correspondent A. Valeney with A. Yablokov, biologist, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and one of the leading specialists in the area of environmental protection.**

[Question] To begin with, Aleksey Vladimirovich, I would like to know specifically what is meant by ecological literacy.

[Answer] My brief answer to that question would be that it is the observance of four laws which were defined long ago: everything is interconnected; everything has to go somewhere; nature knows best; nothing is free.

[Question] Unfortunately, our actions run counter to logic. No one would say, after all, that nature does not need to be protected, but in fact managers and entire industries place their departmental interests ahead of the need of mankind and of our people for a clean environment, ahead of the health of people, which is just what new enterprises and electric power plants should be built and plans should be compiled for.

[Answer] One could not disagree with that. I would add only that ecological illiteracy entails also economic illiteracy. One should take a concerned look at the experience of the developed capitalist nations, which passed through "Dante's circles" of ecological hell ahead of us and whose reality has forced them to derive the proper conclusions.

We have placed on our agenda today the matter of developing extremely reliable means of cleaning up harmful waste. The developed capitalist nations also went through this... and fell into an economic trap. The cost of modern purification facilities can exceed 30 percent of the cost of the enterprise itself. The most important thing, however, is the fact that this path is unpromising from the economic standpoint. I share the viewpoint of Academician Boris Nikolayevich Laskorin, who maintains that the problems of protecting the environment can only be thoroughly solved with revolutionary new technologies: waste-free or low-waste production processes. This would make super-capacity purification facilities unnecessary. Japan, which has basically dealt

with the problem of water and air pollution, is combatting more and more vigorously... urban noise and other problems which are still not so acute from our standpoint.

[Question] But is it really necessary to pass through those "Dante's circles" of ecological hell in order to become more intelligent and literate? Take, for example, the attempt to increase crop yields with the extensive application of pesticides. It would seem clear that this is not the way to go, that it is not worth deliberately making an error in order to learn from it.

[Answer] Indeed. The application of pesticides has catastrophic consequences directly affecting our lives, yours and mine. Even the biologists have long known that chemical plant protection is unpromising. We shall never rid ourselves of either pests or weeds by taking this false path. On the contrary, they rapidly adapt and even increase.

That is not the worst of it, however. Pesticides in any, even insignificant, concentrations weaken the organism's immune system. And what is even more horrifying, it has a damaging effect upon homo sapiens' holy of holies, his genes. The result is that deficient man will give birth to like offspring. This needs to be stated frankly, hiding nothing "between the lines."

Incidentally, we have many farms which get along perfectly well without pesticides and obtain fine yields.

[Question] The flooding of land in the construction of hydroelectric power plants is also among the ecological problems. The USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification insists on having things its own way, justifying everything by the shortage of electric power in the nation. There is no arguing with this. There is a shortage. But there are also alternative sources of electric power: thermal plants, wind-driven units, small and undammed GES's. You will agree that there are no findings to justify the construction of the Turukhan GES, for example. Its reservoir will flood practically all of Evenkia, and its water will possibly be more saline than that of the Black Sea. Incidentally, the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification is trying to gain a monopoly on the expert examination of plans for most of its hydroelectric facilities. It appears to me that the ministry leadership is interpreting the democratization of our society and glasnost in its own way.

[Answer] Power engineering is a touchy ecological issue. It is not clear when our power engineers will begin taking world trends into account in their work. The developed nations of the West are gradually abandoning the construction of huge plants of any type, which are ecologically inexpedient.

The USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] is now planning to build several dozen GES's. They will be built on practically all of the nation's large,

still unregulated rivers. The ecologically adverse nature of this approach is obvious. One cannot evaluate everything just in terms of kilowatts. We cannot permit all of our rivers to be turned into a chain of reservoirs.

Incidentally, when the damage from the construction of GES's is calculated, ordinarily only the obvious, surface effects are taken into account. The timber on a hectare of forest to be flooded is assessed at 500 rubles, for example. This figure is entered into the proper document. But the scientists have assessed that same hectare in the central, European part of the nation at over 5,000 rubles—converted into terms of people's health, figuratively speaking.

I would cite yet another historical example. When Russia sold Alaska everyone thought that its main value lay in its gold. The gold is practically all gone there now, however. The American experts have calculated that the fish and furs obtained there during all the intervening time have considerably exceeded the value of Alaska's gold. There is no gold there now, however, nor will there be, but fish and wild animal furs will always be obtained.

Now sable will not be hunted in a flooded Yenisey taiga, and the regal fish will not be caught there....

[Question] And what about the Katun GES, for which the Minenergo and its Gidroproyekt [All-Union Planning, Surveying and Scientific Research Institute] "are fighting" so hard? In order to dampen the passions, the designers speak only of it, although on paper they have already outlined "bright prospects" for an entire series of electric power plants. And we now know that a regulated Katun could easily be poisoned by mercury compounds. It flows through a mercury zone, after all. As an alternative to the Katun GES the scientists and specialists propose thermal plants using Kansk-Achinsk coal, with the thorough cleanup of gas and smoke emissions. And wind-driven facilities combined with undammed GES's are entirely suitable for the remote regions of Gornyy Altay (and for other regions as well).

Strange as it seems, however, the hydroelectric power engineers maintain that "a series" of wind turbines are less ecologically feasible, because wind turbines occupy more area than reservoirs with the same capacity.

[Answer] I remember seeing wind-driven electric power plants in Holland. Do you know what amazed me about them? No, it was not their large size. It was something fundamental. They had an aura of hopeful prospects for mankind. With respect to the area they occupy, everyone knows that land is valued in Holland as nowhere else. They wrest it from the sea there.

Incidentally, EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA has written about the possibility of erecting undammed GES's on the swift-flowing rivers of Gornyy Altay, and about the first experiment. One has been conducted. They operate all over Sweden, producing electric power.

[Question] Well organized expert examination by a group of highly qualified specialists in various fields is expected to protect nature. Is that not so?

[Answer] It would be difficult to overstate the role of the commission of experts. In July of 1985 the USSR Supreme Soviet decreed that mandatory, expert ecological examination be established for new equipment, technologies and materials, as well as for plans for the construction, reconstruction or technical reequipment of national economic facilities. I stress the fact that this is to be state expert ecological examination.

The same decree states that in resolving the problems of national economic development we must give "priority to protecting the health of present and future generations of Soviet people and creating the very best conditions for their lives, and focus scientific and technological progress on this."

[Question] These are fine words. But how is it that they do not fit in with the praxis of a number of ministries and departments? Take that giant of the land reclamation workers, the Volga-Chorgay Canal, for example. I am familiar with the negative findings reached by the commission chaired by Aleksandr Leonidovich Vanshin, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences....

[Answer] Yes, the opinion was not unqualified. The plan is economically unjustified and ecologically dangerous. Construction must be halted.

[Question] But the planners are continuing the project and have dug up a stretch of 180 kilometers already (one third the length of the canal), damaging pasturelands. The specialists assess the damage at 100 million rubles, no more and no less.

[Answer] Unfortunately, the recommendations from the public expert ecological examination conducted by a group of concerned scientists were ignored by the departments. The scientists were supported by the party Central Committee. The commission's conclusions were not respected, it is now apparent.

[Question] We know that the authors of ecologically dangerous projects say the following: "You are against scientific and technological progress...."

[Answer] This discussion actually demonstrates that the ecologists are voting with both hands for scientific and technological progress but speaking out resolutely against technocratic progress. These are two separate concepts. Every project absolutely must be thoroughly discussed. Let there be debate. But let the final conclusion not be written—and this is practically always the case today—as dictated by the department concerned.

I am convinced that we must have rigid party control in this matter. I remember how, not long ago, in accordance with a decree passed by the party and the government, work was halted on the reversal of a part of the flow of northern and Siberian rivers. Just what are the more than 20,000 people who worked on the "project of the century" doing today? The very same thing, working on "scientifically" based reversal projects.

[Question] I have read the manuscript of your book being readied for simultaneous publication here, by the Progress Publishing House, and in Sweden. You have in it a discussion with Rolf Edberg, a prominent Swedish public figure. Its underlying theme is that ecology is not the internal problem of one nation.

[Answer] Absolutely not. We are more closely linked ecologically with other nations and even other continents than many people imagine. Even pesticides sprayed somewhere in Africa are sometimes carried by air currents onto our territory.

[Question] The book contains the following statement: "I am sometimes frightened by what I know."

[Answer] Yes, frightened, because I can see what ecological illiteracy and ecological adventurism lead to. I have an obligation to use my knowledge, however, to help avoid new ecological mistakes. It is not too late. Incidentally, that is the title of my book: "V voskresenye budet pozdno" [Sunday Will Be Too Late].

And now let me cite something which is forcing us to do some serious thinking: "The victories of technology are being purchased, as it were, at a cost of moral degeneration. It seems that as mankind subjects nature to his will, people become slaves of other people or slaves to their own baseness." Karl Marx said this in 1856.

[Question] That sounds as though it had been said for us today. In connection with this, we have reported to the readers that the editorial board plans to set up a public ecological council under EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA. We plan to have it include prominent scientists and practical specialists. We see the public, ecological expert examination of plans and newly developed technologies and materials as one of its jobs. It is entirely possible to conduct the discussion publicly, on the pages of the weekly, with the involvement of all our readers.

[Answer] I would participate with pleasure in what, as far as I know, would be the first such public ecological council under a press organ.

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**Bela River Reservoir Construction Continues
Despite Ecology Concerns**
18300381b Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 7 Jun 88 p 2

[Report by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent M. Merzabekov under the rubric "Going Back to Something Previously Published": Ufa- Tolyatti: "The Project Is Impractical, But Construction Continues..."]

[Text] Last year SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA was already speaking out about the reservoir under construction on the

Bela River in the Bashkir ASSR ("At a Sick River," 17 Jul 87; "Why flood the River With Sea Water," 28 Oct 87). The overall theme of the articles was that the expediency of the construction project is doubtful from both the economic and the ecological standpoint. The editors appealed to the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ecology of the Volga Basin in Tolyatti to conduct an expert ecological examination of the plan for the reservoir. The Presidium of the Bashkir Republic Council of the All-Russian Society for Nature Protection made the same request of the institute. Half a year was spent studying the multi-volume plan. The findings of the expert examination were recently summarized by the institute's scientific council. Following is a report from that session.

S.M. Konovalov, doctor of biological sciences and institute director:

The expert ecological examination of large national economic facilities is basically a new thing in our nation. This work has still not been placed, one might say, onto a legal, organizational and methodological foundation. The objective of the expert examination was to answer two main questions: the possible effect of the facility upon man and nature, the extent to which the objectives for which it is being built are realistic. I turn the floor over to the speaker.

G.S. Rozenberg, doctor of biological sciences and chief scientific associate:

Experts at the Institute of Ecology of the Volga Basin of the USSR Academy of Sciences and specialists invited from other scientific establishments and educational institutions familiarized themselves with the technical and economic feasibility study (TEO) and the plan for the Bashkir Reservoir, as well as with the findings of an expert examination made by the RSFSR Gostroy, studied the opinion of community representatives and letters from workers, and arrived at the following conclusions.

The plan for the Bashkir Reservoir, with an estimated cost of 429 million rubles, was worked out by the Uzhgiprovodkhoz institute (Rostov-on-Don) and approved by the USSR Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources]. The authors proceeded from the forecast that production volume in Bashkiria's southern industrial region will increase 2.6-fold by the year 2010, the population 1.4-fold, and water consumption 1.3-fold, with highly contaminated run-off. The so-called comprehensive option was selected from the various alternatives for resolving the problem: to partially purify the water by diluting it with water from the reservoir and partially, by building new purification facilities. From this standpoint the purpose of the facility is defined as water protection. It involves the perennial regulation of the Bela's flow for purposes of improving its sanitary and hygienic state and increasing the water supply for consumers. This basis for the project is producing very important objections.

The forecast for the economic development of Bashkiria's southern industrial region was compiled prior to the promulgation of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Limiting Industrial Development in Large Cities." These include the cities of Salavat, Sterlitamak and Ishimbay in Bashkiria's southern industrial network. Industry and the population in that area will not grow rapidly and, naturally, there should be no great increase in water consumption. Furthermore, the prognosis does not take scientific and technological progress into account in any way. The plans call not only for Sterlitamak, for example, to consume 1.6-fold more water in the year 2010 than in 1990, but also for a reduction in the portion recycled. Conclusion: the forecast is based on the traditional, inefficient use of water resources, is oriented toward the "cost-is-no-object" management methods and does not take into account modern water recycling systems, water conserving technologies, water conservation by the population, and so forth, toward which the national economy must be oriented today. The planners did not take into account, for example, such things as the fact that during the past few years Nefteorgsintez in the city of Salavat has begun recycling 98 percent of the water it uses.

And so, no ecological and economic analysis has actually been made in the region, which casts doubt upon the economic feasibility study for the reservoir plan.

The plan and the statements by proponents of its implementation note that this is the world's only reservoir for nature protection designed to "dilute" run-off with pure water. The scientists, however, consider the concept of "diluting the run-off" to be baseless. This is precisely why there is no such reservoir in the world.

The authors of the project base their rejection of one of the alternatives for saving the river—the development of run-off purification facilities—with the assertion that this will cost twice as much, a billion rubles. The economic calculation is distorted: the cost of purification facilities is based on their operation for a period of 10 years; that of the dam, several centuries. Furthermore, the cost of the entire water protection system (the reservoir, purification facilities for the cities and forest restoration) amounts to 828 million rubles. Taking into account the 15-20-percent overruns, without which not a single project is built, however, the result will be the same, a billion rubles.

Finally, I would make the following comment. The statement in the main project document, "An adverse economic and ecological situation has developed as a result of the absence of regulation of water resources and the unsatisfactory sanitary state of the river, which are a major factor limiting the normal functioning and development of production forces in this region." is an embarrassment to the professional ecologist. How many times have we read that all of the problems of our rivers arise precisely from a lack of regulation? I would also

note that the "unsatisfactory sanitary state of the river" affects primarily the health of people. And this is the main ecological parameter! It comes ahead of the fact that the water besouled by enterprises becomes unsuitable for their own needs.

The forecast of water quality contained in the plan for the river's sections after the reservoir is filled are based on purification facilities no part of which even exist. It is easy to see that the planners are attempting to pass off what is desired as reality and generate advertisement for the reservoir. The problem of purification facilities has only been worked out at the level of the most generalized technical and economic feasibility study, however, and it will quite obviously take decades to complete the job.

One of the main arguments put forth by the authors of the plan is an acute shortage of water to meet the needs of industry and the population. What is the actual situation? According to data provided by UralNIIVodkhoz [Scientific Research Institute of Water Resources in the Urals?], the plan exaggerates water needs 1.4-fold and understates the river's available water by a factor of 2. How could such a blunder have been made? Quite simply: the forecast of water needs was based on the claims of enterprises, for which the more water there is, the better.... Or take the needs of the population. At the present time, 215 liters per day is used per person in cities along the middle part of the Bela, while the planners call for 550 liters by 1990 and 600 by the year 2010. An incredible spread!

In addition to this, when one looks at the water consumption chart, one sees that the largest consumer, along with industry, is the irrigation system. So this is what the reservoir is being built for! What is more, this purpose was not overly emphasized in the beginning. Money was requested for one thing, while something else entirely, it turned out, was being built. When the technical and economic feasibility study was approved in the 1980's, the request for irrigation purposes was modest: around 25 percent of the reservoir's capacity. Later, in the plan proper (1985), the appetite of the Minvodkhoz increased to 40 percent. And an annotation to the technical and economic feasibility study made out by the Southern Bashkir Irrigation System calls for the use for irrigation of 60 percent of the water used for national economic needs. Construction is calculated to take 25 years, and 160,000 hectares are to be irrigated. The projected cost is 997 million rubles. Why, by the way, is it not a billion? Because projects with a cost exceeding a billion rubles have to undergo expert examination by the USSR Gostroy. The extravagance might be detected there. Specialists familiar with the region's conditions have been drawn upon to study this part of the project.

F.Kh. Khaziyev, doctor of biological sciences and deputy director of the Biology Institute of the Bashkir Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Ural Department:

The expediency of developing an irrigated tract in areas adjacent to the West Urals is doubtful. It has been scientifically proven that irrigated crop cultivation is

economically advantageous only where the possibilities for dry farming have been exhausted. Just where have they been exhausted in Bashkiria? Nowhere! The low yields are not caused by inadequate moisture but by the low caliber of cultivation methods and the fact that little is done to apply soil protection measures, measures which at the same time conserve moisture. The irrigated cultivation of grain is economically unsuitable for Bashkiria.

G.F. Galimov, candidate of biological sciences and senior scientific associate with the Bashkir Division of the Scientific Research Institute for Water Management in the Urals:

Our studies have shown that irrigation of the chernozem has irreversible ecological effects. The soil is compacted down to great depth, and fertility is reduced by the leaching out of active components of the humus and by an increase in the content of acids and salts toxic to plants. On the Mayak Kolkhoz in Dyuryulinskij Rayon, for example, a saline stratum has formed beneath the arable chernozem layer after 5 years of irrigation. And it takes only 5 years of irrigation for the salinity to reach the surface in typical carbonaceous soil.

G.S. Rozenberg:

Construction of the reservoir will also result in the drying up of 60,000-100,000 hectares of usable flood-land. The general, gross assessment of a 20-25-percent drop in the output from those meadows would appear to be valid. In addition, 3,000 hectares of tilled land and 2,000 hectares of hayfields and pasture would also be flooded. Furthermore, while the plan assesses the loss from the flooding of land at 55 million rubles, the loss would actually reach 200 million based on the higher land prices which have been established.

The Bashkir Reservoir affects the entire natural system of the region. A unique phytocenological system is concentrated in this region, which would be disturbed by changing the climatic conditions.

M.V. Shustov, junior scientific associate:

This area is one of only a few in the Union with such uniqueness of natural conditions. The "Red Book for Bashkiria" lists up to 30 species of plants which grow in the construction area. The Shulgan-Tash State Preserve and the Bashkiria National Park, which were set up for purposes of protecting the unique natural treasures in the South Urals' system of mountain forests, are located in the vicinity. If the reservoir is built, many rare and priceless treasures of nature will be lost forever.

A.I. Kiryushin, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior scientific associate:

Has the opinion of the native people been considered? I feel that it is not too late to submit the project for general discussion in the region.

Vykhristyuk, candidate of geographical sciences and senior scientific associate:

The plan is based on the premise that the reservoir will silt up in 1,000 years. A comforting prediction! But why do we need projections, when we already have some bitter experience? It was also predicted that the Vakhsh Reservoir would fill up with silt in a thousand years, but the "prediction" has already come true—just 7-8 years later!

S.M. Konovalov, doctor of biological sciences and institute director:

In other countries project survey work accounts for up to 10 percent of the estimated cost of a project, while the figure is only 2-2.5 percent in our nation. The Bashkir reservoir is no exception. And this is what determines the quality of the planning. The expert ecological examination should be conducted prior to the planning stage, of course. As you know, our institute recently conducted an expert ecological examination of the Astrakhan Gas Condensate Complex, which was also built with too much haste. Roughly speaking, they first "drove the stakes" and "gave the green light" to the project, listing it in the Main Directions for one of the five-year plans. Those responsible for carrying out the project, equipped with only a chart and a pencil were given an extremely short deadline. The sad result: instead of a gas chemistry facility, we have only a gas complex. That is, it cannot thoroughly process the raw material.

The Scientific Council's Conclusion:

An analysis of the documents makes it possible to derive the following conclusions:

1. The plan lacks an in-depth, comprehensive ecological study of the long-range consequences of disturbing the natural ecosystems by building the Bashkir Reservoir.

2. It can be said that the project does not achieve its basic purpose of protecting nature. Doubt is cast upon the stated need to regulate the river's flow by the plan's significant exaggeration of the extent of the water shortage in the southern industrial region of the Bashkir SSR, even with the ideal implementation of the plan, the dilution of run-off will not solve the problem of water quality in the middle stretch of the Bela River; and finally, the proposed irrigation will not be economically productive (the same amount of land is to be irrigated as will be dried up by the construction of the reservoir) and will lower water quality in the Bela River basin. The plan is ecologically unsound.

3. The economic feasibility study for the project was based on a hypothesis of extensive industrial development. The economic feasibility study must be adjusted on the basis of the latest documents issued by the party and the government on nature protection.

4. A number of points in the project having to do with the hydrological and hydrobiological study of the situation and the effects on surface ecosystems require additional, in-depth work.

5. The USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute for Ecology of the Volga Basin recommends that construction of the Bashkir Reservoir be halted and that additional studies be made of alternative plans for improving the sanitary and hygienic state of the Bela River. (S.M. Konovalov, doctor of biological sciences and chairman of the scientific council; N.S. Tomilovskaya, candidate of biological sciences and scientific secretary to the council)

Our Correspondent's Postscript

When representatives of Bashkiria's community, most of them scientists, published the article "Why Flood the River With Sea Water?" in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, the USSR Minvodkhoz, as well as certain officials in the autonomous republic, pretended that nothing had happened. At the same time, lobbyists' statements cast doubt upon the competence of local scientists.... During the 6 months the expert examination was underway, however, work at the construction site was accelerated in every possible way, with a double shift set up.

Finally, we have the findings of the expert ecological examination. Not local and not departmental, but a scholarly examination. Nonetheless, it does not appear that the departments and responsible individuals, defending their position of wasteful handling of natural resources, intend to retreat. One has the impression that they are trying to immure as many millions as possible in the ground in order to "rule out the question" of halting construction.

"The train has left the station; the project cannot be halted now," Minister I.P. Budarov has declared.

"We have already applied 100 million rubles," came the echo from V.N. Gorzhanov, manager of the Bashgidrostroy Trust.

It could be put another way, however. Only 100 million rubles has been spent thus far. It would certainly be easier to lose that than half a billion.

State Committee Chairman on Forestry Ecology Issues

18300375a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Jun 88 p 1

[Interview with A.S. Isayev, academician, chairman of the USSR State Forestry Committee and delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, by N. Kharitonova, under the rubric "Today is World Environmental Protection Day": "The Green Profile of Life"]

[Text] Three months ago Aleksandr Sergeyevich Isayev could give the newspaper an interview as a scientist, academician, leading specialist on forest ecological systems and director of the Forestry and Timber Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Today he answers questions for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in a new capacity, as chairman of the USSR State Forestry Committee. It is only natural that a prominent scientist would be at the helm of the state agency during the restructuring of nature protection in our nation. World Environmental Protection Day is being commemorated today, and at our request Aleksandr Sergeyevich talks about the most urgent problems of interaction between man and the forest.

[Answer] It is good that we have such a celebration date on the calendar, but the news from nature is not very gratifying. The seas are growing shallower, fish are disappearing and everywhere there is soil erosion. We have now begun to discuss the crisis with the forest. The fact that a decision has been made in the nation fundamentally to restructure nature protection and that the USSR State Committee for Nature Protection has been established, as well as the new State Forestry Committee, inspires hope that we will succeed in halting this process.

Our nation has almost one quarter of the world's forest reserves. And 95 percent of this green area is in Russia. But what is its condition? Extremely lamentable, it should be frankly stated. This is particularly true of the oblasts in Central Russia, where the coniferous forests have practically been wiped out. Extremely valuable species of trees are being replaced by deciduous stands of low productivity. At the present rates of timber procurement we shall use the remaining forests up within 50-60 years. Compare this with the fact that it takes 100-120 years for them to be restored in these areas. This discrepancy marks us as poor managers. It is long since time to abandon also the myth of the limitless Siberian taiga. The effects of man's management there are even more disappointing. By failing to measure our procurement targets against the forest's capacities, we have essentially forgotten about our children and grandchildren.

The restructuring must fundamentally alter our attitude toward natural resources. Among other things, it has advanced forest protection to the ranks of the most important environmental protection problems. It is inadmissible to view forests as just cubic meters of

commercial lumber. Forests are not only a natural resource but also an extremely important part of the biosphere, which protects the soil, the water, the air, the animal world, and regulates all of nature's balances.

This is what dictated the line taken by our state of dealing with the forests in our national economic praxis primarily from an ecological standpoint and only in the second place, with an economic view. A special-purpose, comprehensive state program called Les is being developed and a research information center on timber resources in the USSR is being created for the first time in the nation's history. The data bank of the latter will be linked to an international information system on forests.

The monitoring functions of Goskomles [State Forestry Committee] have also been significantly increased. This involves the use of modern aerospace methods, the organization of nondepartmental monitoring, the author's monitoring of the observance of forestry development requirements and improvement of the battle against fires and pests. The positions of chief forest warden and chief state forestry inspector of the USSR are being established.

[Question] **But are we not traveling in a closed circle?** We learn about the fact that the forest is our treasure and must be protected in our primers, after all. Nonetheless, every 10 or 15 years we are informed that the situation with respect to the forests is deteriorating, which means that the battle for the forests has to be "intensified," "improved," "perfected"....

[Answer] Unfortunately, we do repeat ourselves in the slogans about "protecting the forests." They have recently turned out to be blank salvos.

How does what we are doing today differ from our previous actions? The timber use policy, as the main component, contains a vast program for correcting errors committed at various times, beginning in the '30s, when a large-scale offensive was carried out against the forests, and ending only recently. The "cost-is-no-object," gross-output system exhausted all types of forestry activities except felling operations. It, the felling, benefited from the image of an infinite and inexhaustible forest realm and the absence of accurate information on timber resources.

A modern timber policy requires primarily a constancy of timber use and evenly distributed felling over the nation's territory, not just near human habitation, as is the case today.

We can also save a great deal of forest if we learn how to use all of the procured lumber and stop building fences and containers out of valuable species, as we universally do—from Brest to Vladivostok. The structure of timber use is being very rigidly reviewed in the world today, and substitutes are even being proposed for paper production. Here, however, we use no more than 60 percent of

each felled tree, while the rest becomes waste. Our inability efficiently to process lumber places us in an extremely disadvantageous position in the world market. We export trainloads of first-grade logs at low prices and then pay through the nose for the products made of them.

Unapplied scientific developments constitute an enormous potential for the society with respect to making efficient use of timber. We have an impressive scientific system, with 22 scientific research institutes operating in the industry. Five academic forestry institutes and 17 VUZ's are working on forestry problems. Until recently, however, science has not properly influenced the forestry sector.

"Don't touch anything in nature!" is the primitive level of ecological thinking. A higher level calls for the efficient utilization of nature, which takes into account the powerful process of self-renewal of the forests and makes it possible to achieve a multifaceted effect—economic, social and, most important, ecological—without destroying this natural ecosystem.

[Question] **Still, getting back to the felling, which is depleting nature....** The saying is that "he who has the most rights is himself right." If the timber procurers continue to have the right to reckon with no one as they carry out their "development plans," will your plans not turn into schemes?

[Answer] How far the matter has progressed can be judged from the state of our timber management. The timber management agencies, which are designed to look after the interests of the forests, have switched their activities primarily to timber procurement. The forest warden has become a timber procurer! What could be worse? We have begun to lose an extremely valuable possession: the professional know-how of the specialists and their successive devotion to their noble job. Neglect of the profession of forest protection has been echoed in the personnel training system. Out of inertia attempts are still being made to reduce the number of people accepted into this special field and even to cut back on the training institutions themselves. The Voronezh Forestry Technology Institute had to be defended when the USSR State Committee for Public Education planned to merge it with a polytechnical institute. There were difficulties also at the Leningrad Forestry Technology Academy, where they wanted to restrict the number accepted into the forestry school.

Man's legal right to operate in the forest is one of the central issues of forestry policy. Right now, we are witnessing the birth of ecological law—both international law and the regulation of ecological matters within individual nations. It is designed to restrict the unlicensed rule of commercial competition in the long-term interest of a nation and of mankind as a whole.

The development of improved legal principles governing the use of the forest is our committee's prime task.

The new economic system opens up broad possibilities for balanced interaction between man and the forest. In the first place, it is planned to increase the payment per tree felled, which is five to ten times below that of other nations. In the second place, a statute is being drawn up on the leasing of forested areas. The State Forestry Committee will act for the state and lease forest to users on a long-term basis, with mandatory, scientifically based regulations governing the operations. The income from the leases is to provide for the implementation of environmental protection measures.

We feel that passage of the USSR Law on Cooperation opens up some interesting prospects. The thrift, efficiency and inventiveness demonstrated by the cooperatives in their operations are precisely the qualities which can ensure that efficient use is made of timber resources. The indiscriminate "cost-is-no-object" approach is inadmissible here, and the industrial procurers are guilty of this. Furthermore, a large-scale lumber industry can only operate in heavily forested areas—that is, on virgin forestlands. It is important today, however, for us to establish prudent timber use also in sparsely forested areas. The cooperative workers can do a great deal in this respect. Monitored by the forestry service, the cooperative will conserve every log it removes and will observe all of the regulations in order not to lose its right to continue its operation. This kind of thorough and detailed approach is what is needed when it comes to nature. Cooperative workers today collect the lumber in razed buildings. They put a price on every board and take ideal care of the stored lumber. Such thrifty managers will be desirable workers even in our forests in groups 1 and 2, where only maintenance felling is permitted. Everyone who wants to can become a cooperative member: individual organizations, rural residents and amateur gardeners, who feel the shortage of lumber and firewood as no one else today.

We are immediately faced with a problem, however. Where are we to get the compact equipment, mini-tractors and other mechanical aids for the forestry workers?

There is one other cause of the forestry crisis which you have mentioned. It is the inaction and inertia of the public, of the agencies of Soviet power in various regions of the nation. If the ispolkoms were true managers of their land, they would not permit the "denuding" of enormous areas, and, unfortunately, this has already occurred in the European part of the nation, in the Urals and in many areas of Siberia. What gives rise to this kind of consumption-oriented attitude toward nature? I believe that it is not just the poor ecological training of the specialists but also an inadequacy of general ecological sophistication on the part of the population. The development of such sophistication, particularly among the youth, is an extremely important social task.

Many of the world's peoples have a saying about what should be done in order not waste one's life. Each has its own version, but they have this in common: plant a tree. This remarkable folk tradition needs to be renewed. When there is a wedding, plant a tree; when a child is born, plant a tree; after a graduation dance, plant a tree. I am confident that such a lesson in love for nature would be an important step in the restructuring of the society's ecological awareness.

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Logging Industry Blasted for Waterway Environmental Damage

18200375b Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by N. Kharitonova, A. Shchegolev and A. Chernykh under the rubric "The Ecological Situation": "Dead Flotage"]

[Text] The Mana, a mountain stream, rushes toward the Yenisey. Swirling in the rapids, it tosses enormous logs against the banks. This is a timber float, the cheapest and therefore most popular method of the procurers for delivering logs. They are generally hauled on logging trucks, drawn along the river in special corrals or towed as rafts. A more simple method is frequently used, however—on the Mana, for example: during the high-water season logs are thrown into the river loose to be delivered by the river to their destination (the stream-driven method).

They are delivered, of course. Logs which lose their buoyancy sink, to be sure. Others have such wild ride down the river that they leave nothing intact on it. A battered channel, warped spits, destroyed spawning grounds—this is what any river looks like following a stream-driven timber float. The most terrible sight is a logjam, however. The river itself cannot handle the logs, and powerful bulldozers enter the water, shoving the wooden mass, cutting up the bottom with the tracks and dumping oil and gasoline into the water. The jams are sometimes hundreds of meters long. A nine-kilometer jam formed on the Poyma River in Krasnoyarskiy Kray. The river is entirely destroyed.

Stream-driven flotage is a dead method. One no longer finds this barbarous method of delivering timber anywhere else in the world. Only in Finland, perhaps, are loose logs floated on certain rivers. This cannot be compared with our flotage, however. They observe extremely strict river protection rules, and following a flotage operation the timber procurers turn the stream over to a receiving commission—after performing all of the necessary restoration work.

Stream-driven flotage is used on 275 of Russia's rivers. The effects are most destructive. There are no char, whitefish, omul or grayling in half of the rivers in the Komi ASSR on which stream-driven flotage is practiced.

The Upper Pechora, Izhma, Unya and Ilych supported a quarter of all the famous Pechora salmon. Unfortunately, stream-driven flotage predominates there too. Salmon was previously available in the tons in the Far East, but many of the settlement stores have only frozen horse mackerel today.

Public health officers are sounding the alarm. Sunken logs and bark decompose on the bottom over a period of decades following this kind of flotage. This results in the formation of concentrations of phenol in the water exceeding permissible levels many times over. Because of their hydrological features small rivers cannot cope with such pollution on their own, and undiluted phenol and petroleum products float in them....

"The fact should be clearly recognized," K. Akulov, chief state medical officer for the RSFSR, says, "that the small rivers determine the quality of the water in large bodies of water. In addition, timber is moved, stream-driven, along rivers from which we drink water directly: the North Dvina, Chusovaya, Sukhona, Vychechda, Tomi.... No kind of purification helps following stream-driven flotage. It leaves the water little suitable for drinking purposes. The oxygen content drops, and bacterial pollution of the water increases drastically. We are frequently forced to lay a waterline from another body of water to provide the people with normal water and avoid jeopardizing their health....

Ten percent of the timber procured is transported by the stream-driven method today. For purposes of comparison, take the fact that only 60 percent of all the felled timber is utilized. The rest becomes waste. In other words, that which is delivered by the stream-driven method might as well not be procured at all. Furthermore, according to the Komigipronilesprom institute, timber losses in stream-driven flotage reaches 120,000 cubic meters annually on republic rivers alone. This means that every 30th log sinks. And the so-called trimmings, the upper parts of the trees, go to waste at the felling sites. They are not placed into the water because they would go to the bottom immediately. Nor are the deciduous trees rafted. And what about losses at the holding facilities lower down, where the timber awaits railcars after it has arrived? The logs, which no one undertakes to dry out, rot for months.

The Water Code is supposed to protect the rivers. It does so very unreliably, however, in the absence of a scientifically based calculation of the damage caused by various kinds of contamination. The USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources' VNIPlekonomiki [All-Union Scientific Research and Planning Institute for Economics?] attempted to work out methods for calculating this back in 1983. It turned out that the damage caused by stream-driven flotage had long ago exceeded the "saving" achieved. The system worked out by the institute has still not been approved by USSR Gosplan, however. Furthermore, the penalty for violating the Water Code has little effect. The total fines are

described in numbers with many zeros, but they still have no effect upon the financial state of the collectives or their leaders. Unfortunately, the article in the Criminal Code under which irreparable damage done to nature entails criminal liability has not been applied.

Incidentally, we do have experience in prosecuting for water pollution. Graduated fines have been in effect for the navy for several years now, which go into the collective's social development fund. The water around ports has been cleaned up considerably as a result. We were also forced to take this action by international commitments. Nor should we forget the fact that the rivers, lakes and forests, even those in the nation's interior, do not belong to us alone.

When is this barbarous treatment of the rivers going to end? In accordance with a decree passed by the RSFSR Council of Ministers last year, stream-driven flotage is to be phased out in stages by 1995. The fundamental restructuring of environmental protection in the nation should ensure this. It specifies a number of measures mandatory payment for everyone for the use of natural resources, including water (today, only municipal services and industry pay for it) and scientifically based calculation of the cost of damage to nature. all "ecological" fines will go into the budgets of the local soviets, which can use them for protecting the environment

Individual changes have already been made. Rail lines and timber transport roads are being built. Rafting crews on the Sangilka, a tributary of the Ob, worked very hard this winter. They formed the rafts neatly on the bank, and vessels towed them into deep water. It turns out that this is not difficult to do. Local residents pin their hopes for a return of real fishing on the halting of stream-driven flotage.

Unfortunately, this is not being done everywhere. A breach is already being sought in the long-awaited decision universally to halt stream-driven flotage. The USSR Minlesprom [Ministry of Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry] has appealed to the RSFSR Council of Ministers to extend the flotage cut-off deadline on 60 rivers all the way to the year 2000! How could we forget the fact that such decrees were passed at the end of the '70s but were not implemented. The main argument is that the program requires a great deal of capital.

The Khakasles Production Association in Khakasia, for example, moves timber by the stream-driven method on three rivers: the Kebezh, Oya and Abakan. Stream-driven flotage on these tributaries of the Yenisey is to end in 1990.

"In order to meet this deadline, we must build lower-level holding areas, roads and bases," says Yu. Kovrigin, chief technologist for rafting in the timber procurement department, "and this will cost 12.7 million rubles.

The timber procurers have therefore thrown up their hands and are demanding another extension of the cut-off date for stream-driven flotage. The timber is going to be exhausted in any case, they say, and there is no sense in investing funds in new construction. In the meantime, the rivers are being destroyed in front of our eyes.

"I want the nation to be as rich as possible," is the reasoning of I. Kirillov, chief of Russia's largest association, Krasnoyarsklesprom. "The need for lumber is enormous, after all, and up to 40 million cubic meters of timber past maturity is rotting where it stands, at a time when we are felling only 22 million...."

Kirillov is prepared to demonstrate that stream-driven flotage on the rivers is not a crime but an economically justified operation, whereas its cessation will destroy the association's budget. The basic cost of a single cubic meter of lumber will increase by 6-7 rubles.

Yu. Guskov, First Deputy USSR Minister of Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry, states that the industry as a whole will need 5.5 billion rubles. A total of 850 kilometers of roads alone will be required to haul out the timber.

"These calculations and this logic are a typical example of the narrowly departmental approach," N. Radugin, head of the Department for Land Reclamation and Water Resources of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, believes. "We need to make the financial outlays right now, because the cost of restoring the environment will be immeasurably greater in the future. If money can make it possible at all to restore that which has been destroyed by imprudent management and backward technology. Outlays for ecology even now significantly exceed these 5.5 billion. The Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services needs 6-8 billion, for example, just to restore drinking-water purity to the rivers following the stream-driven flotage operations. It is therefore advantageous for the state to make the outlays now and halt the stream-driven flotage of timber."

One would like to hope that the maneuvering of the timber procurers will not be successful this time. Implementation of the government decisions must be guaranteed by the resolve both of the central agencies and the local soviets. The Krasnoyarskiy Kray Ispolkom and the Murmansk Oblast Ispolkom have already adopted a decision to abandon the stream-driven flotage ahead of schedule, for example. And the last such operation was carried out on rivers of the Far East this year. The krayispolkom decreed that they would not wait for the '90s, but would put an end once and for all to this ruinous method of delivering timber right now. Is this not an example for the republic's other territories?

Halting the flotage operations is only part of the job, however. The channels of more than a thousand rivers are covered with several layers of sunken logs. These

rivers need to be cleaned up. The plans of the Ministry of Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Working Industry for raising the sunken logs by rope proved to be spurious, however, because they did not provide for even a small portion of the needed cleanup of the waterways. The timber procurers took some kind of action only where it was easiest: within the booms, in the outside timber storage areas and the timber traps. The channels of rivers and reservoirs continue to be graveyards for unprocessed timber, however. For example, not one of the 52 rivers on which stream-driven flotage was halted during the past two five-year periods has been released to the basin directorates by the timber procurers.

First Deputy Minister Yu. Guskov gave hope that, according to him, the clean-up of the rivers will improve soon, since a joint enterprise of the Ministry of Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Working Industry and one of the Western companies for the processing of secondary raw materials will go into operation. It certainly makes sense to adopt the know-how of others, but it is time also to acquire some of our own. Particularly since we have somewhere to go for examples. We well know how littered the Bratsk Reservoir is. Even the most approximate calculations show that 600,000 cubic meters of timber are buried there. Cooperatives have now begun the cleanup, putting the logs to use.

In short, the society today is vigorously acquiring experience in combatting the narrowly departmental approach in the use of nature. Public protests against reversing the northern rivers and the battle for the purity of Baykal and Ladoga are landmarks in our civic maturation and our departure from the era of silence on social issues. We have come to understand well from these examples that the idea of economic benefit for the moment can only be affirmed by remaining deaf and blind, leaving the future outside the framework of our calculations.

Stream-driven flotage is "economically justified" madness, an obstruction in our minds, a sort of "plug" which must be removed. And it would be worthwhile to begin thinking about whether we actually need to wait until the year 1995. Why not find within ourselves the fortitude to make the outlays and end once and for all the stream-driven flotage operations right now?

11499

Industrial Pollution Sources Along Upper Volga Detailed

81442964 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 5 Jun 88, p 1

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent V. Lagovskiy: "Left Bank, Right Bank"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] To recall, on 30 April, having published two alarming letters, this newspaper initiated a campaign called "The River Volga Flows" and named Kalinin

Oblast, at the beginning of this great waterway, as the first area of its involvement. What is their attitude there toward the cleanliness of the river? For an answer to this question, our correspondent took a ride upstream from the oblast center aboard a cutter, met with various specialists, and familiarized himself with written materials characterizing the ecological situation. Today, we present his thoughts for the attention of our readers.

Let us carry out a mental experiment. We will pour some water into a bucket. Into this, we will throw a rusty tin can, having first filled it to the brim from the closest puddle. We will add a splash of fuel oil, sprinkle in some wood chips and grass, and let it stand for a week or two, so that the water develops an appropriate bloom. That's it; now you can drink it. You don't want to? But there isn't any other water...

"And there won't be," says the deputy chairman of the presidium of the Kalininsk Oblast council of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Nature, M. Karasov. "Until we understand that we are not tenants on our own native soil, but its landlords. The driver who washes his car in the river, and the enterprise director, who, without pausing for breath, orders at untreated industrial waste be poured into the water, are equally immoral. The low ecological standards of each of us, an indifference compounded by the production egoism of enterprise and department directors—this is the main reason for this sickness. The drinking water is only a symptom."

OUR OWN INFORMATION: Every year, industry in the oblast dumps up to 150 tons of petroleum products, 6 tons of greases, 115 tons of iron, and almost 180,000 tons of so-called dry left-overs into the river. During the past year, less than half of the dangerous substances were caught and neutralized.

A paradox: In order to get a little clean water to drink, you first have to dirty it up. But let's be objective—the water in this extremely polluted "well" is nonetheless cleaner than in other oblasts where industry is developed. Thanks to many years of effort by the oblast executive committee and the Moscow-Oka Basin Administration, almost all the cities which the river passes are equipped with treatment facilities. A great deal has been done in order to deaden the groans of Mother Volga.

"It is all so," I was told by the chief of the Kalinin Territorial Hydro-Chemical Laboratory for the Protection of the Upper Volga Basin, M. Kozlov. "At first glance, the picture may even look favorable. Thus, not long ago, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Water Protection issued 'Recommendations for assessing and selecting the technical and economic characteristics of installations for treatment of urban sewage.' If these are taken as a reference point, then the oblast is clearly in the forefront. But, indeed, the standards in

these recommendations are obviously too low—they have simply been adjusted to existing treatment systems. On paper, waste water is being treated to 'normal purity'; in fact, it is dirty

At the spot where, among the Balday Hills, Lake Seliger lies blue, there discharges up to 14,000 cubic meters of contaminated water. There have also been salvo discharges, the most recent of them in February of last year. Then, eleven times the permitted level of chrome ended up in the river. Yugoslav specialists are now rebuilding the plant and are constructing new cinder-filtration facilities. However the public, not without reason, is afraid: will these treatment facilities be updated on a timely basis? Indeed, the old ones were not designed for the increased volumes.

And is the damage really any less from small enterprises? Inspectors, for example, checked out the Torzhokoskiy tannery, and were amazed. Treatment was organized in such a way there that wool regularly clogs up the collector and dirty water flows directly into the river. The inspectors closed the plant. And what happened? Several weeks later, they found that it was back in operation again! The Ministry of Light Industry put pressure on local authorities, including those of the party, and they yielded. Both they and others are standing close guard over his majesty. The Plan, and not over the health of Mother Volga.

Left bank, right bank... As if between two different worlds, our cutter passes. The places on the left cannot be called anything other than a garbage dump. The industrial enterprises can be easily recognized by the gray heaps of broken cement, the construction trash, and the rusted iron. The banks in urban districts are piled high with the trash of innumerable tin cans, broken glass, and paper scraps. Even the grass does not grow here. But here, I see with joy, there are now small green meadows that run to the water.

"Pretty, but ignorant," sighs fish conservation inspector N. Krutogorskiy. "Look how narrow these strips of grass are. The sovkhozes and kolkhozes are plowing the bank right up to the water itself..."

Why waste land, it would seem. But if the crops are not planted at least 50 meters back from the river, the fertilizer, manure, and humus will run off into the water along with the rain.

OUR OWN INFORMATION: According to data from the Institute for Water Problems, 3,000 tons of nitrogen, 0.2 tons of phosphorus, and 12,000 tons of organic carbons are ending up in the upper reaches of the Volga every year.

These substances are far from being harmless. Doctors warn that up to 20 percent of the nitrates—of nitrogen fertilizers—are transformed into nitrites. Combining within an organism, with amino acids, they form complexes of carcinogenic substances. A long chain? There are also shorter ones.

Starting at the end of the 1950's, crops of flax in Kalininskaya Oblast used to be treated with DDT and hexachlorines. In the 1970's, their use was prohibited. Other chemical poisons are now being used—dozens of kinds. All of them have either mutagenic or carcinogenic qualities. When, on one dish of the scale, there is increased crop productivity and, on the other, harmful, though long-term, health consequences, then which way do the scales dip? The answer suggests itself immediately—to the side of the immediate benefits. And, meanwhile, overseas, they are placing their bets on biological methods of protecting vegetation and are using fewer and fewer "chemicals" every year. We also could lessen the degree of risk by applying chemical poisons and fertilizers strictly in accordance with standards, by maintaining storage areas in proper order, and by not plowing up the shoreline. But checks show that many farms in the oblast are spreading twice as much poison and fertilizer on their fields as is necessary. Over half the storage areas fail to meet sanitary standards, and almost everywhere the shoreline has been turned into additional "crop land."

...Our cutter passes the mouth of a small stream. The sovkhoz imeni 50th Anniversary of the USSR dumps manure into it. Treatment was designed for 28,000 hogs. There are now almost 70,000. The old facilities can no longer cope with the sea of manure. New ones are only in the planning stage.

OUR OWN INFORMATION: Of the 700 farms in the upper part of the Volga, only a few more than 100 have treatment facilities. And these were built a long time ago and have been neglected to an extreme. Nobody takes care of them.

It is not surprising that sanitary and epidemiological stations think that agricultural production poses the main threat to the Volga.

However, in the final analysis, it is possible to clean up waste drainage. But if we kill the river itself, will it be possible to revive it?

We have mercilessly stopped up Russia's main waterway with clotting dams. Its once powerful course has been transformed into a chain of almost motionless reservoirs. As a river, the Volga has been preserved only in its upper reaches. It freely carries its waters for a little more than 300 kilometers. Here, turbulent waters saturate the river with life-giving oxygen, the Balday Hills run in steep ridges to her shores, the wind rocks the thick pine

forests. The landscapes, the picturesque and unique places, are dear to the point of pain to every Russian. We may lose them irretrievably.

The Gidroproyekt institute is proposing to stop up the river with still another clot, to flood what remains of the Volga with still another sea at its most upper part, near Rzhev.

We will totally destroy Mother Volga, object the scholars. The water will cover unique cultural monuments, the most ancient human settlement sites—sites from the stone and bronze ages, echo the archaeologists. We will lose 6,000 hectares of water-conserving forests, add the forest managers.

They are already cutting down the trees, preparing a bed for the future sea—the Sea of Rzhev.

The small Vazuza River used to pour into the Volga in a stormy and powerful torrent, cleaning out its channel, as with a brush, in the spring. They blocked it off with a dam and there is no longer any brush. They also reduced the flow of the Volga; sub-surface water levels were raised, flooding the area; algae bloomed in the Ivankovskiy water reservoir. Streams from the swampy plains flowed into it. Now, more than 9,000 hectares are already overgrown.

The Institute of General and Communal Hygienics of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and the Moscow City sanitary and epidemiological station recently carried out a study of the drinking water coming to Moscow from the Ivankovskiy reservoir. They detected almost 200 micrograms of chloroform—a carcinogen—per liter. Where did it come from? It turned out to be a product of the reaction between the blooming water and chlorine.

Having rushed to build the Vazuzyk water reservoir, they also hurried to put it into operation by the 60th anniversary of the USSR. They failed to drain the swamps which were designated for flooding and they did not cut down the trees. Pieces of concrete block and steel fittings, which they did not have time to remove, remained as monuments in the water. Then, at the insistence of the fish conservation people, divers brought all this up from the bottom. It was painful to look at the fish which had been maimed on the sharp snags.

"Even now, the Volga cleans itself one-tenth as well as it used to," says Ye. Yashin, deputy to the oblast's chief state sanitary doctor. "The Rzhev hydraulic development generally threatens to turn the river into some other kind of natural body. These destructive processes will go on more actively and the water will become still worse."

For the time-being, at public insistence, construction has been suspended. And it had been begun solely for the sake of an additional 25 cubic meters of water per

second. This much, if not more, could be obtained by other means. Underground springs alone could provide dozens of cubic meters a second. And water could be saved by turning off the faucets in apartments as we should.

The oblast executive committee, which is coming out against the project, is defending its positions. Will it hold out?

13032

Non-Russian Ethnic Contributions to Southern Republics' Resource Usage, Revenue

18300401a Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jul 88 pp 2-3

[Article by E. Yusupov, corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences; S. Ziyadullayev, academician, UzSSR Academy of Sciences; and S. Usmanov, academician, VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin, under rubric "Point of View Concerning a Newspaper Item": "Glasnost and Justice"]

[Text] During recent years the central and republic press have printed a rather large number of articles devoted to a fundamental analysis of the historical path that we have traveled, the present-day state of economic, social, and spiritual development, and the long-range tasks.

However, these articles contain, in addition to the positive ideas, a rather large number of untrue statements that consciously or unconsciously distort the history and present-day state of the interethnic relations in the USSR. One article that especially stands out in this respect is "Equality and Equal Rights," which was published in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRY, 4 June 1988¹ and reprinted by TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA, in which individual aspects of interethnic relations and the contribution made by every republic or region to the reinforcement of our country's economic might are expounded not only in a onesided manner, but also, at times, incorrectly. First of all we would like to dwell on the criteria for determining the national income of the union republics.

Under conditions when the specialization of social production is being carried out on a countrywide scale, it is difficult concretely and accurately to determine the contribution made by every republic to the economic and social development of the USSR. Raw materials are produced in one region and the final output in another, and therefore the turnover tax, which constitutes the basic item in national income, is formed in those regions where the final output is sold.

One area that is typical in this respect is cotton-growing. Uzbekistan provides the country with two-thirds of the raw materials that are grown. Provision has been for the cotton independence not only of the USSR, but also of the countries in the socialist community. From products

resulting from cotton-growing, the republic receives 500,000 tons of vegetable oil, and more than a million tons of oil cakes are sent to various regions in the country. Ninety-four percent of the raw materials are processed at central textile enterprises, where the turnover tax is formed, but that tax is not taken into consideration when determining the overall volume of the republic's national income. If the existing parameters for determining the national income are preserved, the republic's economy will prove to be one that is operating at a loss, even if the total quantity of raw cotton grown constitutes 10 million tons or more.

According to data provided by economists, the country annually creates from the final output of cotton-growing tens of millions of rubles of national income. For the time being, however, there are no scientifically substantiated criteria for determining the share of the raw-materials suppliers in the profit that is formed at the final stages of the production cycle. The same kind of situation exists in the area of silk-growing, karakul-growing, etc.

When determining the national income of the republics no consideration is taken also of the real income obtained as a result of the processing of mineral resources. And yet Uzbekistan, with respect to the extraction of nonferrous metals—zinc, copper, lead, tungsten, molybdenum—and natural gas, occupies one of the leading places in the country. Nor is any consideration taken of the output produced at the major industrial enterprises of unionwide subordination which are situated in the republics. If one approaches the analysis of this question from positions of the Marxist theory of labor value, then in Uzbekistan the produced national income exceeds the used income by 4.4 billion rubles.

The same thing can be said about the other Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Without a consideration of the previously cited facts, the article author writes that in 1988 it is planned to expend almost 5 billion rubles to subsidize Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia.

The incorrect judgments concerning the economic foundations of the interethnic relations are reinforced by many inaccuracies, which also evolve from the press. In the spring of this year the central press published inaccurate information to the effect that in Uzbekistan only 32.9 percent of the able-bodied population takes part in social production. This picture of the nonemployment of the able-bodied population is not observed even in those capitalist countries where chronic unemployment flourishes. This kind of disinformation, undoubtedly, will promote the appearance in other regions of the country of judgments concerning the flourishing of dependent attitudes in the republic. Actually, in Uzbekistan 77 percent of the able-bodied population takes part in social production. The people who are not employed in social production cannot be completely included in the category of unemployed because people who engage in

individual labor activity and those who work on individual plots produce output valued at 2.5 billion rubles, which constitutes almost one-fourth of the social product produced in the republic. In addition, 80 percent of the persons who are not employed in social production are women with several children or women on maternity or post-maternity leave.

Let us, then, deal with the facts. Throughout the country, the people employed on individual farms produce the following percentages of output: vegetables, 14; melons, 14; meat, 13; milk, 2; eggs, 5; and wool, 23 percent. In Uzbekistan, however, the people employed on individual farms produce the following percentages: vegetables and melons, 49; meat, 50; milk, 66; eggs, 30; and wool, 64 percent. The individual farms also produce 38 percent of the karakul. The overwhelming majority of the output grown on the individual farms is sold to the state at fixed purchased prices. None of this, of course, could be called the flourishing of a dependent attitude.

The previously mentioned article by G. Litvinova contains a rather large number of inaccuracies in the understanding of the history and present-day condition of interethnic relations.

There is no doubt that, during the period of socialist building, the Russian nation and the other nations in the country rendered invaluable aid in overcoming the backwardness in all spheres of life that had been inherited from the colonial past. A specific example of this is Uzbek SSR, which, thanks to the Soviet socialist system and the Leninist friendship of the peoples of the USSR, achieved outstanding successes in all branches of the national industry and culture. Poverty, backwardness, illiteracy, and obscurantism have been long forgotten. We are indebted to the Russian nation for that heartfelt, unselfish aid. We can say with complete responsibility that Uzbekistan does not have, and has never had, any rumors to the effect that the central agencies are "robbing" the republic by being concerned basically for the interests of the Russians.

Nor can one agree with the assertion that the category of "backward" peoples now includes those that previously rendered assistance to the Russians. This judgment is the result of the lack of knowledge of that economic and social situation that developed in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan and in the other regions of the country.

It is necessary to think seriously about the essence and prospects of the specialization of the republic's productive forces. That specialization was made in the interests of our entire country, with a consideration of the tasks of assuring the efficient use of the natural and labor resources, the climatic conditions, and the capabilities of the various regions. As a result, during all these years a single-crop system has flourished in Uzbekistan, and, under the motto of the interests of the entire country, that system crowded out all other agricultural crops and

extremely limited the capabilities of animal husbandry. In the republic, only 2 percent of the irrigated land is occupied by orchards, and this has had an influence upon the prices at the markets and has reduced the opportunities for supplying the public with fresh fruits and vegetables. The constantly expanding single-crop system and the intensive application of mineral fertilizers and chemical poisons have almost nullified the opportunities for crop rotation and have worsened the natural fertility of the soil. As a result, year after year there has been a reduction in the harvest yield per unit of field area, and a worsening of the quality of the agricultural products that are grown. During the years of the Soviet authority in Uzbekistan, industry whose output was intended not only for satisfying the republic's needs but also the needs of the entire country received broad development. More than 10 percent of all enterprises in the country's chemical industry are concentrated in the republic, and those enterprises, as they create the output that the country needs, contribute considerably to the pollution of the environment. All this has also had its social consequences: it has led to an increase in the occurrences of many diseases, an increase in childhood mortality, and the worsening of the health of women of childbearing age.

In order to be healthy, people need not only pure air and good water, but also normal food. In Uzbekistan the earnings of the kolkhoz member and the sovkhoz worker who work under the blazing sun and who do not have any idea of what an eight-hour work day is, or what it is like to have a day off on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, continue to be extremely low. Rural inhabitants, per capita of population, consume from one-seventh to one-sixth the amount of meat that the average inhabitants of the USSR consume. With respect to the rendering of social services to the public, Uzbekistan occupies one of the last places in the country.

G. Litvinova links the imaginary high standard of living of the population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan with the high income from the private plots of kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers. However, the few speculators who trade in fruits and vegetables at markets in the central cities cannot provide anyone with an idea of the people as a whole. The real workers on the cotton fields do not have any time to work on their own plots or to sell their produce at bazaars. Whereas, for the country as a whole, the monthly income per member of a rural family constitutes 98.1 rubles, in Uzbekistan that income is 58.8 rubles, including all the income from the private plots. We might note that throughout the country the average minimum amount to sustain life has been determined to be 75 rubles. The relatively low level of the material welfare of the workers of Uzbekistan can also be illustrated by the following facts. According to data providing by USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], the per-capita consumption for the country as a whole in 1986 was as follows: meat, 62 kilograms; milk, 333 liters; eggs, 265; vegetables and melon crops, 102 kilograms; and fruits and grapes, 56 kilograms; but

the consumption in Uzbek SSR was only 28 kilograms of meat, 177 liters of milk, 107 eggs, 110 kilograms of vegetables and melon crops, and 30 kilograms of fruits and grapes.

Everyone used to know about this previously, but people spoke more about the successes, leaving in the shadows the socioeconomic difficulties that had become acute. Concealing all this required a new form of figure-padding, new fraud. Our victorious reports probably clouded the awareness of various individuals.

Without a doubt the republic has all the opportunities for meeting the growing population's needs for food products, but in order to resolve this task it is necessary to reduce the production of cotton. Probably, under conditions of an increase in the cotton needs within the country and abroad, no one will take the step of carrying out this kind of reduction, and therefore at the present time it would be desirable to improve the problem of specialization with a consideration of the need for the most rapid resolution of the Food Program also. Therefore the problem of the equality of rights and duties which is described by G. Litvinova in her article must be understood with a consideration of this circumstance.

Another question that causes a rather large number of misunderstandings is the question of the purchase prices of agricultural output. In her article G. Litvinova, comparing the purchase prices of citrus fruits and potatoes, mechanically extends this process to other agricultural crops. From this she concludes that it is the difference in purchase prices that determines the population's income. In particular, she considers the prices of raw cotton to be unjustifiably high, and that is what she considers to be determining the high level of the population's standard of living in the cotton-growing republics.

One cannot agree with this statement. Probably the author does not have any idea of the real state of affairs in the cotton-growing republics. But this is what that state of affairs is. The prices of everything that we sell to the cotton-growing kolkhozes and sovkhozes have been growing with every passing year, and the fertility of the soil is being exhausted. The indebtedness of the cotton-growing kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Uzbekistan already constitutes almost 5 billion rubles. The overwhelming majority of the monetary proceeds of the cotton-growing farms currently goes to pay off the debts, and this creates new difficulties in paying for the labor performed by the kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers. During the past 20 years the purchase prices of grain tripled; the purchase prices of beef increased by a factor of 3.2; but those of cotton increased only insignificantly. All this had a very detrimental effect on the economic situation in cotton-growing. On many cotton-growing farms, in most instances the income does not cover even the expenses, much less bring in any profit.

As for the other crops that are more profitable, they occupy an insignificant part of the republic's cultivated area. The production of one ton of raw cotton requires the expenditure of 340 man-hours, whereas the production of one ton of grain requires only 12 man-hours, which is considerably less—by a factor of 29.2. However, the sale prices differ by a factor of only 4.85. With this correlation between the labor-intensity and the prices, the impression is created that labor productivity is low in the cotton-growing regions. Grain could be sown in the spring and autumn and could be completely harvested by combines. It is necessary to work over every cotton plant round the clock, almost round the year. The cotton plants have to be watered 8-10 times. It is necessary to irrigate the soil and to break up the soil after every irrigation, employed a considerable amount of manual labor at such time, etc.

In recent years the level of profitability in cotton-growing has been approximately 30 percent. However, it must be emphasized that this level is "supported" not by high prices, but by the low level of the average annual payment of labor in cotton-growing, which constituted 1670 rubles, as compared with 2015 rubles in agriculture for the USSR as a whole. Computations indicate that if the average annual level of payment for the labor in cotton-growing were raised to the average level for the union as a whole, the profitability would be reduced by one-half.

Therefore, when making analyses, one should not separate the profitability level from the social questions, particularly the level of wages. And, even more so, one should not ignore the demographic peculiarities of the individual rayons that make substantial corrections in evaluating the population's standard of living. Unfortunately, little is written or said about this. Possibly the Central Asian republics have outstripped the RSFSR with regard to their being provided with hard-surface roads per square kilometer. This is probably linked with the fact that the territory is densely populated, with the closeness of populated places to one another, etc. Thanks to the climatic conditions and the availability of the necessary materials nearby, the building of hard-surface roads in Central Asia and Kazakhstan costs from one-fourth to one-third of the costs in the central rayons of the country. Therefore one should not paint in rosy hues all the aspects of the development of the social sphere in the Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

A large number of difficulties continue to exist with housing. In order to get a clear picture of the real situation, Comrade Litvinova and certain others ought to do certain things at least once in their lifetime: take a train trip from Orenburg to Tashkent, spend some time in the villages of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Tajikistan, and see with their own eyes the "real well-being" in the housing situation. It is necessary to keep in mind the fact that in the rural rayons the type of housing construction that has been developed for the most part is the individual type. People build their

homes only with their own meager means, limiting themselves and the entire family with regard to all their material and spiritual needs. In addition, those homes are built of clay or adobe. In the overwhelming majority, the individual homes have an almost complete lack of municipal amenities. In the area of resolving the housing problem, Uzbekistan occupies one of the last places in the country.

Without a doubt, the CPSU and the Soviet state have always paid a large amount of attention to developing the national cultures and improving the social structures of the peoples and nations of our country. In the resolution of this task a tremendous role was played by the Russian nation, its working class, and its intellectual class.

However, it is necessary to look at things with sober eyes. The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan have not gone too far ahead, leaving behind the previously developed peoples. According to Litvinova's reasoning, it turns out that an extremely alarming tendency has allegedly developed in the country in this question, and that "the nations that are distinguished by a low (lower than the nationwide average) percentage of specialists with a higher level of proficiency include the Russians, the Belorussians, and the peoples of the Baltic republics." But the highest indicators allegedly occur in the republics of the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. Let us take a sober look at the real state of affairs. By the end of 1985 the number of scientific workers per 100,000 persons of population, for the country as a whole, was 535, and in RSFSR, 707. That figure in Uzbekistan was 206; in Kazakhstan, 252; in Kirghizia, 224; in Tajikistan, 182; and in Turkmenia, 171. The number of specialists with high and secondary-special education per 10,000 persons during the period indicated was 685 for the country as a whole, 774 in RSFSR; 713 in Belorussia; 386 in Uzbekistan; 594 in Kazakhstan; 455 in Kirghizia; 381 in Tajikistan; and 396 in Turkmenia. Consequently, no sharp change in this regard has yet occurred in the Central Asian republics or Kazakhstan. If one takes into consideration the existing rates of training of highly qualified specialists, the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan will not reach by the year 2000 today's average nationwide level.

Without a doubt, in the past there were many distortions in the field of the cadre policy. With regard to the selection and assignment of cadres, nationalistic and local interests were often followed, and that exerted a negative influence upon the reinforcement of the friendship among our peoples... But here also one should not absolutize individual facts. One cannot agree with the assertion to the effect that "people of another nationality, having lost the hope of occupying prestigious positions, frequently move to other locations." Despite the certain distortions, the republics have carried out measures to implement the interethnic principles in cadre selection and assignment.

The increase in the multinational composition of the population in the republics is an objectively progressive process. In Uzbekistan, industrial enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions, institutions of learning, and the administrative apparatus employ representatives of many peoples and nations. During the past 20 years in Tashkent the number of the representatives of nonindigenous nationalities increased by a factor of 1.5-2. In the city during the prewar years the local indigenous population constituted almost 90 percent, but currently that figure has fallen to 42 percent. The AzSSR Academy of Sciences employs representatives of 48 nations and nationalities. The elected active members and corresponding members of the republic's academy include Uzbeks, Russians, Karakalpaks, Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Tatars, Koreans, Azerbaijanis, and others. The ranks of the engineer-technical workers, physicians, teachers, and representatives of art and literature are also multinational. Therefore very few people are leaving Uzbekistan, "having lost the hope of occupying prestigious positions." Russians constitute 13 percent among the republic's population, and 23 percent among the employees. The multinational makeup of the republic's population is also taken into consideration when admitting applicants to higher educational institutions. For example, in 1987 among the students enrolled in the first year at Tashkent University Uzbeks constituted 65.5 percent, Russians, 17.4 percent, and representatives of other nationalities, 17.1 percent. Among the students enrolled in the first year at Tashkent Polytechnical Institute Uzbeks constituted 61.1 percent, Russians, 18 percent, and representatives of other nationalities, 20.9 percent. At Tashkent Institute of the National Economy the figures were: Uzbeks, 64.07 percent, Russians, 16 percent; other nationalities, 20.9 percent.

The internationalistic principles of cadre selection and assignment must be extended to all parts of the country and uniform measuring sticks, uniform criteria, must exist in this important sociopolitical matter.

Why, then, when determining the social makeup of the population, is consideration not always taken of the national makeup of the cotton-growers, animal husbandrymen, and rural mechanizers who perform the most difficult work?

When analyzing many of the complicated problems of *perestroika* and acceleration, we must observe the principles of internationalism and must have true faith in the friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

It is easy to wound people's national feelings. It is precisely for that reason that V. I. Lenin emphasized the need for tact, a high level of culture, objectivity, and impartiality in understanding the essence of international and patriotic education and its prospects in strengthening the friendship among the peoples of the USSR.

It is necessary not only not to forget those Leninist ideas, but also to embody them in all our specific affairs.

Footnote

1. [For a translation of this article, see pages 43-46 of the DAILY REPORT: SOVIET UNION, FBIS-SOV-88-115, dated 15 June 1988.]

5075

Work of Kirghiz Academy of Sciences Criticized
18300392 *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian* 9 Jun 88 p 3

[Report of an interview with physicist G.A. Mesyats, chairman of the Urals Division and vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences by Kirghiz Telegraph Agency correspondent A. Barshay: "A Look at Science in Kirgiziya"; first five paragraphs are source introduction] [Text] Although the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences has good scientific potential, it is utilizing it poorly and inefficiently. In other words, it is essential to turn the potential energy into kinetic energy directed toward great scientific results. That was—in generalized form—the main conclusion to which a USSR Academy of Sciences (USSR AS) commission came as a result of a planned comprehensive check on the activities of the republic's Academy of Sciences.

A large and prestigious group of scholars, led by the outstanding Soviet physicist G.A. Mesyats, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the USSR AS Urals Division, worked in Kirgiziya for several days.

The members of the commission studied the work of all the academy's institutes, talked in detail with scientists and leaders of creative collectives. They reported in detail on the results of the check to an expanded session of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences, in which R.I. Otunbayev, deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, took part.

The commission's conclusions and recommendations will also be discussed at a session of the AS USSR Presidium.

A KirTAG (Kirghiz Telegraph Agency) correspondent asked the leader of the commission, Academician G.A. Mesyats, to share his thoughts on the work of the republic's Academy of Sciences, to talk about the problems facing it and the ways to overcome its difficulties.

"The Kirghiz Academy of Sciences truly has good scientific potential," said Gennadiy Andreyevich Mesyats. One feature of it—and a worthy one in my view—is the fact that you have here scholars from various schools—the Moscow, Leningrad and Siberian schools and, of course, representatives of your own Kirghiz scientific school. A number of promising directions and problems

are being worked on within the Academy; there are works in progress which one would not be ashamed to take to the Union, European or world scientific market. It is no accident that I am talking about the market because an obvious underestimation of many deserving projects is felt in the republic. The underestimation is a literal one when they can and need to be sold to obtain good money and even foreign currency, which is so necessary to acquire scientific equipment, instruments, machinery, etc.

The Institute of Physics, for example, has good projects on the establishment of low-temperature plasmotrons and their application in spectrography and in the strengthening of materials. Unique machines and equipment with a variable structure have been created by associates in the Department of Mechanics and Mining Machine Science in the Automation Institute. Research into the stress of rock masses in deep mines has great practical significance. It is being carried out by the Institute of the Physics and Mechanics of Rocks. The work related to the utilization of isotope methods is very interesting both from the viewpoint of basic research and their practical application. The biochemists, physiologists and biologists have produced a number of valuable applied studies. Not only Kirgiziya but also the entire country as well can be proud of your very rich botanical garden. The archeologists of Kirgiziya are working on a number of finds which have world-wide scientific significance.

At the same time many things in the work of the republic's Academy of Sciences cannot help but disturb one. The extremely low level of research in a number of scientific fields is disturbing, as are the following: the lack of solid works in progress, the absence of strategies and long-term plans for basic and applied work, the shallow material and the inefficiency of many projects. For example, the situation at the Institute of Geology is bad: the institute is practically in a state of collapse. The Institute of Organic Chemistry is characterized by work with insignificant subject matter, disunity and an abundance of small laboratories. Some of the laboratories—and not only here—do not fit in with the scientific character of the institute. The work of those in the social sciences and the humanities obviously fails to reach the level of today's expectations. One is alerted by the fact that some scientists do not have a command of the language of science.

Many institutes show a characteristic tendency to work on narrowly regional, local and sometimes simply petty, current tasks which do not require serious scientific research. In general this disease—a substantial drop in the level of basic research—is typical not only of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences but also of all our domestic science as a whole. That is why today it is so important to raise the prestige of fundamental science, to increase significantly the level at which fundamental scientific problems are resolved. "After all, basic research" (I

quote Academician R. Sagdeyev), "by creating intellectual work for future applications (frequently unexpected by the researchers themselves) is becoming in essence a real means of production."

But the cause of this disease is to be found not only in the scientists and not only in the Academy of Sciences itself. It is largely programmed by the fact that academy science in Kirgiziya lives on what are virtually starvation rations. What kind of upswing or perestroika of academy science can one talk about when appropriations for its development in the republic amount to 0.4 percent of the national income? This is one-tenth of the average for the country. Capital investment in the construction of science facilities is infinitesimally small. Naturally the poor development of the material-technical facilities for experimentation seriously delays progress.

The Academy of Sciences needs—as much as we need air—its own building and its own dormitory, it needs departmental quarters in order to carry out a free scientific exchange. Without a broad scientific exchange it is impossible to move science forward today. Isolation, and even worse self-isolation, is like death to science. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to make fuller and more fruitful use of trips taken for scientific purposes, especially now that the travel fund is not limited.

Incidentally, many institutes, in my opinion, are not fully aware that they are sitting, figuratively speaking, on a pile of gold. But in order to use it they must demonstrate more initiative and enterprise; they must, as they say, get moving, and not wait for instructions from above. For this it is important to have a good knowledge of the value of one's scientific formulations, the sphere of their application and the potential customers for them. And one must not be shy about offering, advertising and selling advantageously the fruits of one's intellectual labor.

There are some very capable young scientific associates, but one feels that something is holding up their development, that they are experiencing some kind of pressure, that they cannot discover their full potential. It is necessary to be more active in nominating young doctoral candidates for membership in the academy; after all, without an influx of young, fresh forces and new ideas, science cannot move forward. I would not begin to generalize, and I would not want to compare scientists of various generations, nonetheless, I think that the process of renewal—and this means the forward movement of academy life in Kirgiziya—depends on the wisdom and far-sightedness of older associates. It is unfortunate that when we had conversations with academicians or doctors of science, they talked more about relations among themselves, and their complaints and resentments, but when we had young associates sitting with us, the conversation was about science and its problems.

The concern for a new generation of scientists must begin with the elementary school. For this it is necessary to develop in the republic a network of specialized schools and to strengthen their links with the academy's institutes. This should contribute to the integration of science and higher education, moreover, the VUZ's of the republic are not training specialists in some very important fields, for example, sociology, ecology and genetics. It is essential to encourage the creative growth of scientific personnel, and for this, clearly, it is advisable to create in the republic several new specialized councils to award the academic degree of doctor of science. This problem is quite resolvable, and, I think, that the USSR Academy of Sciences, along with VAK (High Degree Commission), will be able to help in this regard.

The process of perestroika, democratization and glasnost, which has been unleashed in the country, has also come to the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences. Democratic elections were held to choose institute directors and, it seems to us, quite worthy scientists were chosen. In general, a guarantee of positive changes can be seen in the new people, in the new leaders who have taken over the helm, and in the potentially strong young people, who are attacking along practically the entire front of scientific research. It is necessary only to consolidate these forces, to help them lift the cart of science out of the depression into which it has sunk and onto the wide road leading to the mountain. And this cannot be done without the help of the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party, the republic's government, or without the efforts of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

8543

Further Uzbek Criticism Over Tajik Aluminum Plant Pollution

18300413a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by I. Dzhalilov, doctor of juridical sciences, the UzSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and the Law, V. Sokovin, candidate of technical sciences of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Production Forces, Z. Salokhiddinov, A. Bedrintsev, F. Asamov, N. Safayev, B. Kurmanov, V. Sultanov, A. Abdukadyrov, D. Sagdullayev, candidate of economic sciences, UzSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics; Ye. Zubkova, junior scientific associate of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics under the rubric of Repercussions: "Is This a State Approach?"]

[Text] An article entitled "Sariasiyshi Drama: Losses and Lessons," which was published in PRAVDA VOSTOKA on 28 March [For a translation of this article, which in fact appeared in the 29 March 1988 PRAVDA VOSTOKA, see pages 37-38 of the USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-88-020, dated 6 June 1988], covered the ecological problem which has emerged in the south of Surkhan-Darya Oblast and around the city of Tursunzade, as well as the establishment of a government commission to discover the causes and the extent of the damage which is being inflicted by an aluminum plant located at the border of two neighboring republics. Publication of the article has stimulated public consciousness in the face of the calamity which is imminent.

But we do not completely understand the ambivalence of the position taken by the UzTAG correspondent N. Shlepina. Specifically, we do not understand why she objects to the proposal by the people of Surkhan-Darya Oblast and Tashkent to close the aluminum plant—and we would add ourselves—if only for the length of time necessary “to clean up the plant once and for all.” That must be the lesson—not the “first” lesson, although truly the “main” one. And given the situation which has developed, that is the best way out. In the process, we are not excluding any other alternatives which would ensure the cleanliness of the environment, as well as the health of the population and of all life in the zone which is in reach of the plant.

In order to move from studying the situation to taking decisive actions is it not enough that “people have begun to be ill more frequently, and infant mortality is rising. Cattle have suffered, the silkworm is dying. Immature persimmons are falling from the trees, the pear, pomegranate and cherry crops have fallen to a fifth of their previous levels...” The average atmospheric concentration of a gas as toxic as fluorine was higher than the MPC (maximum permissible concentration) and “...when new capacities were put into operation, the proportion of harmful atmospheric gases began to grow. Although the presence of even the MPC of this poisonous gas is a direct threat to man’s normal activities. After all, it marks a critical limit, the boundary between healthy and sick, between living and dying!” The fluorine content of milk, blood, finger nails, food-stuffs and plants with burned leaves (indicating a large concentration) has been proven irrefutably. Is this really not enough?

In his report at the 8th session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, Deputy R. Saidov said with great concern and a feeling of responsibility: “The population of the entire Surkhan-Darya Oblast is worried about the growing air pollution from the aluminum plant in the city of Tursunzade in the Tajik SSR, which is all of 20 kilometers away from us. Day after day in recent years we have in fact been losing gardens, spots of natural beauty and—what is most important—the health of the younger generation is threatened.”

Is it true that the members of the commission which studied the causes and extent of the Sariasiykiy drama did not understand its essence?

It is essential for all of us to clarify for ourselves once and for all that when the issue is people’s health or whether a living thing is to be or not to be, it is impossible to talk

about the local nature of an eco-problem or source which is inflicting harm on society. For this reason we are puzzled by the reduction of the Sariasiykiy drama to the mere resolution (or, more accurately, to the non-resolution) of financial questions through the use of legal levers: the establishment of the degree of guilt (the amount of damage) and the degree of responsibility (the amount of compensation).

The discussion should be not so much about the amount of damage or how these monies could be used to build “medical facilities and hospitals, improve public services, meet special catering needs, establish the kind of contamination-free zone that is already emerging in Tajikistan”; rather it should be about the source of the chronic illness which has led to the exhaustion and death of everything alive and how to get rid of it once and for all. It is necessary to find (and it is still not too late now) the true causes of the drama and take specific, urgent and truly practicable measures to eliminate them.

In our opinion the search for the causes should begin with an answer to the question “how are the fluorine emissions developing at the aluminum plants?” As everyone knows, alumina—the raw material of aluminum—contains no fluorine. But the technology which nearly all plants use to dissolve the aluminum oxide (in the raw material) involves the reagent cryolite, which is obtained from fluorspar, one of the components of which is fluorine. This means that the cause is not in the initial raw material but in the damage to the environment caused by the technology being used for the production of aluminum and in a preconceived approach, which is doomed in advance to failure, to the resolution of the problem.

But scientists did make proposals on rendering the aluminum plant harmless. For example, in early 1987 after a television program, the staff members of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Production Forces came out with a proposal concerning the advisability of replacing cryolite with other active reagents and graphited carbon electrodes with electrodes made from a metallic alloy. This replacement would completely eliminate the discharge of fluorine and other harmful substances into the environment.

Of course, the authors of the proposal took account of the fact that the new technology would not be cheap for the ferrous metallurgy sector.

This was the answer from the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy: “Unfortunately, it is not possible at the present time to pose the question of the industrial introduction of these formulations in place of the existing method of aluminum production.”

It is clear that even in the period of perestroika, departmental arrogance still clings to life; efforts are being made to avoid vitally important facets of perestroika

and the acceleration of scientific and technical progress in ferrous metallurgy. But will they always succeed in this? And why are they ready to pay out tens of millions of rubles in compensation (just for the Tajik Aluminum Plant alone), if only they had substantiated the absolute amount of the damage in the beginning? Moreover, the Tajik metallurgists are willing to maintain at their own expense a monitoring laboratory which the environmental protection service of Uzbekistan is already establishing. And where does this generosity suddenly come from? Again the diseases from the period of stagnation are present: the adoption of half-way measures and measures which are doomed in advance to failure, as well as attempts to take the monitoring service under the industry's wing.

Why could not the ministry's representatives (without tying the the problem up in endless debates and without accusing the local soviets of every possible sin) channel these efforts into genuine perestroika and improving the technology of aluminum production?

And one last thing. If one is going to approach the Sariasiyevi drama from the positions of the article's authors, that is, to attempt to determine the exact amount of damage inflicted by the aluminum plant (although "...the conclusions are disheartening damage...is present"), then this procedure (assuming of course, that all the members of the commission have the necessary desire and understanding of the essence of the question) can be carried out in an expert manner.

And that is something to which the authors of this article could—and can—contribute, if the results of an expert evaluation serve as the basis for the adoption of an objective decision.

8541

UzSSR: Fines To Be Levied For Selling Contaminated Foodstuffs

*18300413b Tashkent PR 11 DA 1 OSTOKA in Russian
23 Jul 88 p 2*

[Ukase of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Introduction of Changes and Additions to the Uzbek SSR Code of Administrative Offenses, 21 July 1988]

[Text] The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves

—to introduce into the Uzbek SSR Code of Administrative Offenses adopted by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on 13 December 1985 (GAZETTE OF THE UZBEK SSR SUPREME SOVIET, 1985, 35, p 411), the following changes and additions:

1. Add to the code Article 1691 with the following content:

"Article 1691.

"The sale of agricultural products having a content of residual quantities of pesticides, mineral fertilizers and

other chemicals which is above the established maximum permissible levels—

"The sale at markets, trade enterprises and other places, of agricultural products known to contain accumulations of residual amounts of pesticides, mineral fertilizers and other chemical substances harmful to the health of the public and animals in amounts above the established maximum permissible levels—

"entails the imposition of a fine on citizens in the amount of 50 rubles and up to 100 rubles for officials. If the agricultural products in question cannot be used for cattle fodder or for other purposes, they are subject to non-reimbursable seizure from sovkhozes, kolkhozes and other state or cooperative enterprises and organizations and from citizens for the purpose of their subsequent destruction."

2. In the first part of Article 228 the numbers "168-170" should be replaced with the words

"168, 169, 1691 (if the given offense was not investigated by officials of the state public-health and veterinary inspectorate), 170."

3. Establish that protocols concerning the administrative offenses stipulated by Article 1691 are formulated by officials authorized to do so from the organs which perform the work of the state public-health and veterinary inspectorate, in accordance with their competence, as stipulated by the existing legislation.

Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, P. Khabibullayev, Secretary of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, L. Bekkulbekova

City of Tashkent 21 July 1988

8543

Officials Note Most Urgent Kirghiz Environmental Issues

*18300380a Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian
18 Jun 88 p 3*

[Kirghiz News Agency report: "The Riches of Issyk-Kul for All Times"]

[Text] An out-of-town meeting of the Commission on Environmental Protection and Efficient Use of Natural Resources of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, chaired by Deputy N. M. Chepelev, was held in the city of Cholpon-Ata. It was conducted jointly with the Commission on Environmental Protection of the Issyk-Kul Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and the editorial staff

of ISSYK-KULSKAYA PRAVDA. It discussed the question of the work of the local soviets of people's deputies of Issyk-Kul Oblast on observing the requirements of environmental protection in the Lake Issyk-Kul Basin.

The report by R. Beyshembayev, chairman of the Issyk-Kul Oblispolkom, the joint report of the deputy preparatory group given by Deputy N. Dzhapiyev, and reports from the deputies in the localities, heads of environmental monitoring bodies, and scientists noted that in recent years there had been increased attention to protecting land, water, air and animal and plant life in the oblast. New water treatment works are being put into operation; units for trapping harmful substances and dust given off into the air are being installed in a number of places; and a number of other steps are being taken to reduce the harmful effects on the environment of many factors occurring during the course of national economic activities.

At the same time, the meeting participants talked with concern about the unresolved problems of conserving, increasing and efficiently using natural resources. It was emphasized that the volume and tempo of conservation measures do not correspond to the scale of damage inflicted and the unfavorable trends in the condition of the environment. There are frequent cases of a consumer attitude towards nature and formal resolution of problems of preserving its riches. Thus, the ecological situation in the lake and in the area around it has markedly worsened as a result of stepped up economic activities in recent years. Due to the high load of livestock per unit of area, haphazard grazing and also violation of agricultural technology rules in farming, 80 percent of the plowed land and 10 percent of the pastures have been subjected to erosion. For this reason, their productivity has decreased sharply. In the last 30 years, the total area of forests has been cut in half just due to the excessive exploitation of large forests, chopping down of them and uncontrolled grazing of livestock. This, in turn, has resulted in a worsening of their natural ability to regenerate and a decrease in their water-conservation role. At the same time, underground waters continue to be pumped out actively, which leads to a decrease in reserves of the natural source of replenishment of the lake and the rivers replenishing it.

During the course of preparing for the meeting, 12 various violations of farming legislation were identified. For example, medical-sanitation complexes "cut" for themselves 457 hectares of land above the established norm. At the same time, 369 hectares were not retilled, including 167 hectares of plowed land. There are cases of arbitrary opening of quarries; organizations of the Ministry of Automobile Transportation and Highways particularly abuse this.

The problem of preventing contamination of the Issyk-Kul remains unresolved. There are a number of reasons. The sewage purification works at Cholpon-Ata and the purification works of the Rybachye and Przhevalsk meat-packing combines and the resort complex in the village of Kurskoye, Issyk-Kulskiy Rayon, are not working. Due to a large number of defects, the Ak-Suyskiy Central Rayon Hospital's purification works have been operating inefficiently for 3 years. The problem of the final disposal of waste water from the purification works of the Murok Resort Hotel of the republic's Ministry of Land Improvement and Water Conservation has not been resolved. The resort hotels Nur, Berezka, Romashka, Zhemchuzhina, and Priboy and eight Young Pioneer camps do not have purification works at all.

As a result of poor monitoring on the part of ispolkoms of local soviets and irresponsibility of facility administrators, dozens of livestock farms, bathhouses, warehouses, fuel and lubricants, mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals are located in the immediate proximity of the lake. For example, bathhouses of the Ala-Too Kolkhoz of Dzhety-Oguzskiy Rayon are located 1.5 meters from a stream which feeds into the lake. Ten sheepyards of the Byuru-Bash Sovkhoz of Ak-Suyskiy Rayon are situated on the banks of the Dzhergalan River. Three sheepyards of the state pedigree horse-breeding farm, a dairy farm and a number of sheepyards of the Sovkhoz imeni Lenin, and the Novaya Zhizn and Pervoye Maya sovkhozes of Issyk-Kulskiy Rayon are in immediate proximity of the lake. During rains, all the mud and liquid manure from them feed directly into the lake. As a result, more than 11,000 cubic meters of sewage are discharged into the reservoirs each day.

The fact that 31 of the 64 warehouses for storing mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals in the oblast do not meet environmental safety requirements also is also having a destructive effect on the sanitary condition of the basin. The Sovkhoz imeni Karl Marx, the Sovkhoz imeni Frunze, the Tamchi and Uryukty sovkhozes of Issyk-Kulskiy Rayon, the Altyn-Bulak Sovkhoz of Tonskiy Rayon, and the Arashan Sovkhoz of Ak-Suyskiy Rayon have not warehouses at all. For this reason, mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals are stored under the open sky, get into the soil and ground waters, and contaminate the lake.

The Pokrovskiy and Grigoryevskiy bulk plants located in the zone near shores of the Issyk-Kul are inflicting serious damage on nature.

The lack of dust and gas collectors on almost all boiler plants of the oblast is totally intolerable. Enterprises of Przhevalsk alone discharge about 5,000 tons of hazardous substances into the atmosphere annually. Motor transport accounts for nearly half of the total discharge. Motor transport enterprises and the State Motor Vehicle Inspection Service have not provided a sufficient amount of control and measuring instruments for determining the content of carbon monoxide in exhaust gases

and, apparently, are not concerned about questions of preserving the purity of air. As a result, motor vehicles with faulty fuel equipment are being used without control on the roads of the oblast, and the carbon monoxide content and smoke in the air remain high.

The problem of ensuring protection of flora and fauna remains unresolved. Irreparable damage has been inflicted on nature due to the good-natured attitude of local authorities toward violators of hunting and fishing rules and insufficient support of controlling agencies and inspectorates in putting an end to illegal actions of poachers. Damage inflicted on the animal and plant world of the oblast amounts to more than 200,000 rubles in just the last 2.5 years.

All this has become possible because local soviets overlook environmental protection work and ecological problems are rarely discussed at meetings of ispolkoms and standing committees. The decisions being made are distinguished by formalism and vagueness, and there is no proper monitoring of their fulfillment.

Due to the lack of resources, many problems of protecting and increasing natural resources remain unresolved. It has been proposed to study the question of opening in the resort area trolley bus traffic and building gas stations and electric boiler plants in Przhevalsk, Rybache and Cholpon-Ata. It has been suggested to organize a number of preserves, game refuges and nature parks which would make it possible to preserve and increase the riches of flora and fauna of the Issyk-Kul region.

Based on the results of discussions, the deputies have developed specific recommendations aimed at improving environmental protection activities in the Lake Issyk-Kul basin.

The secretary of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, A. Myrzaliyeva, participated in the work of the meeting.

12567

Scientist Reviews Lake Baykal Environmental Improvement Progress

18300380b Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Jun 88 p 2

[Interview with G. Filshin, economist-scientist, by S. Karkhanin: "Lake Baykal A Year Later"]

[Text] The report published the other day about the routine dumping of industrial discharge into the waters of the Lake Baykal caused a wave of comments from our readers. The letters contained questions about how the party and governmental resolution adopted 1 year ago on preserving the unique lake was being carried out.

A council of scientists and specialists set up under the office of the correspondent of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Irkutsk is monitoring its fulfillment. One of the members of the council is G. Filshin, department head of the Economics Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He participated in preparing the draft general concept of development of productive forces in the Baykal region. The basic provisions of this draft were recently approved by the commission of the USSR Council of Ministers and will soon be the guiding document for economic bodies.

[Question] Gennadiy Innokentyevich, the fate of the entire natural complex of the lake depends directly on the state of existing and future enterprises in Lake Baykal's zone of influence. What has the development of the concept shown?

[Answer] In our view, it has become an event, in the sense that it convincingly demonstrates that economic and ecological goals can be combined, despite the misconception that has existed for a long time. Scientists of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Gosplan Council for Studying Productive Forces created the concept together, and there was complete unanimity between the two sides. The main thing is that we examined all economic proposals with an orientation towards precisely the ecological result. It seems that this new approach, outlined by the resolution, has good prospects. This methodology, necessary under conditions of efficient economic management, can also be used in the future in other regions where ecological problems have been unjustifiably relegated to the background.

Nevertheless, there is something to ponder. The attempt to compile ecological certificates at several paper and pulp, chemical, and wood-working plants of the Baykal region has shown that ministries and sectorial institutes are not yet prepared for this. Proposals for the concept, taking into account the ecological factor, have still not been submitted by 10 of the 17 major ministries, including the Ministry of the Timber, Pulp-and-Paper, and Wood-Working Industry [Minlesbumprom], the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and the Ministry of the Oil-Refining and Petrochemical Industry, although they were supposed to have been prepared by 1 October of last year. The USSR Gosplan tried to intervene: It gathered together representatives of the ministries three times and sent threatening letters to the ministers... All without results.

[Question] If ecology and economics are linked via technology, is it not obvious that the 70,000 tons of hazardous waste which are driven to the Baykal via the "air bridge" from the Angara-Cheremkhovo Industrial Center are the result of technical backwardness?

[Answer] That's just the point. And it is alarming that only one out of every 12 enterprises could compare in general with the world level; construction, agro-industrial and service sector enterprises appeared particularly

hopeless. An analysis showed that 97 percent of the developments compiled for the distant future do not contain comparisons with the world level. Another extremely alarming aspect is that we have begun stepping up deliveries to Siberia of dismantled equipment removed from "operation" at plants in the center of Russia. Most of the proposals for fundamental technical re-equipping of enterprises in the Baykal region are being postponed to the 13th Five-Year Plan due to shortages in equipment deliveries.

Worn equipment cannot be operated without hazardous waste being discharged into the air and water basin. This is one of the fundamental conclusions of the general concept. I had the opportunity to participate in preparing the draft as part of the USSR Gosplan working group. And we stated in concert the inability of the ministries to resolve technological problems.

We must force these ministries to carry out their tasks or adopt experience from abroad. There they have a widely developed system of regional scientific and technical centers which provide enterprises on their territory with advanced technologies. Thus, our draft concept contains the idea of creating in the Baykal region an intersectorial center of ecological instrument building. The Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences has assumed the initiative. Together with machine building departments, it will prepare the appropriate proposals already this year. After all, instruments are needed to monitor the ecological situation. In addition, refresher training of engineers and practical work by students and graduate students may be organized. We do not yet have anything similar to such a center in our country.

[Question] As we all remember, debates arose over certain points in the resolution. Such was the case with the notorious "pipe," about which SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA wrote many times. This was the planned pipeline for discharging waste water from the Baykal Combine into the Irkut River. Public opinion was persistently opposed to this...

[Answer] The decision has been made to rescind the paragraph on the "pipe." But a problem arose here: the question of gradually withdrawing the capacities of the pulp and paper combine from the shore became twice as acute. You see, everything that the Baykal Pulp and Paper Combine discharges, it still discharges into the Baykal... Emergency disposal is also continuing. In our opinion, what is most alarming is that the Minlesbumprom does not intend to regrade the enterprise on the schedule called for by the resolution, that is, before 1993. This follows primarily from the ministry's attitude toward construction of compensating capacities for pulp production in the Ust-Ilimsk area. The volume of planned construction and assembly work for this year has been reduced by 20 million rubles compared to last year.

How is the facility at Ust-Ilimsk being erected? Essentially, there is design documentation only for the zero cycle. It is not yet known what technology will be used at this enterprise. Although no serious development of design and construction work will be accomplished in the current 5-year plan, some things also will not be able to be done in the next one either: we will let time slip by.

How can we compensate for the capacities which must be removed from the Baykal? There is an idea to replace them with operating enterprises, including the Bratsk Timber-Industrial Complex, which is now being modernized. According to data from the USSR Gosplan Council for Studying Productive Forces, according to the balance of the national economy's requirements for cord pulp, the Bratsk Complex completely satisfies the current and future demand, counting exports. It is a different matter with soluble rayon cellulose, part of which the Baykal Combine provides on the basis of so-called "cold refining." But with the modernization of the Bratsk Complex, judging from estimates of the State Institute for Planning of Pulp and Paper Industry Establishments in Siberia and the Far East [Sibgiprobum], it could be possible to create these capacities there. Doing so would require small expenditures.

[Question] But all the same, is it clear when the pulp capacities will be moved from the Baykal?

[Answer] The Siberian scientists do not know the schedule.

[Question] An important point of the resolution was converting the Baykal Heat and Electric Power Plant (TETs) to an electric boiler plant. Anyone who has traveled around Baykal remembers the black smoke hanging over the lake...

[Answer] The heat and electric power plant is also smoking now as before, and as before the trees on the shore are drying up and dying. We believe it is necessary immediately to begin solving the problem of using non-sulfurous fuel oil for the plant. This will not be very expensive, but will be a very effective measure for protecting the air basin of the Baykal above the slopes of the Khamar-Daban, that is, in the most vulnerable spot. Compared to those costs which the ministry was willing to carry for construction of the "pipe," the cost of switching the TETs to fuel oil is meager. It is significant that the Minlesbumprom states it is ready to carry out this work, but believes that local agencies should be the first to show initiative. True, perhaps that does make some sense.

[Question] Up to this point we have been talking about the problems existing on the Irkutsk side of the Baykal. What is the situation on the section of the coastline belonging to Buryatia?

[Answer] In our opinion, the situation there is even more complex. Proposals for technical re-equipping of enterprises of the Ulan-Ude Industrial Center are being implemented very slowly. What is being done for the Seleginsk Cardboard and Pulp Combine is not enough: almost everyone is sure that it is impossible to introduce a reverse cycle there.... And the combine continues to operate as it did in the past. It seems to us that the problem of its regrading can also be resolved, and done so in an economically efficient manner. There is no doubt that it is practicable to withdraw from the Baykal zone those enterprises whose technology still does not make it possible to reduce substantially the amount of hazardous waste dumped into the river. This involves the primary wool processing mill and the locomotive repair plant with its electroplating shop. At one time these problems really concerned many, but now they have somehow been forgotten, and for no reason. Let us remember that at least half of all waste comes into the Baykal via the Selenga River.

[Question] At one time it was believed that a national park on the shores of the lake would help resolve almost all its problems. But the activities of the recently created park are continually encountering difficulties. Why?

[Answer] Probably, the main reason is that we do not have experience in forming such parks. And it turned out that by including the park in the system of the Ministry of Forestry, we linked it to the production plan. There are no guarantees that "cutting to maintain the forest" will not develop into logging... That is why we support the idea of transferring the Baykal Park to the State Committee for the Protection of Nature and making it a model park.

[Question] What is your attitude towards the project of building a tourist and health complex on the shore with the aid of Japanese specialists? This project is viewed differently...

[Answer] I do not believe there is anything to worry about here. In developing tourism, two problems can be solved immediately: attracting currency and acquiring experience in building and operating such installations. The Japanese know how to work ecologically so that the environment of the Baykal will not be harmed.

[Question] If you summarize, in your opinion, what are the major proposals in the resolution which can help improve the ecological situation on Lake Baykal?

[Answer] First of all, to establish for the enterprises of this region a special, sparing regime of economic management, at least until the end of the century. Further, to introduce a system of strict sanctions for damage to the environment, and these sanctions should be most severe. The sum of fines should be added to the Baykal fund. Incidentally, this idea is also in the concept. A special fund for the Baykal is needed; it can be formed through deductions from the enterprises and voluntary contributions from organizations, including international ones, and from individual citizens. But the main thing, I repeat, is that we need a conscientious movement toward ecologically clean production facilities which recycle waste based on modern technology. The method of drawing in more and more resources, including natural resources, which emerged during the famous times of stagnation, has become obsolete; it is also economically inefficient. Let us say that to build devices to recover fluorine from the smoke and then erect a plant next to it to produce fluorine—what can be worse mismanagement? That is why in protecting the Baykal we will also save for the people not only a unique natural complex, but also tremendous resources.

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